HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 AUSTIN MARLER, Case No. 2:24-cv-1221-RAJ
11 Plaintiff, ORDER
12 v.
13 RENTON REGIONAL FIRE AUTHORITY, and SOUTH KING 14 COUNTY FIRE TRAINING CONSORTIUM, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Austin Marler’s motion for 20 leave to amend, dkt. # 24. The Court has reviewed the motion, the submissions in support 21 of and in opposition to the motion, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set 22 forth below, the Court GRANTS Mr. Marler’s motion. 23 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 24 Mr. Marler was a probationary firefighter for Defendant Renton Regional Fire 25 Authority (“Renton Fire”). He alleges Renton Fire and other defendants discriminated 26 1 against him and wrongfully terminated him based on his Tourette Syndrome, and brought 2 claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Washington Law Against 3 Discrimination (“WLAD”). Dkt. # 1. On October 15, 2024, Renton Fire moved to 4 dismiss Mr. Marler’s complaint. Dkt. # 12. On July 25, 2025, the Court granted in part 5 and denied in part Renton Fire’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 22. The Court held Renton 6 Fire failed to meet its burden of showing it is entitled to sovereign immunity for Mr. 7 Marler’s ADA claims, but agreed that Mr. Marler’s WLAD claims should be dismissed 8 because he failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit claim requirement of RCW 9 4.96.020. Id. Due to RCW 4.96.020’s 60-day notice requirement, the Court did not set 10 a deadline for Mr. Marler to file his amended complaint and instead invited Mr. Marler 11 to seek consent or leave to amend once he satisfied the statutory pre-suit requirement. Id. 12 On August 8, 2025, Mr. Marler filed this motion, seeking leave to file an amended 13 complaint that “mainly cures the deficiency found by this Court” as to Mr. Marler’s 14 WLAD claims. Dkt. # 24 at 4; Dkt. # 25-3 at 4–14. Mr. Marler states that in April 2025, 15 while Renton Fire’s motion to dismiss was pending, he served administrative tort claim 16 forms on all defendants, thereby satisfying the pre-suit claim requirement under RCW 17 4.96.020. Dkt. # 24 at 2; Dkt. # 25-1 at 1–19. Mr. Marler’s proposed amended complaint 18 also contains other amendments, including the addition of new defendants, which Renton 19 Fire does not oppose in its response brief. Dkt. # 24 at 4; Dkt. # 25-3 at 4–14; Dkt. # 28. 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 After the time for amending a pleading as a matter of course has passed, “a party 22 may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s 23 leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so 24 requires.” Id. “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, 25 LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotes omitted). 26 1 In considering whether to grant leave to amend, courts consider the following 2 Foman factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to 3 cure deficiencies by amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) 4 futility of amendment. Id. at 1051–52 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 5 Of these factors, “prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight.” Id. 6 “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there 7 exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (emphasis 8 in original). “The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing that 9 amendment is not warranted.” Bio Energy (Washington), LLC v. King County, 10 Washington, No. 23-cv-542, 2024 WL 1974340, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2024). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 A. Leave to Amend WLAD Claims 13 Renton Fire argues the Court should not grant Mr. Marler leave to amend his 14 WLAD claims because Mr. Marler still has not substantially complied with the pre-suit 15 claim requirement under RCW 4.96.020 and thus amendment is futile. Dkt. # 28 at 5–7. 16 Specifically, Renton Fire argues the April 2025 claim form Mr. Marler submitted (1) “did 17 not give [Mr. Marler’s] own contact information or identify his residential address”; (2) 18 “did not give contact information for all persons involved in his claim or with knowledge 19 thereof”; and (3) “indicated three separate potential amounts for the damages he seeks.” 20 Id. Renton Fire does not address any other Foman factor, including, most significantly, 21 prejudice to the opposing party. 22 “Denial of leave to amend due to futility is rare, and district courts ordinarily defer 23 consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave 24 to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Bio Energy, 2024 WL 1974340, 25 at *4 (quotes omitted). “Thus, leave to amend should be denied only if it is beyond doubt 26 1 that the proposed amended pleading would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a 2 claim.” Id. 3 The Court does not find it is “beyond doubt” that Mr. Marler’s WLAD claims will 4 be subject to dismissal again. As explained in the Court’s prior order, RCW 4.96.020 5 requires only “substantial compliance” with pre-suit claim procedures. RCW 6 4.96.020(5). Substantial compliance is met when parties follow a statute in a way that 7 satisfies the “intent for which the statute was adopted.” Lee v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 335 8 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). “The purpose of claim filing statutes is to allow 9 government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims.” Id. (quotes omitted). 10 “[E]xact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information 11 to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents.” Renner v. City of 12 Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571 (Wash. 2010). 13 Mr. Marler presents evidence that in April 2025, he provided Renton Fire and 14 other defendants with a “standard tort claim form,” along with a cover letter providing 15 additional information about his claims, and attaching the then-operative complaint in 16 this case. Dkt. # 25-1 at 1–19. Based on the record and arguments currently before the 17 Court, it appears likely that that these documents were sufficient to place Renton Fire on 18 notice of Mr. Marler’s claims and his intent to sue, thus satisfying the substantial 19 compliance requirement. While Renton Fire argues Mr. Marler did not strictly satisfy all 20 statutory requirements, that is not the standard. See Renner, 230 P.3d at 572 (finding 21 claim form was substantially compliant because it gave defendants “the information 22 necessary to fully investigate [plaintiff] and his claim”); Miller v. Sawant, No. 18-506, 23 2022 WL 2718059, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2022) (finding claim form was 24 substantially compliant where it “refers to the filings in the state court action Plaintiffs 25 26 1 had commenced, and it provided counsel as the contact should [defendant] have sought 2 any additional information about the Plaintiffs”).
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HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 AUSTIN MARLER, Case No. 2:24-cv-1221-RAJ
11 Plaintiff, ORDER
12 v.
13 RENTON REGIONAL FIRE AUTHORITY, and SOUTH KING 14 COUNTY FIRE TRAINING CONSORTIUM, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Austin Marler’s motion for 20 leave to amend, dkt. # 24. The Court has reviewed the motion, the submissions in support 21 of and in opposition to the motion, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set 22 forth below, the Court GRANTS Mr. Marler’s motion. 23 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 24 Mr. Marler was a probationary firefighter for Defendant Renton Regional Fire 25 Authority (“Renton Fire”). He alleges Renton Fire and other defendants discriminated 26 1 against him and wrongfully terminated him based on his Tourette Syndrome, and brought 2 claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Washington Law Against 3 Discrimination (“WLAD”). Dkt. # 1. On October 15, 2024, Renton Fire moved to 4 dismiss Mr. Marler’s complaint. Dkt. # 12. On July 25, 2025, the Court granted in part 5 and denied in part Renton Fire’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 22. The Court held Renton 6 Fire failed to meet its burden of showing it is entitled to sovereign immunity for Mr. 7 Marler’s ADA claims, but agreed that Mr. Marler’s WLAD claims should be dismissed 8 because he failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit claim requirement of RCW 9 4.96.020. Id. Due to RCW 4.96.020’s 60-day notice requirement, the Court did not set 10 a deadline for Mr. Marler to file his amended complaint and instead invited Mr. Marler 11 to seek consent or leave to amend once he satisfied the statutory pre-suit requirement. Id. 12 On August 8, 2025, Mr. Marler filed this motion, seeking leave to file an amended 13 complaint that “mainly cures the deficiency found by this Court” as to Mr. Marler’s 14 WLAD claims. Dkt. # 24 at 4; Dkt. # 25-3 at 4–14. Mr. Marler states that in April 2025, 15 while Renton Fire’s motion to dismiss was pending, he served administrative tort claim 16 forms on all defendants, thereby satisfying the pre-suit claim requirement under RCW 17 4.96.020. Dkt. # 24 at 2; Dkt. # 25-1 at 1–19. Mr. Marler’s proposed amended complaint 18 also contains other amendments, including the addition of new defendants, which Renton 19 Fire does not oppose in its response brief. Dkt. # 24 at 4; Dkt. # 25-3 at 4–14; Dkt. # 28. 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 After the time for amending a pleading as a matter of course has passed, “a party 22 may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s 23 leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so 24 requires.” Id. “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, 25 LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotes omitted). 26 1 In considering whether to grant leave to amend, courts consider the following 2 Foman factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to 3 cure deficiencies by amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) 4 futility of amendment. Id. at 1051–52 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 5 Of these factors, “prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight.” Id. 6 “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there 7 exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (emphasis 8 in original). “The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing that 9 amendment is not warranted.” Bio Energy (Washington), LLC v. King County, 10 Washington, No. 23-cv-542, 2024 WL 1974340, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2024). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 A. Leave to Amend WLAD Claims 13 Renton Fire argues the Court should not grant Mr. Marler leave to amend his 14 WLAD claims because Mr. Marler still has not substantially complied with the pre-suit 15 claim requirement under RCW 4.96.020 and thus amendment is futile. Dkt. # 28 at 5–7. 16 Specifically, Renton Fire argues the April 2025 claim form Mr. Marler submitted (1) “did 17 not give [Mr. Marler’s] own contact information or identify his residential address”; (2) 18 “did not give contact information for all persons involved in his claim or with knowledge 19 thereof”; and (3) “indicated three separate potential amounts for the damages he seeks.” 20 Id. Renton Fire does not address any other Foman factor, including, most significantly, 21 prejudice to the opposing party. 22 “Denial of leave to amend due to futility is rare, and district courts ordinarily defer 23 consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave 24 to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Bio Energy, 2024 WL 1974340, 25 at *4 (quotes omitted). “Thus, leave to amend should be denied only if it is beyond doubt 26 1 that the proposed amended pleading would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a 2 claim.” Id. 3 The Court does not find it is “beyond doubt” that Mr. Marler’s WLAD claims will 4 be subject to dismissal again. As explained in the Court’s prior order, RCW 4.96.020 5 requires only “substantial compliance” with pre-suit claim procedures. RCW 6 4.96.020(5). Substantial compliance is met when parties follow a statute in a way that 7 satisfies the “intent for which the statute was adopted.” Lee v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 335 8 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). “The purpose of claim filing statutes is to allow 9 government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims.” Id. (quotes omitted). 10 “[E]xact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information 11 to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents.” Renner v. City of 12 Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571 (Wash. 2010). 13 Mr. Marler presents evidence that in April 2025, he provided Renton Fire and 14 other defendants with a “standard tort claim form,” along with a cover letter providing 15 additional information about his claims, and attaching the then-operative complaint in 16 this case. Dkt. # 25-1 at 1–19. Based on the record and arguments currently before the 17 Court, it appears likely that that these documents were sufficient to place Renton Fire on 18 notice of Mr. Marler’s claims and his intent to sue, thus satisfying the substantial 19 compliance requirement. While Renton Fire argues Mr. Marler did not strictly satisfy all 20 statutory requirements, that is not the standard. See Renner, 230 P.3d at 572 (finding 21 claim form was substantially compliant because it gave defendants “the information 22 necessary to fully investigate [plaintiff] and his claim”); Miller v. Sawant, No. 18-506, 23 2022 WL 2718059, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2022) (finding claim form was 24 substantially compliant where it “refers to the filings in the state court action Plaintiffs 25 26 1 had commenced, and it provided counsel as the contact should [defendant] have sought 2 any additional information about the Plaintiffs”). 3 Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Renton Fire’s contention that Mr. 4 Marler’s claim form included inconsistent statements of his alleged damages. Mr. 5 Marler’s cover letter included a minimum settlement amount he would consider, the 6 claim form left blank the amount of damages Mr. Marler seeks, and the attached 7 complaint listed categories of Mr. Marler’s damages. Dkt. # 25-1 at 3, 6, 15. These are 8 fully consistent with each other. Mr. Marler’s complaint listed the categories of damages 9 he seeks, which is all that is required to substantially comply with RCW 4.96.020. See 10 Renner, 230 P.3d at 572 (“Because the number a claimant provides is perhaps likely to 11 change as the case progresses, an accurate and complete description of the damages— 12 instead of a number—will often supply the information and notice required by the claim 13 filing statute.”). Mr. Marler left the exact damages amount blank on the claim form 14 because under Renner, he is not required to provide an exact number. Finally, Mr. 15 Marler’s statement regarding a minimum settlement amount is just that—an indication 16 of what he will accept to settle. It does not contradict the complaint’s description of 17 damages or otherwise bring his claim form out of substantial compliance. 18 In sum, Renton Fire fails to show amendment is futile, and fails to address any 19 other Foman factor including, most significantly, prejudice to the opposing party. This 20 falls far short of overcoming the liberal policy in favor of amendment. 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 B. Arguments Regarding ADA Claims and Sovereign Immunity 2 Renton Fire further argues Mr. Marler’s ADA claims are futile and raises new 3 arguments regarding why Renton Fire is entitled to sovereign immunity.1 These 4 arguments are not properly before this Court. The Court’s prior order denied Renton 5 Fire’s motion to dismiss Mr. Marler’s ADA claims and thus left those claims intact. Dkt. 6 # 22. Accordingly, Mr. Marler is not seeking leave to amend his ADA claims, and any 7 arguments regarding the viability of those claims are not a proper basis to deny the 8 currently pending motion. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 11 amend, dkt. # 24. Plaintiff may file his amended complaint within 14 days of the date of 12 this order. 13 14 Dated this 5th day of September, 2025. 15
16 A
17 18 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 19
20 21 22
23 1 The Court’s prior order found neither party addressed sovereign immunity under the applicable test set out in Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2023), 24 and therefore as the party asserting immunity, Renton Fire failed to meet its burden. Dkt. 25 # 22. Renton Fire now seeks to address the Kohn factors in its response brief to Mr. Marler’s motion for leave to amend. 26