Marlene Mitchell v. Tarrant County Court at Law 1

Opinion

Case: 18-11282 Document: 00514972592 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/28/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

No. 18-11282

Fifth Circuit

FILED

Summary Calendar May 28, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce

MARLENE WEAVER MITCHELL, Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

TARRANT COUNTY COURT AT LAW #1,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:18-CV-563

Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* After losing a forcible detainer proceeding brought against her, Marlene Mitchell sued the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, Texas. She alleged that the County Court mishandled various financial instruments she submitted—amounting, in her eyes, to a violation of federal law. The district

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 18-11282 Document: 00514972592 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/28/2019

No. 18-11282

court dismissed her claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, concluding that Mitchell was merely attempting to relitigate her loss in state court.

“[W]e may ‘affirm on any ground supported by the record, including one not reached by the district court.’” Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ballew v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012)). The district court did not lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Mitchell is seeking relief that the County Court could not have granted—title to the foreclosed property. See, e.g., Chambers v. Pruitt, 241 S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). But, because her claims seem to rely solely on the legally unfounded “redemptionist theory,” we conclude that her claims fail on the merits. Cf. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining the “redemptionist theory”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal because Mitchell “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).