Marlene Abrams v. Marlene R. Abrams

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided November 17, 2022·No. CB-7521-15-0031-T-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARLENE R. ABRAMS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CB-7521-15-0031-T-1

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY DATE: November 17, 2022 ADMINISTRATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Marlene R. Abrams, Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

Patrick W. Carlson, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

Sharese M. Reyes, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant, an administrative law judge (ALJ), has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The Social Security Administration (SSA) filed two complaints with the Board, seeking to suspend and remove the appellant, respectively, from her ALJ position based on charges of failure to follow instructions, unacceptable docket management, neglect of duties, and medical inability to pe rform, and the appellant raised affirmative defenses of disability discrimination in both matters. 2 Social Security Administration v. Abrams, MSPB Docket Nos. CB-7521-13-0008-T-1, CB-7521-14-0004-T-1. In February 2013, during

2 The ALJ assigned to adjudicate these matters joined the appeals and found that SSA proved the charges of unacceptable docket management and medical inability to perform, that the appellant, who was the respondent in those matters, did not prove her affirmative defenses of disability discrimination, and that SSA had good cause to remove her. Social Security Administration v. Abrams, MSPB Docket Nos. CB-7521- 13-0008-T-1, CB-7521-14-0004-T-1, Initial Decision (Apr. 12, 2016). Ms. Abrams and SSA have filed a petition for review and a cross petition for review, respectively , of the initial decision. Those matters are currently pending before the Board, and we will address the arguments contained therein in a separate decision. 3

the pendency of the first Board appeal, the appellant contacted an equal employment opportunity (EEO) counselor to report discrimination based on disability, religion, and harassment, among other things. Social Security Administration v. Abrams, MSPB Docket No. CB-7521-15-0031-T-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 18-34. The appellant subsequently filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging discrimination based on disability, religion, and a hostile work environment. Id. at 6-14. On August 25, 2014, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative judge dismissed the appellant’s discrimination complaint “with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction as a mixed case” due to the pending Board matters and ordered SSA to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 35-39. On February 9, 2015, 3 SSA issued a final agency decision (FAD) on the appellant’s discrimination complaint, finding that SSA did not discriminate against her based on disability, religion, or reprisal. Id. at 56-103. ¶3 On April 20, 2015, SSA rescinded the FAD because it did not comply with the administrative judge’s order and it gave the appellant incorrect appeal rights. Id. at 107. SSA reissued the FAD on the same date. Id. at 107-14. The reissued FAD dismissed the appellant’s discrimination complaint “because the same matter was first raised before the MSPB.” Id. at 112 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(4)). The reissued FAD noted that the appellant could file an appeal with the Board or a civil action in a U.S. district court. IAF, Tab 6 at 112. ¶4 In May 2015, the appellant filed a submission with the Board, entitled “Notice of Appeal,” which we construed as an appeal of the reissued FAD. IAF, Tab 1. The ALJ issued an initial decision in which he dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant did not have the right to appeal the FAD to the Board. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant has filed a 3 It appears that the final agency decision was mistakenly dated February 9, 2014. IAF, Tab 6 at 56. 4

petition for review, SSA has filed a response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3, 7-8.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As noted above, the appellant raised claims of disability discrimination in the other pending Board ap peals. She has not cited on review, nor are we aware of, any source of Board jurisdiction over SSA’s dismissal of her discrimination complaint as a mixed case under these circumstances. See, e.g., Social Security Administration v. Harty, 96 M.S.P.R. 65, ¶¶ 15-16 (2004) (finding that the respondent did not have Board appeal rights from SSA’s decision to dismiss his discrimination complaints because he elected the Board as his preferred forum for evaluating his discrimination claims). Even though the FAD advised the appellant that she could appeal the dismissal of her complaint to the Board, this error does not confer Board jurisdiction over this appeal. Jundt v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 688, ¶ 2 n.2 (2010); Scott v. Department of the Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 9 (2010). Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Marlene Abrams v. Marlene R. Abrams, (Miss. 2022).

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