Marlen Santos-Cabrera v. Jefferson Sessions
This text of Marlen Santos-Cabrera v. Jefferson Sessions (Marlen Santos-Cabrera v. Jefferson Sessions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLEN SUYAPA SANTOS-CABRERA, No. 16-71117 AKA Maria Gonzalez-Pacheco, Agency No. A098-589-470 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Marlen Suyapa Santos-Cabrera, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from
an immigration judge’s order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings
conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo
questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005).
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Santos-Cabrera’s motion
to reopen as untimely, where she filed the motion nearly nine years after her in
absentia removal order, and has not demonstrated that any exception to the filing
deadlines are applicable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), (c)(7)(C)(i).
We reject Santos-Cabrera’s contentions that the agency failed to sufficiently
consider evidence and arguments, properly consider all factors, or insufficiently
explained its decision. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010)
(agency need not write an exegesis on every contention); Fernandez v. Gonzales,
439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did not overcome the presumption
that the BIA did review the record).
Santos-Cabrera’s contention that the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is unconstitutional lacks merit. See Jimenez-
Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2002) (limitations by country
of origin on the availability of special rule cancellation of removal do not violate
equal protection).
To the extent Santos-Cabrera challenges the agency’s discretionary decision
not to reopen proceedings sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review this
2 16-71117 determination absent a claim of legal or constitutional error. See Bonilla v. Lynch,
840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has jurisdiction to review Board
decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the limited purpose of reviewing the
reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional error.”).
Because the untimeliness determination is dispositive, we do not reach
Santos-Cabrera’s remaining contentions regarding eligibility for relief. See
Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
3 16-71117
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Marlen Santos-Cabrera v. Jefferson Sessions, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marlen-santos-cabrera-v-jefferson-sessions-ca9-2018.