Markowitz v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 25-1747
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILIP MARKOWITZ, No. 25-1747 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-06528-ODW-MRW v. MEMORANDUM*

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a National Banking Association; CLAIR DAWSON, an individual; DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 20, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO, District Judge.***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. Philip Markowitz brought this action asserting various tort claims against

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) after the bank froze his account and, for

several months, refused to allow him to withdraw funds from two checks he

deposited in the account. The district court granted summary judgment to Chase on

Markowitz’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive

damages. The district court’s summary-judgment order also limited the time period

for which Markowitz could recover on his claims for conversion and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, which were tried to a jury. Markowitz now appeals.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Yonay v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 163 F.4th 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2026). We review the

district court’s decisions about the scope of cross-examination for abuse of

discretion. Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir.

2005).

1. The district court correctly granted partial summary judgment to Chase on

the conversion claim. The court held that Chase was entitled to summary judgment

for claims based on its conduct through December 8, 2023, when Chase

established that the two checks from SureTec Insurance Co. (SureTec) that

Markowitz deposited were genuine.

2 25-1747 An element of the California tort of conversion is “the defendant’s

conversion by a wrongful act” of plaintiff’s property. Lee v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334,

344 (Cal. 2015) (quoting Welco Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 881

(Ct. App. 2014)). The terms of Markowitz’s account authorized Chase to freeze the

account “pending investigation.” There is no genuine dispute that Chase was

conducting an investigation until December 8, so it was entitled to freeze the

account until then—preventing there from being any wrongful act during that

period. Chase was concerned because the deposit involved two checks from the

same issuer, “the deposit was out of pattern,” and the typeface on the checks

appeared irregular, all of which led Chase to suspect that the payee name on the

checks may have been altered. Chase actively, though intermittently, tried to reach

SureTec from May until December to verify the checks. In May, Chase tried to call

SureTec, but “there was no active phone number on the checks and the paying

bank would not verify with third parties.” Markowitz filed this action in early July,

and between July and December, Chase’s litigation department tried, through

counsel, to obtain SureTec’s contact information from Markowitz. Although

Markowitz had emailed SureTec in April about SureTec’s forthcoming payment to

him, he did not disclose the contact to Chase until much later. Chase eventually

wrote to two law firms that had represented SureTec in unrelated litigation and

asked SureTec, through those attorneys, to confirm that the checks were genuine.

3 25-1747 Markowitz’s challenges to the district court’s interpretation of the evidence do not

alter the fact that Chase made ongoing efforts to reach SureTec until it verified the

checks in December.

2. Markowitz’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arises

from the same facts as his conversion claim, so we affirm the district court’s grant

of partial summary judgment limiting that claim to the period after Chase verified

the checks on December 8.

3. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Markowitz’s

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. California recognizes a cause

of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on “extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress.” Hughes v. Pair, 209

P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863

P.2d 795, 819 (Cal. 1993)). Only conduct so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of

that usually tolerated in a civilized community” gives rise to a claim. Id. (quoting

Potter, 863 P.2d at 819).

The district court correctly held that the summary-judgment evidence could

not support an inference that Chase’s actions were “calculated to cause . . . severe

emotional distress” or were taken with the knowledge that “severe emotional

injury” was a “substantial certainty.” Christensen v. Superior Ct., 820 P.2d 181,

4 25-1747 204 (Cal. 1991). The evidence presented to the district court also does not describe

conduct severe and outrageous enough to support Markowitz’s argument that

Chase’s actions could “only be explained” as the tortious infliction of emotional

distress.

4. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Markowitz’s

claim for punitive damages for conversion. “Punitive damages are permissible

under California law when there is ‘clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.’” Hardeman v.

Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941, 971 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code

§ 3294(a)). For corporate defendants, a plaintiff must show “the advance

knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, [or] ratification” of the

oppressive acts by “an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b).

Markowitz contends that Kevin Kesterson, a Chase Vice President, ratified

Chase’s conversion of his funds. But Kesterson was responsible for the fraud

department, and Chase transferred the SureTec check investigation from the fraud

department to the litigation department when Markowitz filed suit in July. The

district court therefore correctly determined that Kesterson did not ratify any

actions relating to the funds taken after December 8.

5 25-1747 5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Chase to cross-

examine Markowitz about, for example, the people and events at issue in other

actions in which Markowitz sought damages for emotional distress. The cross-

examination was relevant to the issue of causation. See Huggins v. Longs Drug

Stores Cal., Inc., 862 P.2d 148, 151 (Cal. 1993); Fed. R. Evid. 402. Markowitz

“broke down on the stand” while testifying that Chase’s withholding of his funds

caused him anxiety, depression, and other serious emotional injuries. The district

court recognized that because Markowitz had “made claims against others for his

emotional distress” during the relevant time period, Markowitz’s causation

evidence would have to show “a distinction between the emotional distress caused

by all of these disparate events.” The limited cross-examination the court

authorized was necessary “to rebut any false impression that might have resulted

from” Markowitz’s testimony, United States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1285

(9th Cir. 1988), and the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to proceed.

AFFIRMED.

6 25-1747