1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARKKIS PORSCHE SONIER, No. 2:24-cv-02511 SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 M. SINGH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se with this civil rights action 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the undersigned for screening under 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915A. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that the 20 complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Singh 21 and a cognizable Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claims against defendants Singh and 22 Mendoza, but no other cognizable claims. Plaintiff will be given the option of proceeding on the 23 complaint as screened or filing an amended complaint. 24 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 25 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 26 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) He has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 27 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 28 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 1 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 2 lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial 3 partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order 4 directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be 5 taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid 6 in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 7 STATUTORY SCREENING 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 9 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 10 performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, 11 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 12 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous 13 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 14 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless 15 legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 16 inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and 17 factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 19 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 20 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 21 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 22 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 23 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 24 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 25 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 26 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 27 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 28 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 1 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 The facts underlying the complaint occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated at the 3 California Medical Facility (“CMF”). (ECF No. 1.) The complaint names four defendants: (1) 4 M. Singh, Correctional Officer; (2) M. Mendoza, Correctional Officer; (3) D. Cueva, Warden; 5 and (4) Field Executive Review Committee (“FERC”). (Id.) 6 Plaintiff alleges he was sitting in his cell when defendant Singh came in with a shield and 7 told him to “get the fuck down.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff was already down but Singh 8 smacked him in the right side of his face with the corner of the shield. Defendants Singh and 9 Mendoza then put plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.) During the RVR hearing, Singh lied and told the 10 presiding Lieutenant that plaintiff headbutted his shield. Plaintiff lost 150 days of good-time 11 credits. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered blurred vision, headaches, bruising, and worsening PTSD and 12 other mental health symptoms. (Id.) 13 Defendants Singh and Mendoza escorted plaintiff to the dayroom. Defendant Mendoza 14 told plaintiff that he was going to “fuck [plaintiff] in the ass.” Defendant Singh told plaintiff that 15 Mendoza had a big dick. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Defendants told the psychiatrist present to give 16 plaintiff Haldol to make him look like the aggressor. Plaintiff was shaken and scared for his life. 17 (Id.) Plaintiff filed a staff complaint but alleges that defendants Cueva and the FERC did not 18 refer it to the Centralized Screening Team as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486.1. (Id. 19 at 5.) Plaintiff requests $100,000 in damages, as well as fees and costs. 20 DISCUSSION 21 I. Claim I: Excessive Force 22 A. Constitution Claims 23 The undersigned construes plaintiff’s excessive force claim as arising under the Eighth 24 Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 25 punishment on inmates which, in excessive force cases, has been defined as “the unnecessary and 26 wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison 27 officials stand accused of using excessive physical force … the core judicial inquiry is … whether 28 force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 1 sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 2 For screening purposes only, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint states a 3 cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Singh only. As alleged, 4 there was no need to restore discipline because plaintiff was seated and compliant when 5 defendant Singh struck him with his shield.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARKKIS PORSCHE SONIER, No. 2:24-cv-02511 SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 M. SINGH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se with this civil rights action 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the undersigned for screening under 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915A. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that the 20 complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Singh 21 and a cognizable Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claims against defendants Singh and 22 Mendoza, but no other cognizable claims. Plaintiff will be given the option of proceeding on the 23 complaint as screened or filing an amended complaint. 24 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 25 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 26 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) He has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 27 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 28 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 1 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 2 lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial 3 partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order 4 directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be 5 taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid 6 in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 7 STATUTORY SCREENING 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 9 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 10 performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, 11 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 12 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous 13 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 14 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless 15 legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 16 inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and 17 factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 19 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 20 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 21 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 22 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 23 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 24 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 25 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 26 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 27 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 28 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 1 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 The facts underlying the complaint occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated at the 3 California Medical Facility (“CMF”). (ECF No. 1.) The complaint names four defendants: (1) 4 M. Singh, Correctional Officer; (2) M. Mendoza, Correctional Officer; (3) D. Cueva, Warden; 5 and (4) Field Executive Review Committee (“FERC”). (Id.) 6 Plaintiff alleges he was sitting in his cell when defendant Singh came in with a shield and 7 told him to “get the fuck down.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff was already down but Singh 8 smacked him in the right side of his face with the corner of the shield. Defendants Singh and 9 Mendoza then put plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.) During the RVR hearing, Singh lied and told the 10 presiding Lieutenant that plaintiff headbutted his shield. Plaintiff lost 150 days of good-time 11 credits. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered blurred vision, headaches, bruising, and worsening PTSD and 12 other mental health symptoms. (Id.) 13 Defendants Singh and Mendoza escorted plaintiff to the dayroom. Defendant Mendoza 14 told plaintiff that he was going to “fuck [plaintiff] in the ass.” Defendant Singh told plaintiff that 15 Mendoza had a big dick. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Defendants told the psychiatrist present to give 16 plaintiff Haldol to make him look like the aggressor. Plaintiff was shaken and scared for his life. 17 (Id.) Plaintiff filed a staff complaint but alleges that defendants Cueva and the FERC did not 18 refer it to the Centralized Screening Team as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486.1. (Id. 19 at 5.) Plaintiff requests $100,000 in damages, as well as fees and costs. 20 DISCUSSION 21 I. Claim I: Excessive Force 22 A. Constitution Claims 23 The undersigned construes plaintiff’s excessive force claim as arising under the Eighth 24 Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 25 punishment on inmates which, in excessive force cases, has been defined as “the unnecessary and 26 wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison 27 officials stand accused of using excessive physical force … the core judicial inquiry is … whether 28 force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 1 sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 2 For screening purposes only, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint states a 3 cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Singh only. As alleged, 4 there was no need to restore discipline because plaintiff was seated and compliant when 5 defendant Singh struck him with his shield. Further, plaintiff’s alleged injuries, including blurred 6 vision and headaches, support a reasonable inference that Singh used more than de minimis force. 7 However, plaintiff did not include sufficient facts to show that defendant Mendoza’s handcuffing 8 was excessive. For example, the complaint does not allege any resulting hand or wrist injuries. 9 The fact that plaintiff’s RVR resulted in a loss of good-time credits raises the possibility 10 that his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 11 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (extending Heck’s “favorable termination rule” to prison disciplinary 12 proceedings resulting in loss of good-time credits). But given the complaint is silent on whether 13 the loss of credits affected the duration of plaintiff’s sentence, as well as the fact that Heck is an 14 affirmative defense, see Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024), the 15 undersigned will decline to address a potential Heck bar at this time. Accordingly, on screening, 16 plaintiff may proceed against defendant Singh on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. 17 B. CDCR Use of Force Policy 18 Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated § 51020 of CDCR’s Use of Force Policy. 19 However, alleged violations of CDCR’s Use of Force Policy are not cognizable under § 1983. 20 See, e.g., Selsor v. Weaver, No. 1:15-cv-0918 LJO BAM PC, 2016 WL 4191882, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 21 Aug. 8, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-cv-0918 LJO BAM PC, 2016 WL 22 8731329 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016); Hughes v. Kelly, No. 1:24-cv-0660 HBK (PC), 2024 WL 23 4556762, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-cv-0660 24 KES HBK (PC), 2024 WL 5125866 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2024). 25 The reasons are twofold. First, § 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of 26 federally protected rights only. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 27 2007) (“Section 1983 requires [plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”) 28 Second, while certain prison regulations may involve state-created liberty interests, the policy 1 cited by plaintiff does not do so. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2 2009) (alleged failure to follow prison policy does not establish federal constitutional violation); 3 Manzanillo v. Jacquez, 555 F. App’x 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). Accordingly, plaintiff 4 cannot proceed on claims under CDCR’s Use of Force Policy. 5 II. Claim II: Verbal Staff Sexual Misconduct 6 A. Eighth Amendment Claim 7 Plaintiff’s second claim alleges “verbal staff sexual misconduct” by defendants Singh and 8 Mendoza, which the undersigned construes as arising under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 9 at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges defendants’ actions violated § 54040.1 of CDCR’s Prison Rape 10 Elimination Act (PREA) Policy. (Id.) 11 Allegations of verbal harassment do not generally state a viable claim under section 1983. 12 See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). This is true even where the 13 verbal harassment is of a sexual nature. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 14 2004) (holding that “the Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to mere 15 verbal sexual harassment.”). However, a claim based on verbal harassment can succeed if the 16 offending comments were “gross even for a prison setting and were calculated to and did cause 17 [plaintiff] psychological damage.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (1996); see also 18 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (verbal harassment intended to 19 endanger an inmate may violate the Constitution). 20 At this early stage of the proceedings, the undersigned cannot say as a matter of law that 21 defendants’ alleged vulgar comments were not “gross even for a prison” and not “calculated to … 22 cause [plaintiff] psychological damage.” See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092. Plaintiff alleges that 23 defendants’ comments and actions worsened his PTSD and other mental health symptoms and 24 caused him to fear for his life. Moreover, defendants’ alleged request for a psychiatrist to inject 25 plaintiff with Haldol minimally supports the reasonable inference that they were aware that 26 plaintiff had mental health conditions. Accordingly, for screening purposes only, the complaint 27 states cognizable Eighth Amendment verbal sexual harassment claims against defendants 28 Mendoza and Singh. 1 B. CDCR PREA Policy 2 However, as explained above in the context of CDCR’s Use of Force Policy, plaintiff’s 3 claim under CDCR’s PREA Policy is not cognizable under § 1983. See Cousins, 568 F.3d at 4 1070. To the extent plaintiff to intended to sue under PREA itself, his claim fails because PREA 5 does not contain a private right of action on its own or through § 1983. See McPherson v. 6 Carpenter, No. 2:25-cv-0202 DC CSK P, 2025 WL 745819, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025), report 7 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-cv-0202 DC CSK (PC), 2025 WL 2590355 (E.D. Cal. 8 Sept. 8, 2025); Stevens v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-0741 SAB PC, 2022 WL 4292289, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 9 Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Smith v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-0741 10 ADA SAB PC, 2022 WL 16850368 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Stevens v. Smith, 11 No. 22-16850, 2023 WL 6140590 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2023). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot 12 proceed against defendants Mendoza or Singh under CDCR’s PREA Policy or PREA itself. 13 III. Claim III: Mishandling of Staff Misconduct Complaint 14 Plaintiff’s final claim alleges that Defendants Cueva and the FERC failed to properly 15 screen his staff misconduct complaint in violation of Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486.1(c) and the 16 First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 17 Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983. To the extent plaintiff seeks to enforce § 18 3486.1 itself, that alleged violation of a state regulation is not cognizable under § 1983. See 19 Galen, 477 F.3d at 662. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail because “inmates lack a separate 20 constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 21 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also 22 Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s due 23 process claim challenging the adequacy of the prison’s administrative appeal procedure and the 24 disposition of his appeals); Henderson v. Muniz, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 25 (“[C]ourts have held that there is no due process liability for failing to process or decide an 26 inmate appeal properly”). Accordingly, plaintiff may not proceed on his challenge to defendants 27 //// 28 //// 1 handling of his grievance.1 2 OPTIONS FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE 3 After conducting the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court finds that 4 plaintiff has adequately stated a valid Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant 5 Singh and valid Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claims against defendants Singh and 6 Mendoza. The cognizable claims are against defendants in their respective individual capacities 7 only. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen a plaintiff sues a 8 [state] defendant for damages, there is a presumption that he is seeking damages against the 9 defendant in his personal capacity.”). 10 Here, the allegations in the complaint are not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment 11 excessive force claim against defendant Mendoza. It appears to the court that plaintiff may be 12 able to allege facts to fix these problems. Therefore, plaintiff has the option of filing an amended 13 complaint. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must 14 be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is 15 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). 16 However, plaintiff is advised that his non-cognizable claims against defendants Cueva and the 17 FERC regarding his staff misconduct complaint cannot be cured by amendment. 18 Based on the court’s screening, plaintiff has a choice to make. After selecting an option 19 from the two options listed below, plaintiff must return the attached Notice of Election form to 20 the court within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. 21 Option No. 1: The first option available to plaintiff is to proceed immediately on his 22 Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Singh and his Eighth Amendment 23 sexual harassment claims against defendants Singh and Mendoza. By choosing this option, 24 plaintiff will be agreeing to voluntarily dismiss defendants Cueva and the FERC, as well as his 25 excessive force claim against defendant Mendoza. The court will proceed to immediately serve 26
27 1 The undersigned notes separately that the FERC is not a proper § 1983 defendant. See, e.g., Herrera v. Pain Management Committee at Corcoran State Prison, 2012 WL 6005379, *2 (E.D. 28 Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding prison committee was not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action). 1 the complaint and order a response from defendants Singh and Mendoza. 2 Option No. 2: The second option available to plaintiff is to file an amended complaint to 3 fix the problems described above regarding the excessive for claim against defendant Mendoza. 4 If plaintiff chooses this option, the court will set a deadline in a subsequent order to give plaintiff 5 time to file an amended complaint. 6 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 7 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 8 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, the complaint must specifically identify how each named 9 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 10 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 11 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 12 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 13 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 14 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 15 Plaintiff is also informed that the court will not refer to a prior pleading in order to make 16 his amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an 17 amended complaint replaces the prior complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) 18 (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 19 2012). Therefore, in an amended complaint, every claim and every defendant must be 20 included. 21 CONCLUSION 22 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 24 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 25 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 27 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 28 3. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Cueva and the FERC, as well as his Eighth 1 | Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Mendoza, do not state claims for which 2 || relief can be granted. 3 4. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his Eighth Amendment excessive 4 | force claim against defendant Singh and his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claims against 5 || defendants Singh and Mendoza as set forth above, or to file an amended complaint. 6 5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return 7 || the attached Notice of Election form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the 8 || screened complaint or whether he wants to file an amended complaint. 9 6. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court will assume that he is choosing to 10 | proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend dismissal without prejudice of 11 | defendants Cueva and the FERC, as well as the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 12 | defendant Mendoza. 13 | DATED: October 10, 2025
15 SEAN C. RIORDAN 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARKKIS PORSCHE SONIER, No. 2:24-cv-02511 SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION 14 M. SINGH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Check one: 18 _____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim 19 against defendant Singh and his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claims against 20 defendants Singh and Mendoza without amending the complaint. Plaintiff understands 21 that by choosing this option, the remaining defendants and claims will be voluntarily 22 dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 23 24 _____ Plaintiff wants time to file an amended complaint. 25 26 DATED:_______________________
27 Markkis Porsche Sonier Plaintiff pro se 28