Markel v. Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc.

2019 NY Slip Op 2049
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 19, 2019
Docket156671/15
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 NY Slip Op 2049 (Markel v. Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Markel v. Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 2049 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

Markel v Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. (2019 NY Slip Op 02049)
Markel v Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc.
2019 NY Slip Op 02049
Decided on March 19, 2019
Appellate Division, First Department
Gische J., J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided on March 19, 2019 SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION First Judicial Department
John W. Sweeny, Jr.,J.P.
Dianne T. Renwick
Judith J. Gische
Marcy L. Kahn
Cynthia S. Kern, JJ.

156671/15

[*1]Stephanie Markel, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc., et al., Defendants-Respondents.


Plaintiff appeals from the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Reed, J.), entered on or about November 27, 2017, which, to the extent appealed from, denied plaintiff's motion for a protective order and to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on the individual who accompanied plaintiff to her medical examination by defendants' orthopedist.



Buzin Law, P.C., New York (Brian J. Isaac and Joshua Brian Irwin of counsel), for appellant.

Havkins Rosenfeld Ritzert & Varriale, LLP, Mineola (Gail Ritzert of counsel), for respondents.



GISCHE J. Plaintiff seeks damages for knee injuries that she alleges were sustained while participating in an exercise drill at defendants' boot camp style gym. During discovery, plaintiff appeared for a physical examination by an orthopedist

designated by defendants (IME). Plaintiff's attorney hired a individual from IME Watchdog (IME observer) to be present with plaintiff while she was examined. Six months later, defendants served a subpoena deuces tecum on the IME observer for the production of her notes, reports, memoranda, photographs, and "any [*2]other relevant material" in her possession. Because these materials are protected by the qualified privilege applicable to materials prepared for litigation, the subpoena duces tecum should have been quashed and the protective order granted.

Where a plaintiff puts her physical condition at issue, the defendants may require that she submit to an IME by a physician retained by defendant for that purpose (CPLR 3121[a]; Chaudhary v Gold, 83 AD3d 477, 478 [1st Dept 2011]). It is well established that a plaintiff is entitled to have a representative of her choice present during the IME, provided the individual does not interfere with the IME or prevent the defendant's doctor from conducting "a meaningful examination" (Santana v Johnson, 154 AD3d 452, 452 [1st Dept 2017], citing Guerra v McBean, 127 AD3d 462 [1st Dept 2015]; Henderson v Ross, 147 AD3d 915 [2d Dept 2017]; Marriott v Cappello, 151 AD3d 1580 [4th Dept 2017]; see also Ramsey v New York Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 14 AD3d 349 [1st Dept 2005]; Jakubowski v Lengen, 86 AD2d 398, 400-401 [4th Dept 1982]).

The categories of representatives that a plaintiff is entitled to have present during the IME are broad. They include the plaintiff's attorney or law clerks from plaintiff's attorney's office (Jakubowski, supra), paralegals (Bermejo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 135 AD3d 116 [2d Dept 2015]), interpreters (Henderson, supra), and in at least one case, a nurse (Marriott at 1583] [defendant's doctor improperly excluded a nurse hired to observe plaintiff's IME]). More recently, this Court clarified that a plaintiff can have an observer or "watchdog" present during the IME (Martinez v Pinard, 160 AD3d 440, 440 [1st Dept 2018]; Santana v Johnson, supra; Guerra v McBean, supra). No special or unusual circumstances need be shown in order for the IME observer to be present during the examination (Santana at 452). IME observers or "watchdogs" are typically hired by plaintiff's lawyers to assist their clients in filling out forms at the examining doctor's office. More importantly, according to plaintiff, the presence of an IME observer deters examining doctors hired by defendants from inquiring about matters beyond the scope of the particular action and keeps the IME process honest.

The specific question of whether an IME observer's notes etc., are discoverable, given CPLR 3101(a)'s broad umbrella of full disclosure, presents an issue of first impression for this Court. The issue has been addressed by the trial courts with varying results [FN1], requiring us to now [*3]clarify whether, and under what circumstances, such materials are protected from disclosure. The IME observer retained by plaintiff's attorney in this case is a college graduate. She has no formal training in any medical discipline, including orthopedics. No claim is made that she qualifies as an expert. Nor do defendants make any claim that the IME observer's presence either interfered with or impeded the defendants' doctor's examination of plaintiff or that the plaintiff's examination was in any way curtailed due to the IME observer's presence (see e.g. Santana, supra). Defendants do not identify in this record any information related to the plaintiff's IME that they cannot obtain from their own examining doctor.

The information contained in the IME observer's notes would generally be considered material and necessary for the prosecution or defense of the underlying action (CPLR 3101[a]). The dispute regarding whether the material is discoverable turns on whether it is otherwise protected by any privilege. Plaintiff, as the party resisting disclosure, has the burden of establishing that the material is covered by a protection (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661-662 [2018]).

The information contained in the IME observer's notes and other materials are not protected by either the attorney-client or work product privileges (CPLR 3101[a][4]). The materials were not generated by plaintiff's attorney, nor were they used to communicate with the client or convey legal advice to her (see Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 NY3d 616, 624 [2016]).

The IME observer, however, is an agent of the plaintiff's attorney. Consequently, the requested notes and materials constitute materials prepared for trial, bringing them within the conditional or qualified privilege protections of CPLR 3101(d)(2). Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation and preparation for trial may be obtained only upon a showing that the requesting party has a "substantial need" for them in the preparation of the case and that without "undue hardship" the requesting party is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means (CPLR 3101[d][2]; see also Forman at 661-662).

The IME observer was hired to assist plaintiff's attorney in advancing the litigation and preparing for trial (Hudson Ins. Co. v Oppenheim, 72 AD3d 489 [1st Dept 2010]). Although present, she was not involved in the doctor's examination of the plaintiff. Her function was to serve as the attorney's "eyes and ears," observing what occurred during the IME, and then reporting that information back to plaintiff's attorney.

Defendants have not shown, in response, any "substantial need" for the IME observer's notes, etc., or why they are unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the "substantial equivalent" of the materials by other means (id.; Forman at 661-662).

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Related

Guerra v. McBean
127 A.D.3d 462 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
Bermejo v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
135 A.D.3d 116 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
Ambac Assurance Corporation v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
57 N.E.3d 30 (New York Court of Appeals, 2016)
Henderson v. Ross
2017 NY Slip Op 1186 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
Marriott v. Cappello
2017 NY Slip Op 4580 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
Santana v. Johnson
2017 NY Slip Op 6997 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
Ramsey v. New York University Hospital Center
14 A.D.3d 349 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Hudson Insurance v. Oppenheim
72 A.D.3d 489 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)
Chaudhary v. Gold
83 A.D.3d 477 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Jakubowski v. Lengen
86 A.D.2d 398 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1982)
Cornex, Inc. v. Carisbrook Industries, Inc.
161 A.D.2d 376 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)
Forman v. Henkin
93 N.E.3d 882 (Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, 2018)

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2019 NY Slip Op 2049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/markel-v-pure-power-boot-camp-inc-nyappdiv-2019.