Mark Watkins, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedDecember 18, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-01119
StatusUnknown

This text of Mark Watkins, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., et al. (Mark Watkins, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mark Watkins, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., et al., (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 25CV1119-AJB (BLM) 11 MARK WATKINS, et al.,

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL 13 v. FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES

14 AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC., et al., ECF No. 29 15 Defendants. [REDACTED] 16

17 Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ November 3, 2025 Motion to Compel Further 18 Discovery Responses (“MTC”) [ECF No. 29], Defendant’s November 20, 2025 revised opposition 19 to the motion (“Oppo”) [ECF No. 40], and Plaintiffs’ December 1, 2025 reply (“Reply”) [ECF No. 20 44]. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED in part. 21 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 22 This putative class action challenges Defendant AvalonBay’s (“Defendant”) security 23 deposit practices. Plaintiffs allege Defendant retains residential security deposits from former 24 tenants in violation of California law. MTC at 1 (citing Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) 25 Plaintiffs claim Defendant centrally administers security deposit policies and procedures 26 uniformly across its California properties. Id. at 1; Compl. at ¶ 108. Plaintiffs identify three 27 “centralized deposit practices” which they claim result in “uniform statutory violations.” MTC at 1 1-2. These three challenged practices are: (1) the fixed-fee “Clean Sweep Program”; (2) use of 2 self-generated Itemized Apartment Receipts (“IARS”) in place of vendor-provided invoices; and 3 (3) deductions for work performed by Defendant’s employees without statements “describing 4 the work performed, the time spent, and the cost of labor.” MTC at 2-3 (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 13- 5 15, 120, 150, 153, 122-125, 141-145, 152-158.) 6 The originally named Plaintiffs1 are former residents of Defendant’s property known as 7 “AVA Pacific Beach” from approximately July 2023 to August 2024, and they seek to represent 8 all “residents of Defendant’s property [throughout California] whose leaseholds terminated 9 within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment” who 10 had at least $125 of their security deposit retained for cleaning, repairs, and/or replacements 11 combined. Compl. at ¶ 179. 12 DISCOVERY BACKGROUND 13 On August 27, 2025, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Special Interrogatories and 14 Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”) on Defendant. Decl. of Jimmie Davis Parker in 15 Supp. of MTC (“Parker Decl.”) at 29-1 at 33, Ex. A. Defendant served its responses and 16 objections to the RFPs on September 26, 2025 and acknowledged that Plaintiffs had agreed to 17 an extension to respond to the interrogatories. Id. at 32-33. After the parties agreed to an 18 extension, Defendant served its responses and objections to Plaintiffs’ RFPs on October 10, 19 2025. Id. at 31-32. The parties met and conferred “in multiple written, telephonic 20 videoconference meet and confers in an effort to resolve the discovery disputes without court 21 intervention” but could not reach a resolution. Id. at ¶ 2. 22 On October 23, 2025, the parties jointly contacted the Court regarding Defendant’s 23 responses. ECF No. 28. In regard to the dispute, the Court set a briefing schedule. Id. The 24 parties timely filed their pleadings.2 See MTC, Oppo, and Reply. In addition, Plaintiffs and 25 26 1 Mark Watkins, William Crosier and Alex Tharappel are the originally named Plaintiffs. 27 2 Defendant’s initial opposition was timely filed on November 17, 2025 but they later discovered a typographical mistake in their opposition and sought leave to file a revised opposition which 1 Defendant sought leave of Court to file their pleadings under seal. ECF Nos. 35, 39, 45, and 47. 2 The Court granted the parties leave to file the motion, revised opposition, and reply under seal. 3 ECF Nos. 32, 37, 47. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows: 6 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 7 to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, 8 considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ 9 resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 10 the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 11 Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. 12 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 14 District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See 15 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts also have broad discretion 16 to limit discovery to prevent its abuse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (instructing that courts must 17 limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the 18 information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably 19 cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less 20 burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”). 21 The scope of pre-class certification discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial 22 court. Coleman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 2013 WL 2896884, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) (citing 23 Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.1975)). In seeking discovery before class 24 certification, Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a showing that the Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 23 requirements are satisfied or that discovery is likely to substantiate the class allegations 26 (Mantolete Burden). Salgado v. O'Lakes, 2014 WL 7272784, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014); 27 see also Coleman, 2013 WL 2896884, at *4 (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 1 determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of 2 advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are 3 satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent 4 such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion.”)). 5 Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a) permits a class action to proceed where 6 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there 7 are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 8 representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 9 class. 10 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 11 Plaintiffs seek an order from the Court compelling Defendant to supplement its responses 12 to include information for their deposit-handling policies, procedures, and practices statewide 13 rather than just for the single property, AVA Pacific Beach. MTC at 5. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek 14 to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 1-8, 17-19, 28, 31, 33-34, 36, 40-45 and interrogatories 15 Nos. 1-10, 15-19. Id. at 15.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Mark Watkins, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mark-watkins-et-al-v-avalonbay-communities-inc-et-al-casd-2025.