IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARK WALSH,1 § § No. 316, 2025 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CK21-03133 JENNIFER WALSH, § Petition No. 22-05692 § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: January 9, 2026 Decided: April 6, 2026
Before TRAYNOR, GRIFFITHS, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the Family Court record, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) Mark Walsh (“Ex-Husband”) appeals the Family Court’s order
resolving matters ancillary to his divorce from Jennifer Walsh (“Ex-Wife”). After
careful review of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that the parties married on March 18, 2001. In
March 2022, Ex-Husband petitioned for divorce, and the Family Court entered a
divorce decree on August 23, 2022. At the parties’ request, the court retained
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). jurisdiction over ancillary matters. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Family
Court issued a written decision on May 16, 2025. Among other things, the Family
Court: (i) instructed the parties to sell the marital home and divide the proceeds
equally, (ii) ordered that the parties’ marital assets and debts be split 50/50, and (iii)
awarded Ex-Wife permanent alimony in the amount of $970.00 per month. Ex-
Husband filed a timely motion for reargument, which the Family Court denied. Ex-
Husband appeals.
(3) This Court’s review of an appeal from the Family Court extends to a
review of the law and the facts, as well as a review of the inferences and deductions
made by the trial judge.2 We will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly
wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.3 We review errors of law de
novo.4 If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is
abuse of discretion.5 When the determination of facts turns on the credibility of
witnesses, this Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.6
(4) Ex-Husband raises five claims of error on appeal: (i) the Family Court
violated his due process rights when it denied his request for a continuance of the
evidentiary hearing, (ii) the Family Court abused its discretion by ordering the sale
2 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 3 Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 179 (Del. 2008). 4 Smart v. Smart, 2015 WL 1530898, at *4 (Del. Apr. 6, 2015). 5 Id. 6 Greene v. Greene, 105 A.3d 989, 2014 WL 7010738, at *1 (Del. Nov. 25, 2014) (TABLE). 2 of the marital home without considering equitable alternatives, (iii) the Family Court
improperly ordered the division of Ex-Husband’s 401K plan but not the division of
Ex-Wife’s 401K plan, (iv) the Family Court’s valuation of the parties’ motor
vehicles was not supported by the evidence, and (v) the Family Court erred when it
awarded Ex-Wife permanent alimony. We address Ex-Husband’s arguments in turn.
(5) Ex-Husband first argues that the Family Court erred when it denied his
request for a continuance. The record reflects that the February 27, 2025 trial date
was the fifth trial date scheduled in this matter. Trial was originally scheduled for
June 5, 2023. In May 2023, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the trial, and
the matter was rescheduled to November 15, 2023. Following an October 2023
teleconference with the parties, the court concluded that the parties would not be
ready for trial in November because of outstanding discovery issues. The Family
Court therefore set a new trial date of April 12, 2024. For reasons not entirely clear
from the record, that trial date was later moved to October 1, 2024. After a case
management conference held in September 2024, trial was rescheduled to February
27, 2025. Notably, Ex-Husband was represented by counsel from the filing of his
petition for divorce in March 2022 until January 16, 2025, when counsel moved to
withdraw. During this time, the parties exchanged discovery and engaged in motion
practice related to their respective discovery requests. On January 29, 2025, Ex-
Husband, proceeding pro se, moved for a continuance, citing his desire to retain new
3 counsel. On February 13, the Family Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw
and denied Ex-Husband’s motion for a continuance.7
(6) We review the Family Court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for
an abuse of discretion.8 Here, Ex-Husband does not dispute that he had notice of the
February 27 trial date, and the record reflects that he had more than ample time to
prepare for trial.9 Moreover, as noted above, Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife exchanged
discovery and resolved their discovery disputes through motion practice in the
months preceding the trial, which took place almost three years after the parties’
divorce. “Trial judges are vested with the discretion to resolve scheduling matters
and to control their own docket.”10 Under the circumstances, we conclude that the
Family Court acted within its discretion when it denied Ex-Husband’s request for
another continuance.
(7) Ex-Husband next argues that the Family Court abused its discretion by
ordering the sale of the marital property without considering whether Ex-Husband
could buy out Ex-Wife’s interest in the property or the “competent appraisal
7 On February 20, apparently unaware that the Family Court had granted his motion to withdraw, Ex-Husband’s former counsel filed a motion to withdraw his motion to withdraw together with a motion for a continuance. Following the February 27 trial, the Family Court found these motions to be moot—counsel’s motion to withdraw had been granted and the evidentiary hearing had proceeded as scheduled. 8 Stevenson v. Simons, 905 A.2d 747, 2006 WL 2048487, at *2 (Del. July 21, 2006) (TABLE). 9 See Tsipouras v. Tsipouras, 677 A.2d 493, 496 (Del. 1996) (noting that procedural due process requires that parties whose rights are to be affected by the proceedings are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard). 10 Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1238 (Del. 2012). 4 evidence.”11 The record belies Ex-Husband’s contention concerning the sale of the
marital property. Although Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife each attempted to introduce
at trial a real estate appraisal of the marital home, Ex-Husband’s real estate
appraiser—Kendall Dixon—testified that both appraisals were performed more than
two years ago and therefore could not be relied upon. The trial court therefore
properly refused to consider the appraisals when determining the value of the marital
home. Absent the parties’ agreement as to value, the court was simply unable to
assign a monetary value to the home without ordering its sale. We also note that,
contrary to Ex-Husband’s claim on appeal, the Family Court repeatedly asked Ex-
Husband if he was willing to buy out Ex-Wife’s share of the home (albeit, using Ex-
Wife’s higher appraisal as the basis for negotiation),12 and Ex-Husband told the court
that he was unwilling to do so.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARK WALSH,1 § § No. 316, 2025 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CK21-03133 JENNIFER WALSH, § Petition No. 22-05692 § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: January 9, 2026 Decided: April 6, 2026
Before TRAYNOR, GRIFFITHS, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the Family Court record, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) Mark Walsh (“Ex-Husband”) appeals the Family Court’s order
resolving matters ancillary to his divorce from Jennifer Walsh (“Ex-Wife”). After
careful review of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that the parties married on March 18, 2001. In
March 2022, Ex-Husband petitioned for divorce, and the Family Court entered a
divorce decree on August 23, 2022. At the parties’ request, the court retained
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). jurisdiction over ancillary matters. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Family
Court issued a written decision on May 16, 2025. Among other things, the Family
Court: (i) instructed the parties to sell the marital home and divide the proceeds
equally, (ii) ordered that the parties’ marital assets and debts be split 50/50, and (iii)
awarded Ex-Wife permanent alimony in the amount of $970.00 per month. Ex-
Husband filed a timely motion for reargument, which the Family Court denied. Ex-
Husband appeals.
(3) This Court’s review of an appeal from the Family Court extends to a
review of the law and the facts, as well as a review of the inferences and deductions
made by the trial judge.2 We will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly
wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.3 We review errors of law de
novo.4 If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is
abuse of discretion.5 When the determination of facts turns on the credibility of
witnesses, this Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.6
(4) Ex-Husband raises five claims of error on appeal: (i) the Family Court
violated his due process rights when it denied his request for a continuance of the
evidentiary hearing, (ii) the Family Court abused its discretion by ordering the sale
2 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 3 Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 179 (Del. 2008). 4 Smart v. Smart, 2015 WL 1530898, at *4 (Del. Apr. 6, 2015). 5 Id. 6 Greene v. Greene, 105 A.3d 989, 2014 WL 7010738, at *1 (Del. Nov. 25, 2014) (TABLE). 2 of the marital home without considering equitable alternatives, (iii) the Family Court
improperly ordered the division of Ex-Husband’s 401K plan but not the division of
Ex-Wife’s 401K plan, (iv) the Family Court’s valuation of the parties’ motor
vehicles was not supported by the evidence, and (v) the Family Court erred when it
awarded Ex-Wife permanent alimony. We address Ex-Husband’s arguments in turn.
(5) Ex-Husband first argues that the Family Court erred when it denied his
request for a continuance. The record reflects that the February 27, 2025 trial date
was the fifth trial date scheduled in this matter. Trial was originally scheduled for
June 5, 2023. In May 2023, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the trial, and
the matter was rescheduled to November 15, 2023. Following an October 2023
teleconference with the parties, the court concluded that the parties would not be
ready for trial in November because of outstanding discovery issues. The Family
Court therefore set a new trial date of April 12, 2024. For reasons not entirely clear
from the record, that trial date was later moved to October 1, 2024. After a case
management conference held in September 2024, trial was rescheduled to February
27, 2025. Notably, Ex-Husband was represented by counsel from the filing of his
petition for divorce in March 2022 until January 16, 2025, when counsel moved to
withdraw. During this time, the parties exchanged discovery and engaged in motion
practice related to their respective discovery requests. On January 29, 2025, Ex-
Husband, proceeding pro se, moved for a continuance, citing his desire to retain new
3 counsel. On February 13, the Family Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw
and denied Ex-Husband’s motion for a continuance.7
(6) We review the Family Court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for
an abuse of discretion.8 Here, Ex-Husband does not dispute that he had notice of the
February 27 trial date, and the record reflects that he had more than ample time to
prepare for trial.9 Moreover, as noted above, Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife exchanged
discovery and resolved their discovery disputes through motion practice in the
months preceding the trial, which took place almost three years after the parties’
divorce. “Trial judges are vested with the discretion to resolve scheduling matters
and to control their own docket.”10 Under the circumstances, we conclude that the
Family Court acted within its discretion when it denied Ex-Husband’s request for
another continuance.
(7) Ex-Husband next argues that the Family Court abused its discretion by
ordering the sale of the marital property without considering whether Ex-Husband
could buy out Ex-Wife’s interest in the property or the “competent appraisal
7 On February 20, apparently unaware that the Family Court had granted his motion to withdraw, Ex-Husband’s former counsel filed a motion to withdraw his motion to withdraw together with a motion for a continuance. Following the February 27 trial, the Family Court found these motions to be moot—counsel’s motion to withdraw had been granted and the evidentiary hearing had proceeded as scheduled. 8 Stevenson v. Simons, 905 A.2d 747, 2006 WL 2048487, at *2 (Del. July 21, 2006) (TABLE). 9 See Tsipouras v. Tsipouras, 677 A.2d 493, 496 (Del. 1996) (noting that procedural due process requires that parties whose rights are to be affected by the proceedings are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard). 10 Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1238 (Del. 2012). 4 evidence.”11 The record belies Ex-Husband’s contention concerning the sale of the
marital property. Although Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife each attempted to introduce
at trial a real estate appraisal of the marital home, Ex-Husband’s real estate
appraiser—Kendall Dixon—testified that both appraisals were performed more than
two years ago and therefore could not be relied upon. The trial court therefore
properly refused to consider the appraisals when determining the value of the marital
home. Absent the parties’ agreement as to value, the court was simply unable to
assign a monetary value to the home without ordering its sale. We also note that,
contrary to Ex-Husband’s claim on appeal, the Family Court repeatedly asked Ex-
Husband if he was willing to buy out Ex-Wife’s share of the home (albeit, using Ex-
Wife’s higher appraisal as the basis for negotiation),12 and Ex-Husband told the court
that he was unwilling to do so. The Family Court has broad discretion when dividing
marital property under 13 Del. C. § 1513,13 and we conclude that the Family Court
did not abuse its discretion by ordering the sale of the marital home here.
(8) Ex-Husband also argues that the Family Court failed to credit him with
his share of Ex-Wife’s retirement account, which was valued at $4,573 on the date
of the parties’ separation. But, in fact, the Family Court ordered half of the value of
11 Opening Br. at 19. 12 Dixon testified that real estate property values had generally increased since the parties’ appraisals had been conducted. 13 Glanden v. Quirk, 128 A.3d 994, 1001 (Del. 2015). 5 Ex-Wife’s account ($2,286.50) be deducted from the amount Ex-Husband owed Ex-
Wife from the division of his retirement account. In short, there is no merit to Ex-
Husband’s argument.
(9) Ex-Husband also challenges the manner in which the Family Court
valued the parties’ three automobiles. The Family Court’s valuations of the parties’
assets are findings of fact.14 We will not set them aside if they are “sufficiently
supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive
process.”15 Here, the parties presented conflicting valuations for the autos based in
part on inaccurate mileage estimates, and not one of the estimates was based on a
physical examination of the motor vehicle at issue. In light of the foregoing, we find
that the Family Court’s decision to assign an average of the parties’ valuations to the
motor vehicles—an approach that resulted in a higher estimated value for Ex-Wife’s
car to the benefit of Ex-Husband—was the product of a logical and deductive
process.16
(10) Finally, Ex-Husband argues that the Family Court abused its discretion
because it awarded Ex-Wife permanent alimony without making the findings
required by the statute governing alimony, 13 Del. C. § 1512. To obtain an alimony
14 Boyer v. Boyer, 531 A.2d 1000, 1987 WL 44964, at *2 (Del. Oct. 2, 1987) (TABLE). 15 Id. 16 See Greene, 2014 WL 7010738, at *3-4 (upholding the Family Court’s “split the difference” approach to valuing the parties’ condominium as the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process). 6 award, Ex-Wife had the burden to prove her dependency and her inability to support
herself through “appropriate” employment.17 The Family Court found that she had
done so. And, contrary to Ex-Husband’s position on appeal, the Family Court’s
decision reflects due consideration of the factors enumerated in Section 1512 and
the deductions and inferences it made were the product of a logical and deductive
reasoning process.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice
17 Smart, 2015 WL 1530898, at *4. 7