Mark Vinzant v. Jesus Fernandez

Ninth Circuit

Mark Vinzant v. Jesus Fernandez

676 F. App'x 739

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 27, 2017

Docket15-56287, 15-56344, 15-56361

StatusUnpublished

This text of 676 F. App'x 739 (Mark Vinzant v. Jesus Fernandez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mark Vinzant v. Jesus Fernandez, 676 F. App'x 739 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Jesus Fernandez, Pratap Mesra, Louis Sterling, Stacey Allen, and S.A. Holincek (collectively, “the officers”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity as to Mark Vinzant’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the “purely legal” question of qualified immunity, Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2010), and we reverse.

We review the denial of qualified immunity with special attention to the recent Supreme Court case White v. Pauly, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 548, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017), which was decided after the district court’s summary judgment order here. We note that Vinzant received continuous medical care and Dr. Fernandez’s prescription was for non-emergency treatment. The short claimed delay in providing the physical therapy appointment, which *740 Vinzant declined to attend, did not violate clearly established law. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (noting that for a defendant to violate a clearly established right, “the right’s contours [must have been] sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it”). The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Vinzant’s deliberate indifference claim, and summary judgment should be entered for them.

Vinzant cross-appeals the district court’s ruling on the scope of this court’s mandate in Vinzant v. United States (Vinzant I), 584 Fed.Appx. 601 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court appropriately understood the mandate to confine Vinzant’s claim to the post-prescription period. In Vinzant I, we reversed only the district court’s conclusion that Vinzant had waived his post-prescription deliberate indifference claim. Id, at 602. We decline to revisit the mandate, as Vinzant I is not “clearly erroneous [such that] its enforcement would work a manifest injustice.” See Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995). We reject the cross-appeal and affirm the district court’s determination with respect to this ruling.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Jesus Fernandez, Pratap Mesra, Louis Sterling, Stacey Allen, and S.A. Holincek (collectively, “the officers”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity as to Mark Vinzant’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the “purely legal” question of qualified immunity, Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2010), and we reverse.

We review the denial of qualified immunity with special attention to the recent Supreme Court case White v. Pauly, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 548, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017), which was decided after the district court’s summary judgment order here. We note that Vinzant received continuous medical care and Dr. Fernandez’s prescription was for non-emergency treatment. The short claimed delay in providing the physical therapy appointment, which *740 Vinzant declined to attend, did not violate clearly established law. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (noting that for a defendant to violate a clearly established right, “the right’s contours [must have been] sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it”). The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Vinzant’s deliberate indifference claim, and summary judgment should be entered for them.

Vinzant cross-appeals the district court’s ruling on the scope of this court’s mandate in Vinzant v. United States (Vinzant I), 584 Fed.Appx. 601 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court appropriately understood the mandate to confine Vinzant’s claim to the post-prescription period. In Vinzant I, we reversed only the district court’s conclusion that Vinzant had waived his post-prescription deliberate indifference claim. Id, at 602. We decline to revisit the mandate, as Vinzant I is not “clearly erroneous [such that] its enforcement would work a manifest injustice.” See Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995). We reject the cross-appeal and affirm the district court’s determination with respect to this ruling.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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676 F. App'x 739, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mark-vinzant-v-jesus-fernandez-ca9-2017.

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