Mark v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 27, 2023
Docket2:21-cv-01065
StatusUnknown

This text of Mark v. Doe (Mark v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mark v. Doe, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ JONATHON M. MARK,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 21-cv-1065-pp

ADMINISTRATOR DOE and SUPERVISOR DOE,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SCREENING ORDER (DKT. NO. 10) ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Jonathon Mark filed a complaint alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when he was confined in a Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) institution,1 dkt. no. 1, along with a motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 3. The court granted the motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 6. In the same order, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) and found that it violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 because it attempted to bring unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Dkt. No. 6 at 9. The court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to choose which unrelated claim he wanted to pursue in this case and to file an amended complaint that focused on the related claim(s) of his choice. Id. at 10. The plaintiff has timely filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 9. This order

1 The plaintiff is not currently incarcerated, nor was he incarcerated when he filed this case. screens the amended complaint. It also grants the defendants’ motion for screening order. Dkt. No. 10. I. Screening the Amended Complaint A. Standard for Screening Complaint

The court must decide whether the plaintiff has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff was incarcerated at the Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution at the relevant time, and he has sued John Doe “Admin. Sgt.” and John Doe “Admin. Sgt.’s supervisor.” Dkt. No. 9 at 2-3. He alleges that the defendants retaliated against him between January 25 and 29, 2018 for submitting an informal grievance letter “dealing with the pay rate not being

equal to other photographing jobs at other institutions, and fired [him] from [his] job based solely on said grievance.” Id. at 3, ¶1. John Doe Admin. Sgt. allegedly provided the grievance to John Doe Admin. Supervisor. Id. at ¶2. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to retaliate against him, and they both decided to fire him from his job. Id. at 4, ¶3. The plaintiff sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 5. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id.

C. Analysis To plead a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants fired him from his prison job

because he filed a grievance satisfies this standard. First, the plaintiff alleges that he engaged in First Amendment-protected activity by filing a grievance about a prison issue. See Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020). Second, the denial or loss of a prison job can deter First Amendment activity. Id. at 648 (citing McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (assuming that taking away an incarcerated person’s job could amount to a constitutional deprivation); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that job removal stated a retaliation claim), abrogated on other

grounds by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020). Third, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants fired him because he filed the grievance. The plaintiff may proceed on a retaliation claim against John Doe Administrative Sergeant and John Doe Administrative Supervisor. While the plaintiff states that he also wants to proceed on a claim that the defendants conspired to retaliate against him, his allegation that “they both decided to fire me from my job” does not state a claim for conspiracy. See Ryan v. Mary

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
James T. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Department
95 F.3d 548 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Donnie McElroy v. Gary Lopac
403 F.3d 855 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Smith v. Gomez
550 F.3d 613 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Bridges v. Gilbert
557 F.3d 541 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Johnnie Savory v. William Cannon, Sr.
947 F.3d 409 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Monwell Douglas v. Faith Reeves
964 F.3d 643 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Mark v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mark-v-doe-wied-2023.