Mark v. City of Ormond Beach

113 F. Supp. 504, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2607
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 10, 1953
DocketCiv. Nos. 2532-J, 2533-J
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 113 F. Supp. 504 (Mark v. City of Ormond Beach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mark v. City of Ormond Beach, 113 F. Supp. 504, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2607 (S.D. Fla. 1953).

Opinion

SIMPSON, District Judge.

The sole question for determination under the defendant city’s motion to dismiss and motion for more definite statement filed in each of these cases, is whether or not the provisions of Section 51.12, Florida Statutes Annotated1 apply in an automo[505]*505bile negligence case where the accident occurred in Florida, brought in the United States Court by reason of diversity of citizenship. The complaints are admittedly drawn under the statute, and admittedly would be sufficient if the actions had been brought in the State Court and not removed.

Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, and the cases which have followed it, if Section 51.12 deals with procedural matters only, it has no effect in the United States Court and the complaints should be dismissed, for they clearly fail to state a claim on which relief could be granted under common law. However, if the statute relates to matters of substance, the statute applies in the United States Court and the motions should be denied.

It is my view that the statute is more than merely procedural and that the changing of the burden of proof at the trial and establishing a presumption of liability thereunder, grant the plaintiff a substantive right, the benefit of which he is entitled to receive in the Federal Court, as well as in the State Court.

The statute has never been construed by the Supreme Court of Florida, and research does not indicate the construction of a similar statute by the Courts of another State or by any United States Court. But much authority (including Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 294, Id., 308 U.S. 208, 60 S.Ct. 201, 84 L.Ed. 196 and Central Vermont Railway Company v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 35 S.Ct. 865, 59 L.Ed. 1433) indicates that matters touching burden of proof are substantive in nature, rather than procedural. See also the cases collected at page 257, 21 A.L.R.2d.

The situation here seems to be analogous to the trial of railroad crossing cases arising in Florida in United States Courts. In such cases the benefit of the presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company,- created by Section 768.05, Florida Statutes Annotated2 is given to the plaintiff in trials in the United States Court, exactly as it is in the State Court.

The respective motions will be denied by appropriate orders.

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Related

Culver v. Tucker
182 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Florida, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
113 F. Supp. 504, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mark-v-city-of-ormond-beach-flsd-1953.