Mark Steven Virovatz v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 01-24-00334-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued February 12, 2026.

In the

Court of Appeals for the

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00334-CR ——————————— MARK STEVEN VIROVATZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. MD-0414438

OPINION

Pro se appellant Mark Steven Virovatz voluntarily entered a plea of nolo

contendere to the class B misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04. Following appellant’s plea, the trial court entered a

judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty of the offense, assessing punishment at three days in county jail, and imposing a fine of $3,000 as required by section

709.001 of the Texas Transportation Code. In his two issues, appellant challenges

the constitutionality of section 709.001’s mandatory fine. We affirm.

Background

On November 1, 2023, appellant was charged by information with operating

a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. On March 28, 2024, appellant

voluntarily entered an oral and written plea of nolo contendere to the class B

misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated in exchange for the State’s

recommended sentence of three days in county jail with credit for time served. The

punishment for that offense is “a fine not to exceed $2,000,” “confinement in jail for

a term not to exceed 180 days,” or both. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.22 (prescribing

punishment for class B misdemeanor); see TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(b) (defining

offense as class B misdemeanor). In addition, if convicted, sections 521.341 and

521.344 of the Texas Transportation Code require an automatic suspension of the

defendant’s driver’s license for “not less than 90 days or more than one year.” TEX.

TRANSP. CODE §§ 521.341, 521.344(a)(2)(A). Section 709.001 of the Texas

Transportation Code also imposes a mandatory $3,000 fine “in addition to the fine

prescribed” for the offense of which appellant was convicted. Id.§ 709.001. The trial

court accepted appellant’s plea, finding him guilty of the class B misdemeanor of

driving while intoxicated and assessing punishment at three days in county jail,

2 suspension of appellant’s driver’s license for 90 days, and a $3,000 fine.1 The trial

court ordered that the $3,000 fine be paid in monthly installments of $100.

At the plea hearing, appellant objected on the record to the imposition of the

$3,000 fine, arguing that section 709.001 of the Texas Transportation Code is

unconstitutional. Appellant argued that section 709.001 (1) violates the separation-

of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution because it removes discretion from both

prosecutors who negotiate plea agreements and judges who determine sentences,

(2) is unconstitutionally vague, and (3) puts appellant in “double jeopardy.” The trial

court overruled the objections and orally pronounced the $3,000 fine as part of the

sentence. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction that conformed to the

orally pronounced sentence. That same day, the court entered a “Certification of

Defendant’s Right of Appeal,” which appellant signed, certifying that “this criminal

case . . . is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal . . . or . . .

the defendant has waived the right of appeal.”

1 The judgment of conviction states that the assessed fines amount to $3,100. However, the trial court waived $100 of fines. In orally pronouncing appellant’s sentence, the trial court stated that appellant’s fines were $3,000. See Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[F]ines generally must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence.” (citing TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 42.03, § 1(a); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))). To the extent the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement, “the oral pronouncement controls.” Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500 (citation modified).

3 On April 29, 2024, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 26.2(a)(1) (requiring notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days after the day

sentence is imposed”). On July 15, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss this

appeal, arguing that the trial court did not certify that appellant has the right of appeal

as required by rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. APP.

P. 25.2(d). We denied the motion to dismiss, abated the appeal, and remanded the

case to the trial court for further proceedings. We directed the trial court to conduct

a hearing on the record and make findings clarifying: (1) whether there was an

agreement between the State and appellant regarding a punishment recommendation

and, if so, the terms of that agreed recommendation; (2) whether the trial court’s

punishment exceeded the agreed punishment recommendation; and (3) whether the

trial court granted appellant permission to appeal. On remand, the trial court

conducted a hearing, made findings on the record, issued written findings, and

executed a new certification regarding appellant’s right of appeal.

Following receipt of the supplemental clerk’s record, we reinstated the appeal.

Trial Court’s Certification of Right of Appeal

In the new “Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal”—

which is a pre-prepared form with blank spaces to be filled in or marked, as

appropriate—the trial court selected the statement that read: “this criminal case . . .

is a plea-bargain case, but matters were raised by written motion filed and ruled on

4 before trial and not withdrawn or waived, and the defendant has the right of appeal.”

Another option on the form was a statement indicating that this “is a plea-bargain

case, but the trial court has given permission to appeal, and the defendant has the

right of appeal”; the trial court did not mark that statement. However, at the hearing

on remand, the trial court orally granted permission to appeal. The trial court’s

written findings of fact also state: “The Trial Court grants Appellant permission to

appeal.”

This Court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant

has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record under these rules.” TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(d). Here, we previously abated this appeal and remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings on this very issue. In an oral pronouncement and in

written findings of fact, the trial court granted appellant permission to appeal. The

State, which filed its brief after receipt of the post-remand record and reinstatement

of this appeal, did not challenge appellant’s permission to appeal based on the post-

remand record. We find that the trial court granted appellant permission to appeal

and we need not remand once more for further proceedings on that issue. See

Richardson v. State, No. 02-15-00271-CR, 2016 WL 6900901, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(finding trial court granted permission to appeal based on oral pronouncement

despite contradictory statement in pre-prepared certification of appeal form); cf.

5 Grice v. State, 162 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.

ref’d) (finding appellant did not waive right of appeal based on on-the-record

exchange and certification over “surplusage statement” included in judgment).

Constitutionality of Section 709.001 of Texas Transportation Code

In two issues, appellant contends that section 709.001 of the Texas

Transportation Code is unconstitutional. That statute imposes a set of mandatory

fines for conviction of an “offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while

intoxicated” depending on the number of prior convictions, if any, and the

defendant’s “alcohol concentration level.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 709.001(b); see

TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(c)(1) (defining “offense relating to the operating of a

motor vehicle while intoxicated”). Appellant argues that section 709.001 is

unconstitutional because: (1) the mandatory nature of the fine violates the

separation-of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution by removing a judge’s

discretion to determine punishment and a prosecutor’s ability to negotiate a plea

agreement and (2) the statute is unconstitutionally vague by failing to specify when

the mandatory fine must be paid and whether the trial court has discretion to shorten

that time period or order the fine paid in installments. The State responds that the

statute (1) does not violate the separation-of-powers clause because the legislature

constitutionally exercised its power to prescribe punishments and (2) is not

unconstitutionally vague when harmonized with the Texas Code of Criminal

6 Procedure, which grants trial courts discretion to determine when a defendant must

pay fines and costs.

A. Standard of Review

The constitutionality of a criminal statute is a question of law that we review

de novo. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The party

challenging the statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality.

Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Whether considering

a facial or as-applied challenge, “we presume that the statute is valid and that the

Legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily” unless the contrary is clearly

shown. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Ex parte

Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)); Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d

691, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021 (“In enacting a

statute, it is presumed that . . . compliance with the constitutions of this state and the

United States is intended . . . .”). We must uphold the statute if we can apply a

reasonable construction that will render the statute constitutional. Ely v. State, 582

S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Allen v. State, 570 S.W.3d

795, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018), aff’d, 614 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2019); Maloney v. State, 294 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2009, pet. ref’d) (analyzing constitutionality of statute facially and as applied to

appellant).

7 B. Analysis

1. Separation of powers

Because appellant does not contend that section 709.001 of the Texas

Transportation Code violates the separation-of-powers clause specifically as applied

to him, we construe his argument as a facial challenge to the statute. See Estes, 546

S.W.3d at 697-98 (“In a facial constitutional challenge, the claimant asserts that the

complained-of law is unconstitutional on its face, meaning that it operates

unconstitutionally in all of its potential applications.” (citation modified)). When

challenging a statute as facially unconstitutional, “a party must establish that the

statute always operates unconstitutionally in all possible circumstances.” State v.

Rousseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citations modified);

Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“A facial challenge

to a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because the

challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute

will be valid.”).

Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution enshrines the separation-of-

powers doctrine and states:

The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these

8 departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. This provision may be violated in one of two ways. “First,

it is violated when one branch of government assumes, or is delegated, to whatever

degree, a power that is more properly attached to another branch.” Armadillo Bail

Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citation modified).

Second, it is violated “when one branch unduly interferes with another branch so

that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned

powers.” Id. (citation modified).

The legislative power of the state is vested in the Texas Legislature. TEX.

CONST. art. III, § 1. The legislature “possesses the sole authority to establish criminal

offenses and designate applicable penalties.” Martinez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 493, 501

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citation modified); see Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922,

932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that legislature’s power includes deciding when

sentence of death is appropriate penalty). The judicial power of the state is vested in

the courts and includes “the power to execute the judgment or sentence.” Kelley v.

State, 676 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A court’s discretion to assess

punishment must fall within “legislatively prescribed boundaries.” Barrow v. State,

207 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804,

806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“A sentence that is outside the maximum or minimum

range of punishment is unauthorized by law and therefore illegal.”); Ibarra v. State,

9 177 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (concluding

sentence was void for failure of trial court to orally pronounce fine in appellant’s

presence where statute required both confinement and fine).

In 2019, the legislature created additional mandatory penalties for individuals

convicted of an “offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while

intoxicated.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 709.001(b). Any person “finally convicted” of

such an offense “shall pay a fine.” Id. (emphasis added). For “the first conviction

within a 36-month period,” the required fine is $3,000. Id. § 709.001(b)(1). The

parties cite no case law directly analyzing whether section 709.001 violates the

separation-of-powers clause, and we have found none.2 Thus, whether the

mandatory fine provided in section 709.001 violates the Texas Constitution’s

separation-of-powers clause appears to be an issue of first impression.

2 After the State filed its brief in this appeal, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg court of appeals issued an unpublished opinion addressing whether a fine imposed under section 709.001 of the Texas Transportation Code was “illegal.” Gilbert v. State, No. 13-24-00530-CR, 2025 WL 2355179, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi- Edinburg Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The appellant contended further that section 709.001 is unconstitutional because the $3,000 fine is disproportionate to the offense committed and that it violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution, but the appellant failed to preserve those arguments for appellate review. Id. at *2. The court of appeals held that the sentence was not illegal because “[t]he sentence . . . has been legislatively authorized” pursuant to the legislature’s constitutional power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. Id. at *3.

10 Appellant points to no authority suggesting that the legislature’s prescription

of mandatory fines “assumes” or “unduly interferes with” a power constitutionally

assigned to the judiciary. Appellant relies instead on Armadillo Bail Bonds and Ex

parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In neither Armadillo Bail Bonds

nor Ex parte Lo did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals consider the

constitutionality of a mandatory fine. The court of criminal appeals considered the

constitutionality of statutes that suspended a court’s power to enter a final judgment.

Armadillo Bail Bonds, 802 S.W.2d at 238-39; Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 29.

Importantly, unlike the power to prescribe criminal penalties, which is assigned to

the legislature, Martinez, 323 S.W.3d at 501, the power “to enter a final judgment”

is a “core judicial power,” and the legislature “unduly interferes” with that power

when it imposes a timeframe during which a court must refrain from entering a final

judgment. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 29. Nothing in Armadillo Bail Bonds or Ex

parte Lo suggests that the legislature “unduly interferes” with any judicial power by

prescribing mandatory fines for certain offenses. Although courts have discretion

when assessing punishment, that discretion is cabined by “legislatively prescribed

boundaries.” Barrow, 207 S.W.3d at 381; see Morano v. State, 572 S.W.2d 550, 551

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (“When a defendant waives a jury, the trial

[court] judge has discretion to assess the punishment within the range provided by

law which he finds appropriate in the circumstances.” (emphasis added)).

11 Despite appellant’s contrary contention, the mandatory nature of section

709.001’s fine is not unique. The legislature has prescribed mandatory punishments

for other offenses. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(c)(2) (“[A] defendant shall

be punished by imprisonment . . . for life if . . . .” (emphasis added)); TEX. CRIM.

PROC. CODE art. 102.0185(a) (“[A] person convicted of [certain offenses] . . . shall

pay a fine of $100 on conviction of the offense.” (emphasis added)). Statutes

mandating life or life-without-parole sentences do not violate the separation-of-

powers clause because “the authority to define crimes and prescribe penalties for

those crimes is vested exclusively with the legislature.” Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d

529, 543 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (citing Matchett, 941 S.W.2d at

932; State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973));

cf. Wilson v. State, 348 S.W.3d 32, 43-44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,

pet. ref’d) (holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentence did not

unconstitutionally usurp power from Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles), vacated

on other grounds, 568 U.S. 802 (2012); Moland v. State, No. 01–10–00869–CR,

2012 WL 403885, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 9, 2012, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

Appellant’s arguments are no different from those raised in Moore. In Moore,

as here, the appellant contended that a “mandatory punishment violates the

separation of powers clause of the Texas Constitution because it is beyond the power

12 of the legislature to mandate a punishment . . . .” 54 S.W.3d at 543. The court of

appeals rejected the argument that the legislature’s prescription of a mandatory

punishment—life imprisonment—“infringes upon or unduly interferes with the

rightful role of the judiciary in assessing punishment in a criminal case.” Id. The

legislature has exclusive “authority to define crimes and prescribe penalties for those

crimes.” Id. The court of appeals concluded that the legislature has the authority to

prescribe life imprisonment as the punishment where a defendant is convicted of

burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a sexual offense and has been

previously convicted of a felony sexual offense, and thus, the mandatory penalty did

not violate the separation of powers of the Texas Constitution. Id.

Here, appellant was convicted of an offense subject to section 709.001’s

mandatory $3,000 fine. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 709.001(b) (imposing fine for an

“offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated”); see TEX.

PENAL CODE § 49.09(c)(1) (defining “offense relating to the operating of a motor

vehicle while intoxicated”). Because the legislature does not violate the separation

of powers when it exercises its exclusive authority to prescribe punishments, the trial

court had no discretion to impose a punishment outside the “legislatively prescribed

boundaries” of section 709.001. Cf. Gilbert v. State, No. 13-24-00530-CR, 2025 WL

2355179, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (holding that mandatory fine imposed under

13 section 709.001 was not “illegal” sentence where legislature “exercised its

constitutional power” to create penalties).

Appellant also argues, without citation to any authority, that section 709.001

violates the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers clause because it removes

prosecutors’ discretion to negotiate plea agreements. Prosecutors belong to the

judicial branch of our state government. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1987) (“By establishing the office of county attorney under Article V,

the authors of the Texas Constitution placed those officers within the Judicial

department.”); Wilson, 348 S.W.3d at 43-44 (conducting separation-of-powers

analysis and concluding prosecutors fall within judicial branch); see TEX. CONST.

art. V, § 21 (vesting county attorneys with power to “represent the State in all cases

in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties” and allowing

legislature to vest such power in “district attorneys”). Because prosecutors belong to

the judicial branch, the result is the same: The legislature’s exercise of its exclusive

power to prescribe criminal penalties does not assume or unduly interfere with any

judicial power.3 The power to define offenses and determine penalties belongs to the

3 Although the Meshell court acknowledged that “some duties of county and district attorneys might more accurately be characterized as executive in nature,” the distinction is unnecessary “because the instant case involves a conflict between the Legislative and Judicial departments.” Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 253 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). In any event, we are bound by Meshell, which concluded that county and criminal district attorneys fall “within the Judicial department” in the context of a separation-of-powers challenge to a statute. Id. at 253.

14 legislature, not the judiciary. We hold that section 709.001 does not violate the

separation-of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution.

2. Vagueness

Because section 709.001 does not implicate activity protected by the First

Amendment, we consider only whether the statute is impermissibly vague as applied

to appellant. Ex parte Barton, 662 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We

first “consider whether the statute is vague as applied to a defendant’s conduct before

considering whether the statute may be vague as applied to the conduct of others.”

Wagner v. State, 539 S.W.3d 298, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Vill. of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)).

A penal statute is void for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly

defined.” State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A statute

is unconstitutionally vague if (1) “it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence

fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute” or (2) “it

encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.” Goocher v. State, 633

S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); State v. River Forest Dev.

Co., 315 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing

Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 499). A statute is not impermissibly vague “merely

because the words or terms used are not specifically defined.” Bynum v. State, 767

S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citation modified). Rather, we must read

15 the words or phrases of the statute in the context in which they are used. Id. (citing

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a)). Undefined terms are given their plain and ordinary

meaning. State v. Gambling Device, 859 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (citing Floyd v. State, 575 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App.

[Panel Op.] 1978)). When the statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislature must

be understood to mean what it has expressed, and we give the statute its plain

meaning unless such a reading would lead to absurd results. Boykin v. State, 818

S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citation modified); McMillian v. State,

388 S.W.3d 866, 871-72 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

Section 709.001(b) of the Texas Transportation Code reads:

Except as provided by Subsection (c), in addition to the fine prescribed for the specific offense, a person who has been finally convicted of an offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated shall pay a fine of:

(1) $3,000 for the first conviction within a 36-month period;

(2) $4,500 for a second or subsequent conviction within a 36-month period; and

(3) $6,000 for a first or subsequent conviction if it is shown on the trial of the offense that an analysis of a specimen of the person’s blood, breath, or urine showed an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed.

TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 709.001(b). Appellant does not contend that the statute fails

to give him fair notice that his conduct—operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated—is prohibited or that the penalty for his conduct is $3,000. He also does

16 not contend that the statute “encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and

convictions.” Goocher, 633 S.W.2d at 865. Rather, he complains only that the time

period—36 months—is vague because it fails to provide notice of when the fine

must be paid or when the 36-month period begins to run.

We disagree with appellant’s interpretation of section 709.001. Read as a

whole, section 709.001 prescribes a system of tiered penalties for driving-while-

intoxicated convictions based on (1) the number of convictions in the past 36 months

or (2) regardless of the number of convictions, the defendant’s alcohol concentration

level at the time of a sample’s analysis. The 36-month period in the statute is not, as

appellant contends, a reference to when the applicable fine must be paid. For

example, subsection 709.001(b)(3) does not include a time period at all because one

is not necessary. Unlike the fines prescribed by subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), the

$6,000 fine in subsection (b)(3) applies to all convictions (“first or subsequent”) if

the requisite condition is satisfied. Appellant points to no statute in which the

legislature has prescribed the time period within which penal fines are to be paid,

and we have found none.4

4 Elsewhere in the Texas Transportation Code, the legislature has prescribed penalties triggered by the number of convictions in a defined time period. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.292(a)(8) (requiring the Department of Public Safety to suspend a person’s driver’s license if “the department determines that the person . . . is under 18 years of age and has been convicted of two or more moving violations committed within a 12-month period” (emphasis added)); id. § 522.081(a)(1)(A) (disqualifying a commercial driver’s license holder from driving a commercial 17 The interpretation of section 709.001 as a tiered-penalty statute is buttressed

by article 42.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Under article 42.15, when

imposing a fine, the trial court has the discretion to direct a defendant to pay (1) “the

entire fine and costs when sentence is pronounced,” (2) “the entire fine and costs at

some later date,” or (3) “a specified portion of the fine and costs at designated

intervals.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.15(b). Article 42.15 makes it unnecessary

for the legislature to prescribe a time period in which to pay a criminal fine under

section 709.001 or any other statute. Here, the trial court exercised its discretion

under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to direct appellant to “pay a specified

portion of the fine . . . at designated intervals.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

42.15(b)(3). That discretion is not inconsistent with section 709.001, which does not

prescribe the time in which the fine can or must be paid. Accordingly, section

709.001 is not impermissibly vague.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

motor vehicle for “60 days if convicted of . . . two serious traffic violations that occur within a three-year period”). We have found no challenges to these statutes as impermissibly vague.

18 Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).