Mark Landon Taylor v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-02155
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Scheele

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Mark Landon Taylor, FILED Feb 02 2026, 8:43 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

February 2, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2155 Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D03-2503-F6-2590

Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges Brown and Felix concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Scheele, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Mark Landon Taylor was convicted of Class A misdemeanors domestic battery

and theft. He raises one issue for our review which we restate as the following

two: whether the trial court violated Taylor’s Sixth Amendment rights in

sentencing him for his domestic battery conviction; and whether the trial court

erred in sentencing Taylor to a probationary period exceeding twelve months

without a statutorily required report substantiating the extension. Finding his

sentence is not unconstitutional and the court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In March 2025, fifty-six-year-old Taylor was residing with his eighty-three-year-

old mother, Beverly Taylor, at Beverly’s home in Carmel. Around 3:00 a.m. on

March 28, Beverly was in bed when she heard Taylor moving around and

yelling loudly. He was cursing and angry about his bad allergies. While still in

bed, Beverly asked Taylor what was wrong and not to yell.

[3] Shortly after, Taylor “burst” into her bedroom and went into her en-suite

bathroom. Tr. Vol. II p. 141. Beverly asked what he was doing, and Taylor

said, “I am freaking out. . . . I need a pill.” Id. at 142. Beverly was prescribed

“lorazepam” for anxiety. Id. at 141. Her prescription was for ten pills, and she

had only taken one; when she later checked the bottle, only eight lorazepam

were left.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 2 of 11 [4] Taylor returned to his room, then Beverly got out of bed and went to the

doorway. From across the hallway, she told Taylor she could not live like this

anymore and told him he needed to move out. Taylor became “very angry” and

told Beverly not only was he not moving out, but his girlfriend was moving in.

Id. at 143. After Beverly told him no one else was moving in, Taylor “very

aggressively came across the hall at [her] . . . and . . . he was yelling[.]” Id.

Beverly put her hands up, but Taylor knocked her hands away, pushed her

“really hard[,]” and Beverly fell to the floor. Id. at 144.

[5] Beverly was frightened, so she dressed and drove to the police station to file a

report. Police went to Beverly’s home and arrested Taylor. Later at trial,

Carmel Police Department Officer Nathaniel Wilson testified that Taylor

“admitted to taking an anxiety pill” after he was handcuffed. Id. at 192. Officer

Wilson also indicated that Taylor “seemed very, not 100% with it[,]” id., and

then slept for the entire ride to jail, which was behavior consistent with

someone who “ingested something or someone under the influence of

something.” Id. at 183.

[6] On March 31, the State charged Taylor with Level 6 felony intimidation, Class

A misdemeanor domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor theft, and alleged he

was a habitual offender. The court held a jury trial on August 5. Taylor testified

that he was experiencing allergy issues and pain from kidney stones that day.

He also admitted that he went into Beverly’s bathroom medicine cabinet and

“took one” of her lorazepam. Id. at 204. The jury found Taylor guilty of Class

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 3 of 11 A misdemeanors domestic battery and theft and not guilty of intimidation; the

habitual offender enhancement was dismissed.

[7] At sentencing the next day, the State admitted Taylor’s “Indiana Criminal

Crossmatch” results, which showed Taylor had prior convictions for possession

of cocaine, operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .10, possession of a

narcotic drug, public intoxication, and possession of marijuana. Ex. Vol. IV. p.

77. Taylor argued against consecutive sentences, alleging his convictions

stemmed from one incident of criminal conduct. The court determined that if it

were to “release [Taylor] short of the 365 days [it could] give him 365 days of

probation on both charges.” Tr. Vol. III p. 12. Taylor said he “won’t add any

further to the consecutive or concurrent argument” and only requested that he

be placed on probation. Id. at 13. Ultimately, the trial court found the sentences

could be served consecutively because the convictions were for separate

criminal acts. 1

[8] For his domestic battery conviction, the court sentenced Taylor to 365 days in

the Hamilton County Jail with 270 days executed and 95 days suspended, plus

365 days of probation. For his theft conviction, Taylor was sentenced to 365

days in the Hamiton County Jail, all suspended, to be served consecutive to his

domestic battery conviction. The court concluded it was “pretty clear from

[Taylor’s] history” and the actions he took “based on a stuffy nose” that Taylor

1 Taylor did not object on any other grounds at sentencing, and he does not re-raise this issue on appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 4 of 11 had a substance problem. Id. at 16. Accordingly, as a condition of his probation,

the court ordered Taylor to submit to a substance-abuse assessment and any

recommended treatment. Taylor now appeals. 2

Discussion and Decision

I. Statutory Maximum and Sixth Amendment

[9] Taylor asserts the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution by imposing a sentence for his domestic battery

conviction that is beyond the statutory maximum. Specifically, Taylor argues

the maximum sentence for his domestic battery conviction is a one-year

combined term of imprisonment and probation. He also argues the court relied

on facts that were not submitted to a jury to conclude that his substance abuse

was either a material element of or contributing factor to his domestic battery

conviction, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

[10] As an initial matter, the State contends Taylor’s argument is waived because he

failed to raise this issue before the trial court. It is well established that issues

may not be raised for the first time on appeal, including constitutional issues.

See e.g., Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (appellant

2 The State filed a motion to dismiss on January 16, 2026, asserting this appeal is moot because Taylor’s sole challenge is to the length of his probation which was revoked after filing of this appeal. However, “[o]ur ‘public interest’ exception to mootness allows us to offer guidance on an issue likely to recur.” G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). Given our conclusion that the misdemeanor sentencing statutes are misapplied by the parties in this case, it is likely the misapplication will recur if not addressed. We therefore proceed to the merits of this appeal. The State’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 5 of 11 waived review of his Sixth Amendment claim that was not raised before the

trial court), trans. denied. However, appellate courts are not prohibited from

addressing waived constitutional claims, and we exercise our discretion to

review Taylor’s constitutional claim here. See Plank v. Comm. Hosps. of Ind., Inc.,

981 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (Ind. 2013).

[11] Generally, “sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of

the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.”

Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). An abuse of

discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual

deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind.

2023) (citation omitted), reh’g. denied. However, we apply a de novo review to

constitutional claims involving matters of law. Healey v. Carter, 109 N.E.3d

1043, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[12] Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to “a jury determination

that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (citation

and brackets omitted). The Apprendi court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. The Supreme Court later clarified that “the

‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge

may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 6 of 11 defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in

original), reh’g. denied. As our Indiana Supreme Court recently summarized,

following Blakely,

a judge could increase a sentence based on only: (1) facts that a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the defendant’s prior convictions and general criminal history, including their probationary status when committing the offense if that status is reflected in a presentence investigation report that a probation officer prepared; (3) facts the defendant admitted; and (4) facts the sentencing judge found after the defendant, in the course of a guilty plea, waived Apprendi rights and consented to judicial fact-finding or the stipulation of certain facts.

Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 853 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied.

[13] Here, however, Taylor’s sentence for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery

did not exceed the statutory maximum. A person who commits a Class A

misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1)

year[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2 (1977). In addition, “[t]he court may suspend

any part of a sentence for a misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-1(a) (2002).

Further,

[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c), whenever the court suspends in whole or in part a sentence for a Class A, Class B, or Class C misdemeanor, it may place the person on probation under IC 35-38-2 for a fixed period of not more than one (1) year, notwithstanding the maximum term of imprisonment for the misdemeanor set forth in sections 2 through 4 of this chapter. However, the combined term of imprisonment and probation for a misdemeanor may not exceed one (1) year.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 7 of 11 I.C. § 35-50-3-1(b) (emphasis added).

[14] However, the parties here agree the trial court judge “used Indiana Code

section 35-50-3-1(c)” to sentence Taylor. Appellant’s Br. p. 9. Thereunder,

[w]henever the court suspends a sentence for a misdemeanor, if the court finds that the use or abuse of alcohol, drugs, or harmful substances is a contributing factor or a material element of the offense, the court may place the person on probation under IC 35-38-2 for a fixed period of not more than two (2) years. However, a court may not place a person on probation for a period of more than twelve (12) months in the absence of a report that substantiates the need for a period of probation that is longer than twelve (12) months for the purpose of completing a course of substance abuse treatment.

I.C. § 35-50-3-1(c).

[15] Subsection (c) provides a statutorily authorized maximum acting as an

exception to subsection (b), as noted by the clear language of the statute. See

State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004) (“If a statute is unambiguous,

that is, susceptible to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and

plain meaning.”). Thus, when Indiana Code sections 35-50-3-2 and 35-50-3-1(a)

and (c) are read together, the statutorily authorized maximum for a single Class

A misdemeanor is a fixed term of imprisonment of not more than one year plus

a maximum of two years on probation if any part of the sentence is suspended

and the court finds substance use was a contributing factor or material element

of the offense.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 8 of 11 [16] Here, for his domestic battery conviction, the court sentenced Taylor to 365

days in the Hamilton County Jail with ninety-five days suspended, plus 365

days on probation. Taylor admitted throughout his trial that he went into

Beverly’s bathroom and took one of her lorazepam, to which he was not

prescribed, shortly before he pushed Beverly down during their argument. At

sentencing, the court considered that Taylor has a substance problem that was

“pretty clear” from his history and the actions he took in the instant case “based

on a stuffy nose[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 16. Therefore, it appears the court concluded

Taylor’s substance use was a “contributing factor” to his offense, which was a

reasonable deduction under these facts and circumstances. I.C. § 35-50-3-1(c);

see Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 269. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its

sentencing discretion in considering these factors. See Smoots, 172 N.E.3d at

1288. Because Taylor’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum under

subsection (c), Blakely does not apply and the Sixth Amendment is not

implicated. 3

II. Mandatory Report

[17] Taylor also asserts the trial court erred in sentencing him to two years of

probation total without the report required under Indiana Code section 35-50-3-

1(c), which provides that a court “may not place a person on probation for a

3 Notably, even if Blakely applied, all the facts the court referenced to support Taylor’s sentence were within categories that Blakely permits: the facts were either admitted by Taylor or were about his criminal history. See Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 854 (it was proper under Blakely for the resentencing court to consider the defendant’s criminal history and his mental limitations where the defendant repeatedly admitted to them in sentencing the defendant beyond the statutory maximum). Thus, no Blakely violation would have occurred.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 9 of 11 period of more than twelve (12) months in the absence of a report that

substantiates the need for a period of probation that is longer than twelve (12)

months for the purpose of completing a course of substance abuse treatment.”

The State concedes there is nothing in the record to indicate that such a report

was filed in this case and the case should be remanded for a new sentencing

hearing. However, “[w]hen the State concedes error, we are nonetheless duty

bound to review the facts and apply the law correctly.” Gardner v. State, 591

N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “Were we to accept a concession as

dispositive of an issue, we would effectively abdicate our judicial function in

favor of a party.” Id. Therefore, we will examine this issue despite the State’s

concession. See e.g., State v. Thomas, 827 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)

(examining an issue raised by the appellant despite the appellee’s concession).

[18] In our view, Indiana Code section 35-50-3-1 provides the maximum

probationary periods that a court may impose for a single misdemeanor

conviction if any part of the sentence is suspended. See Evans, 810 N.E.2d at 337

(“[W]e must give the statute its clear and plain meaning” if it is unambiguous).

Indeed, each subsection under section 35-50-3-1 refers to “a misdemeanor” and

contains no reference to a maximum aggregate sentence where a person is

convicted of and sentenced for multiple misdemeanors. See I.C. §§ 35-50-3-1(a)-

(c).

[19] Here, the court’s sentence included 365 days of probation for Class A

misdemeanor domestic battery and 365 days of probation for Class A

misdemeanor theft. Thus, neither probationary period is more than twelve

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 10 of 11 months, so no report was required under section 35-50-3-1(c). If Taylor wished

to raise an issue regarding his aggregate sentence, he could have reasserted his

trial objection regarding whether his sentences could be served consecutively;

he did not do so. The court did not err in sentencing Taylor to 365 days of

probation for each misdemeanor conviction without a section 35-50-3-1(c)

report.

III. Conclusion

[20] For Taylor’s domestic battery conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence

below the statutory maximum and did not abuse its sentencing discretion.

Thus, the trial court did not violate Taylor’s rights under the Sixth Amendment

because Blakely does not apply. Further, the court did not err in sentencing

Taylor under Indiana Code section 35-50-3-1(c) in the absence of the

mandatory report. We affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

[22] Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael D. Frischkorn Brand & Morelock Greenfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2155 | February 2, 2026 Page 11 of 11