Mark E. Towner v. A Place for Rover Inc.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00553
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MARK E. TOWNER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00553-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY 9 v. 10 A PLACE FOR ROVER INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13

14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant A Place for Rover, Inc.’s 16 motion for a temporary stay of discovery. Dkt. No. 128. Having reviewed the motion, 17 Plaintiff Mark Towner’s response, Dkt. No. 131, Defendant’s reply, Dkt. No. 135, 18 and all other supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the motion. 19 2. BACKGROUND 20 Defendant Rover is an online service where pet owners may book services 21 from individuals interested in offering pet care services. Towner’s wife used Rover 22 to schedule a two-week long boarding stay for their dog, Bella, with Janis Cook. 23 1 Dkt. No. 117 (“TAC”) at 2. When Towner arrived at the Cook residence to drop off 2 Bella, both he and Bella were attacked by Cook’s dog. Id.

3 Towner brings tort and contract claims against Rover arising from that 4 attack, including negligence, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional 5 distress, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 3–6. He seeks between 6 $750,000.00 and $2,000,000.00 in damages. Id. 7 The Court previously dismissed the majority of Towner’s claims against a 8 number of individual, organizational, and municipal defendants. See Dkt. No. 116.

9 Towner filed his Third Amended Complaint on November 6, 2025, naming Rover 10 and three of its executives as defendants. See TAC. Towner voluntarily dismissed 11 the executives, see Dkt. No. 118, leaving Rover as the only remaining defendant. 12 3. DISCUSSION 13 Rover has moved to dismiss Towner’s claims, Dkt. No. 127, and that motion is 14 now ripe for consideration. Rover also seeks to stay all discovery until the Court 15 rules on the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 128. The Court agrees that a stay is

16 warranted. 17 “[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and 18 courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz 19 v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (collecting cases). And district courts have “wide 20 discretion in controlling discovery,” including by staying discovery. See Little v. City 21 of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988).

22 23 1 Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider several factors in determining whether a 2 discovery stay is appropriate. Lomibao v. AGC Biologics Inc., No. 2:25-CV-00361-

3 JHC, 2025 WL 2663178, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025). These factors include: 4 (1) whether the pending motion could dispose of the entire case; (2) whether the motion could be decided without additional discovery; (3) 5 the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay; (4) the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to 6 go forward; and (5) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law 7 which could be expected to result from a stay. Id. (quotation modified). 8 Rover’s request easily satisfies the first, third, fourth, and fifth factors. The 9 outcome of Rover’s motion may very well result in the disposal of the entire case. 10 And despite Towner’s claims that a stay “would prejudice [him] and is inconsistent 11 with Ninth Circuit practice,” see Dkt. No. 131 at 3, he offers no evidence or 12 argument about how a stay would cause him individual harm or otherwise prejudice 13 his case, which has been pending for over a year. Rover, on the other hand, faces 14 real hardship, as Towner has already moved to compel certain discovery responses, 15 see Dkt. No. 130, and permitting discovery to continue would require Rover to 16 litigate that dispute—and potentially others—before the Court has even determined 17 whether Towner’s claims survive dismissal. And finally, resolving the threshold 18 legal questions before opening discovery will promote judicial efficiency. 19 As to the second factor, Towner claims that Rover’s argument that his claims 20 are barred under 47 U.S.C. § 230 is a factual inquiry that necessarily requires 21 discovery to be decided. Dkt. No. 131 at 3. This “requires the court to take a 22 ‘preliminary peek’ at the merits of the pending, potentially dispositive motion to 23 1 determine whether a stay is granted.” Zeiger v. Hotel California by the Sea LLC, No. 2 C21-1702-TL-SKV, 2022 WL 1499670, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2022) (quoting

3 Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC., 20CV2432-JLS(BLM), 2021 WL 2284113, at *2 4 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2021)). Here, while Rover invokes Section 230 immunity in its 5 motion to dismiss, it also argues that Towner’s claims fail for independent reasons. 6 See, e.g., Dkt. No. 127 at 13 (arguing that Towner’s negligence claim fails on the 7 merits). As a result of this “preliminary peek,” the Court is satisfied that no 8 additional discovery is needed in order to rule on the pending motion to dismiss.1

9 4. CONCLUSION 10 The Court ORDERS that all discovery is stayed until the Court rules on 11 Rover’s pending motion to dismiss. The Clerk is instructed to STRIKE all remaining 12 pretrial dates and the trial date in this matter. See Dkt. No. 114. Towner’s motion 13 to compel, Dkt. No. 130, is DENIED with leave to renew should the stay be lifted. 14 Dated this 23rd day of [Pick the date]. 15 A Jamal N. Whitehead 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20

21 1 In the alternative, that a motion to dismiss is premised on Section 230 immunity does not necessary preclude the dismissal of claims on the pleadings. See Morton v. 22 Twitter, Inc., No. CV 20-10434-GW-JEMX, 2021 WL 1181753, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2021) (dismissing with prejudice claims brought against Twitter on the basis of 23 Section 230 immunity).