MARK D. NELSON v. ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TOWN OF WILMINGTON & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0988
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-988

MARK D. NELSON

vs.

ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TOWN OF WILMINGTON & another. 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Mark D. Nelson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus and

for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to compel the

town of Wilmington (town) to issue him a certificate of

constructive approval of a building permit. On the town's

motion for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge

concluded that all of Nelson's claims were barred by res

judicata. Judgment entered dismissing the complaint with

prejudice, and Nelson appealed.

As the judge wrote in his decision, Nelson's "claims have

been previously litigated on multiple occasions and are clearly

precluded by the doctrine of res judicata." The judge's

1 The town of Wilmington. conclusion was sound. This is the fourth lawsuit filed by

Nelson or his privies regarding the building permit, and the

second of those lawsuits involved the specific question of

whether Nelson was entitled to a certificate of constructive

approval of the building permit. In an unpublished memorandum

and order, a panel of this court concluded that he was not. See

Neli Ridge, LLC v. Town Clerk of Wilmington, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

1109 (2018). 2

In his appellate brief, Nelson does not explain why his

claims are not barred by res judicata. In fact, his brief does

not mention the terms "res judicata" or "preclusion" or address

the substance of the judge's ruling in any way. While we are

not insensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented

litigants, such litigants are still bound by the court's rules.

See Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417

Mass. 183, 184 (1994). As Nelson's brief is inadequate to

enable meaningful appellate review, he has given us no reason to

disturb the judgment. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as

appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) ("appellate court need not

pass upon questions or issues not argued in the brief"); Gaffney

2 The second lawsuit was filed by a trust that, at least at the time, owned the property in question. As noted by the panel in its decision, Nelson was the trustee of the trust.

2 v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 6 n.4

(1996).

The town has requested an award of appellate attorney's

fees and double costs on the ground that the appeal is

frivolous. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we

agree that the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, the town may

file an application for appellate attorney's fees and double

costs within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision.

Nelson shall have fourteen days thereafter to respond. See

Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Shin & Tan, JJ. 3),

Clerk

Entered: June 4, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.