Mark Anthony Pena v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 1, 2006
Docket13-04-00656-CR
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
Mark Anthony Pena v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

NUMBER 13-04-656-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

MARK ANTHONY PENA,                                                                Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                    Appellee.

On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Castillo

                      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

Appellant, Mark Pena, was found guilty of robbery, and as a habitual felony offender as proven by enhancement allegations in the indictment, was sentenced to thirty-five years= imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  On appeal, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove the enhancement allegations.  We affirm.


I.  BACKGROUND 

On September 9, 2004, appellant attacked and then robbed Kevin Felix of his car and cell phone.  Later that night, Felix identified appellant as his assailant.  Along with robbery, the indictment also cited appellant=s two prior felony convictions.[1]  During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant testified that he had served time in prison for both of the convictions cited in the indictment.                   

II.  ENHANCEMENT ALLEGATIONS

By his sole issue, appellant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the same person previously convicted, as alleged in the enhancement allegation. 


In evaluating this issue, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that appellant was the same person convicted in the prior offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).  There are various acceptable methods to prove the prior criminal record of a defendant.  Lyle v. State, 669 S.W.2d 853, 855‑56 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1984, no pet.).  These include the following:  (1) testimony of a witness who identifies the defendant as the same person previously convicted; (2) stipulation or judicial admission of the defendant; (3) introduction of certified copies of the judgment and sentence and record of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail, including fingerprints of the defendant, supported by expert testimony identifying them with known prints of the defendant; and (4) comparison by the fact finder of a record of conviction that contains photographs and a detailed physical description of the named person with the appearance of the defendant in court.  Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Lyle, 669 S.W.2d at 856.  However, this list is not exclusive or exhaustive.  Human, 749 S.W.2d at 835.  Each case should be judged on its own individual merits.  Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 32.

During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant testified that he had been convicted of aggravated assault in 1987 and burglary of a habitation in 1991, the two prior convictions alleged for enhancement.  See Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31; Lyle, 669 S.W.2d at 856.  When an accused admits a prior offense or conviction, his testimony is sufficient to connect him with the prior conviction, and the state need not offer any further evidence to support this issue.  Wright v. State, 932 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.BTyler 1995, no pet.) (citing Rascon v. State, 496 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).  We conclude a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the same person convicted of the prior offenses.  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Human, 749 S.W.2d at 834.  Appellant=s issue is overruled. 

III.  CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

______________________

ROGELIO VALDEZ

Chief Valdez

Do not publish.                                             

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 1st day of June, 2006.



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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Littles v. State
726 S.W.2d 26 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Rascon v. State
496 S.W.2d 99 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1973)
Lyle v. State
669 S.W.2d 853 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1984)
Wright v. State
932 S.W.2d 572 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Human v. State
749 S.W.2d 832 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1988)

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Mark Anthony Pena v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mark-anthony-pena-v-state-texapp-2006.