Mark Allen Pleasant and Tralen Robert Doler v. Scott David Dunckley

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00224
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE 2 U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Nov 03, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 MARK ALLEN PLEASANT and TRALEN ROBERT DOLER, 9 No. 2:24-CV-00224-RLP Plaintiffs, 10 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. 11 DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 12 SCOTT DAVID DUNCKLEY, 13 Defendant. 14 15 On September 11, 2025, Defendant Scott David Dunckley filed a Motion to 16 Dismiss Plaintiff Mark Allen Pleasant’s claims on the basis of Bankruptcy 17 Judicial Estoppel, ECF No. 31. Mr. Pleasant opposed the Motion. ECF No. 34. 18 Mr. Dunckley later filed a Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 35. 19 For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Dunckley’s Motion to Dismiss is denied. His 20 Motion to Strike is therefore denied as moot. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Mr. Dunckley seeks dismissal of Mr. Pleasant’s claims based on a 2016 3 bankruptcy petition. Mr. Pleasant argues the Court must convert the present Rule

4 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because, in ruling 5 on the motion, the Court will need to consider evidence outside the pleadings and 6 judicially noticeable documents.

7 As a general rule, in considering a motion to dismiss, courts are limited to 8 the allegations in the complaint and judicially-noticeable documents. The Court 9 can, for example, take judicial notice of the docket in Mr. Pleasant’s bankruptcy 10 prior proceedings and the filing of specific documents in that case because the

11 documents are public records. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (“[A] paper filed in a case 12 under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records[.]”); see 13 also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 857 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We

14 take judicial notice of the bankruptcy court order, because it is a matter of public 15 record.” (citations omitted)). 16 A complaint may be dismissed on the basis of judicial estoppel where the 17 Court does not need to consider evidence outside of the pleadings. See Dzakula v.

18 McHugh, 746 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2014). However, where the Court finds it 19 necessary to review evidence beyond the pleadings to assess whether prior 20 bankruptcy proceedings foreclosed a claim, it must treat the motion as one for 1 summary judgment under Rule 56. Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep't of Transp., 733 2 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 2013); see also FRCP 12(d). 3 Here, there is a dispute as to when Mr. Pleasant’s claim began accruing. In

4 Washington, the statute of limitations of childhood sexual abuse is tolled until the 5 time in which the victim discovers the causal connection between the defendant’s 6 acts and the injuries for which the claim is brought. Hollmann v. Corcoran, 89 Wn.

7 App. 323, 949 P.2d 386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Mr. Pleasant has filed a 8 declaration stating that his claim was tolled until around 2020 or 2021. ECF No. 9 34-1 at ¶17. Mr. Dunckley argues that it began in 1989, but provides no evidence 10 disputing Mr. Pleasant’s position. ECF No. 31 at 2. Reading these facts in the light

11 most favorable to Mr. Pleasant1, he has shown that a genuine issue of material fact 12 exists such to survive a motion for summary judgment. See FRCP 56(a). 13 The deadline for dispositive motions has now closed. See ECF No. 26. The

14 Court thus finds it necessary to schedule a status conference to address the current 15 procedural posture of this case. Specifically, the Court requires clarification from 16 the parties regarding how they intend to proceed in light of the motion to strike and 17

1 In considering a motion for summary judgment, “[a]ll evidence and 18 inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 19 T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 20 1987). 1|| the representations made by the parties. Given that the dispositive motion deadline has passed, a status conference will allow the Court to establish an appropriate schedule for the remainder of this case. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 5 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 31, is DENIED. 2. Defendant’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 35, is DENIED as moot. 7 3. The Parties are instructed to contact the Courtroom Deputy at to schedule a 8 status conference in this matter. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to enter this Order and to provide copies to counsel. MI DATED November 3, 2025. □□□ se 13 ~ REBECCA L. PENNELL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ADTRTD TRICRATCOOIRID RTATIARTC 64