UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MARK A. JONES,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-655-JPS v.
KENDRA RACE, RONALD ORDER KRUEGER, TONIA ROZMARYNOSKI, LT. WASIELEWSKI, A. DEGROOT, and CAPTAIN MATUSHAK,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Mark A. Jones, an inmate confined at Green Bay Correctional Institution (“GBCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. ECF 1. On August 6, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against various defendants for their deliberate indifference to the serious risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. ECF No. 9. This Order grants Defendants’ motion to screen the amended complaint, ECF No. 15, and therefore screens the amended complaint, ECF No. 11. 1. SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 1.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 1.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings the amended complaint against Defendants Kendra Race (“Race”), Ronald Krueger (“Krueger”), Tonia Rozmarynoski (“Rozmarynoski”), Lt. Wasielewski (“Wasielewski”), A. DeGroot (“DeGroot”), and Captain Matushak (“Matushak”). ECF No. 11 at 1. On October 17, 2024, Plaintiff was placed under suicide observation. Id. at 2. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff started banging his head against the cell door window. Id. at 2. C.O. Eihmerson performed his job by telling his supervisors, Race and Krueger, about Plaintiff’s self-harm. Id. Race and Krueger came to Plaintiff’s cell to talk to him but then left to tell Rozmarynoski. Id. Plaintiff was still banging his head against the wall at this time. Id. Race returned with Rozmarynoski, who looked at Plaintiff but then walked away. These defendants did nothing to prevent Plaintiff from continuing to harm himself. Id. On November 12, 2024, inmate complaint examiner DeGroot supposedly investigated Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 3. Degroot lied and said Plaintiff was kicking the door instead of banging his head. Id. Wasielewski wrote a conduct report for lying almost identical to Degroot’s investigation. Id. Plaintiff went to a hearing on the conduct report and Matushak found him guilty for lying without evidence. Id. This was done in retaliation for Plaintiff’s inmate complaint and was intended to deter him from filing future complaints. Id. The conduct report was later overturned by the Warden after Plaintiff had already served the time. Id. 1.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Race, Krueger, and Rozmarynoski for their indifference to the risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety and to ensure that inmates receive adequate care.” Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56, 2019 WL 318403, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). While a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment, not every claim by a prisoner that he did not receive adequate care will succeed. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff will have to provide evidence showing that “(1) his medical need was objectively serious, and (2) the defendant[] consciously disregarded this need.” Berry v. Lutsey, 780 F. App’x 365, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Prison staff have a duty to prevent inmates from causing serious harm to themselves. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014). Before an official will be liable for ignoring a risk of self-harm, however, the “risk of future harm must be sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Davis-Clair v. Turck, 714 F. App’x 605, 606 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of when that risk of future harm becomes “sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers” depends on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “at some point,” to ensure a prisoner is not “seriously endangering his health,” prison officials would have a duty and right to step in and force a prisoner on a hunger strike to take nourishment); see also Davis v. Gee, No. 14-cv-617, 2017 WL 2880869, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2017) (holding that to show a constitutional injury, the harm must present an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of serious damage to future health; swallowing a handful of Tylenol fails to do that).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MARK A. JONES,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-655-JPS v.
KENDRA RACE, RONALD ORDER KRUEGER, TONIA ROZMARYNOSKI, LT. WASIELEWSKI, A. DEGROOT, and CAPTAIN MATUSHAK,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Mark A. Jones, an inmate confined at Green Bay Correctional Institution (“GBCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. ECF 1. On August 6, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against various defendants for their deliberate indifference to the serious risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. ECF No. 9. This Order grants Defendants’ motion to screen the amended complaint, ECF No. 15, and therefore screens the amended complaint, ECF No. 11. 1. SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 1.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 1.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings the amended complaint against Defendants Kendra Race (“Race”), Ronald Krueger (“Krueger”), Tonia Rozmarynoski (“Rozmarynoski”), Lt. Wasielewski (“Wasielewski”), A. DeGroot (“DeGroot”), and Captain Matushak (“Matushak”). ECF No. 11 at 1. On October 17, 2024, Plaintiff was placed under suicide observation. Id. at 2. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff started banging his head against the cell door window. Id. at 2. C.O. Eihmerson performed his job by telling his supervisors, Race and Krueger, about Plaintiff’s self-harm. Id. Race and Krueger came to Plaintiff’s cell to talk to him but then left to tell Rozmarynoski. Id. Plaintiff was still banging his head against the wall at this time. Id. Race returned with Rozmarynoski, who looked at Plaintiff but then walked away. These defendants did nothing to prevent Plaintiff from continuing to harm himself. Id. On November 12, 2024, inmate complaint examiner DeGroot supposedly investigated Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 3. Degroot lied and said Plaintiff was kicking the door instead of banging his head. Id. Wasielewski wrote a conduct report for lying almost identical to Degroot’s investigation. Id. Plaintiff went to a hearing on the conduct report and Matushak found him guilty for lying without evidence. Id. This was done in retaliation for Plaintiff’s inmate complaint and was intended to deter him from filing future complaints. Id. The conduct report was later overturned by the Warden after Plaintiff had already served the time. Id. 1.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Race, Krueger, and Rozmarynoski for their indifference to the risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety and to ensure that inmates receive adequate care.” Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56, 2019 WL 318403, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). While a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment, not every claim by a prisoner that he did not receive adequate care will succeed. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff will have to provide evidence showing that “(1) his medical need was objectively serious, and (2) the defendant[] consciously disregarded this need.” Berry v. Lutsey, 780 F. App’x 365, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Prison staff have a duty to prevent inmates from causing serious harm to themselves. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014). Before an official will be liable for ignoring a risk of self-harm, however, the “risk of future harm must be sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Davis-Clair v. Turck, 714 F. App’x 605, 606 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of when that risk of future harm becomes “sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers” depends on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “at some point,” to ensure a prisoner is not “seriously endangering his health,” prison officials would have a duty and right to step in and force a prisoner on a hunger strike to take nourishment); see also Davis v. Gee, No. 14-cv-617, 2017 WL 2880869, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2017) (holding that to show a constitutional injury, the harm must present an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of serious damage to future health; swallowing a handful of Tylenol fails to do that). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Race, Krueger, and Rozmarynoski were aware that he wanted to self-harm and failed to appropriately act. Plaintiff further alleges that after these defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s condition, Plaintiff engaged in self-harm. At this early stage, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Race, Krueger, and Rozmarynoski for their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s risk of self-harm. The Court does not find, however, that Plaintiff states a claim against DeGroot. For a prison official to be personally liable, he must have participated in some way with the alleged constitutional violation. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003). Generally, the denial of a grievance “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). DeGroot’s denial of Plaintiff’s prisoner grievance does not show that he participated in the constitutional deprivation. Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim against Wasielewski and Matushak. To prevail on a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must ultimately show that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Plaintiff alleges that these defendants retaliated against him for filing an inmate grievance. It is well established that a prisoner’s ability to file complaints is protected by the First Amendment. See Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2016). As for the second element, Plaintiff alleges suffering deprivations—having a false conduct report filed against him and being found guilty with no evidence—that, we can infer, would likely dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from exercising further First Amendment activity. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (prison transfer likely to deter). At the pleadings stage, the Court therefore finds these allegations sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Wasielewski and Matushak. Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed against any defendants for a Fourteenth Amendment claim for a deprivation of liberty without due process. A prisoner challenging the process he was afforded in a prison disciplinary proceeding must meet two requirements: (1) he has a liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with; and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 1994)). “A prisoner’s liberty interest, and incumbent entitlement to procedural due process protections, generally extends only to freedom from deprivations that ‘impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483– 84 (1995)). In the absence of an “atypical and significant” deprivation, the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause are not triggered. Id. Disciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections. Marion v. Columbia Correctional Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). When making the determination whether an inmate is entitled to such protections, courts analyze “the combined import of the duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner during that period.” Id. If conditions in segregation are significantly harsher than those in the normal prison environment, then a liberty interest may arise even when the duration of the segregation, standing alone, would not trigger such an interest. Id. at 697–98. On the one hand, “six months of segregation is ‘not such an extreme term’ and, standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.” Id. at 698 (quoting Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995)). On the other end of the spectrum, transfer to a maximum-security prison and placement in segregated confinement for an indefinite duration where virtually all sensory and environmental stimuli are denied, little human contact is permitted, and prisoners otherwise eligible for parole are disqualified from parole eligibility, taken together, impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. Id. at 697 (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 549 U.S. 209, 224 (2005)). Once a liberty or property interest has been invoked, the Court looks to what process was due. Prison disciplinary hearings satisfy procedural due process requirements where an inmate is provided: (1) written notice of the charge against the prisoner twenty four (24) hours prior to the hearing; (2) the right to appear in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses and to present physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not unduly jeopardize the safety of the institution or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the action taken against the prisoner. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563– 69 (1974); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988). Not only must the requirements of Wolff be satisfied, but the decision of the disciplinary hearing board must be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain facts showing that Defendants interfered with a liberty interest. Plaintiff alleges only that he received a disciplinary disposition but he does not include any facts about the conditions or length of time in segregation. On these facts alone, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff suffered an atypical and significant deprivation. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698. Accordingly, based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff had a protected liberty interest. As such, Plaintiff may not proceed on a due process claim. 2. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b): Claim One: Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Race, Krueger, and Rozmarynoski for their indifference to the serious risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. Claim Two: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Wasielewski and Matushak. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to screen the amended complaint, ECF No. 15, be and the same is hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant DeGroot be and the same is hereby DISMISSED from this action; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, a copy of the amended complaint and this Order have been electronically transmitted to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Defendants Race, Krueger, Rozmarynoski, Wasielewski, and Matushak; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint, ECF No. 11; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants raise any exhaustion- related challenges by filing a motion for summary judgment within forty- five (45) days of service; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED if Defendants contemplate a motion to dismiss, the parties must meet and confer before the motion is filed. Defendants should take care to explain the reasons why they intend to move to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff should strongly consider filing an amended complaint. The Court expects this exercise in efficiency will obviate the need to file most motions to dismiss. Indeed, when the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it typically grants leave to amend unless it is “certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Harris v. Meisner, No. 20-2650, 2021 WL 5563942, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021) (quoting Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 524 (7th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, it is in both parties’ interest to discuss the matter prior to motion submissions. Briefs in support of, or opposition to, motions to dismiss should cite no more than ten (10) cases per claim. No string citations will be accepted. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is hereby warned that he must file a response, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.), or he may be deemed to have waived any argument against dismissal and face dismissal of this matter with prejudice. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 22nd day of June, 2026. \BXTH K OURT: SHRG \P. raueller U.5. District Judge
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Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. If mail is received directly to the Court’s chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.