MARITZA M. KNIGHT v. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & Another.

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-930

MARITZA M. KNIGHT

vs.

DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Maritza M. Knight, appeals from a District

Court judgment affirming a determination by the Department of

Unemployment Assistance (DUA) that she is ineligible for

unemployment benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 25 (e) (1).

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the DUA review examiner

(examiner) erred in determining that she did not resign for

urgent and compelling reasons and by failing to assess whether

further attempts by the plaintiff to preserve her employment

would have been futile. We affirm.

1Walker Home for Children. We are informed on appeal that the name of the entity is Walker, Inc. However, where the plaintiff has referred to the entity as Walker Home for Children throughout, we use that name in the case caption. Background. We summarize the examiner's factual findings,

supplementing them as necessary with materials from the

administrative record. From September 2022 to November 2023,

the plaintiff worked as a special education teacher for Walker

Home for Children (employer), at a therapeutic school in

Watertown. She lived in Fitchburg, which was roughly a ninety-

minute drive from the school. The plaintiff suffered from

glaucoma, with symptoms including headaches, eye pain, and

blurry vision, which were exacerbated by her long commute. Her

physician had advised her to cut back on driving, so to avoid

the drive, the plaintiff sometimes had her husband drive her to

work, rode the train, or rented a hotel room. She also asked

the employer if she could sleep at a school boarding facility,

but the employer said that it was for students only. On

November 1, 2023, the plaintiff went to the emergency room with

eye pain and a migraine headache. A doctor diagnosed her with

work-related stress. The next day, she resigned from her

employment, citing health concerns.

In December 2023, the DUA notified the plaintiff that she

was not entitled to receive unemployment benefits because her

resignation was considered voluntary. The plaintiff appealed

from that notice, and a hearing was held before the examiner.

The examiner upheld the notice, and the plaintiff appealed from

2 that decision to the DUA board of review (board) and then to the

District Court, both of which confirmed the original notice.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. Our review of the

board's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See

G. L. c. 151A, § 42. "The agency's decision may only be set

aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported

by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am.,

Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447

Mass. 852, 857 (2006). "In reviewing an agency's decision, the

court 'shall give due weight to the experience, technical

competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as

to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.'" Id.,

quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). We review the board's decision

to determine "whether [it] contains sufficient findings to

demonstrate that the correct legal principles were applied, and

whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence."

Norfolk County Retirement Sys. v. Director of the Dep't of Labor

& Workforce Dev., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 764 (2006).

"Substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lisbon v.

3 Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 257

(1996), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).2

2. Substantial evidence. At the hearing, the plaintiff

had the burden to prove that her reasons for leaving her

employment were of "such an urgent, compelling and necessitous

nature as to make [her] separation involuntary." G. L. c. 151A,

§ 25 (e). To meet this standard, the plaintiff had to

demonstrate that she made "a reasonable attempt to correct those

conditions of employment which [she] now claims justified [her]

leaving [her] employment," or that "such an attempt would have

been futile." Kowalski v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,

391 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1984).

The plaintiff argues that the examiner's findings compelled

the conclusion that she took reasonable steps to preserve her

employment, and that his contrary conclusion was unsupported by

the evidence. Furthermore, she contends that requesting a leave

of absence prior to resigning would have been futile, yet the

examiner failed to address futility in his findings. We

disagree that the examiner's conclusion was unsupported by

2 The board's summary decision stated that the examiner's decision was based on substantial evidence and was free from any errors of law affecting substantive rights. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the examiner's decision, which was effectively adopted by the board.

4 substantial evidence and conclude that the examiner was not

required to address futility on this record.

a. Reasonable efforts to preserve employment. The

examiner acknowledged that the plaintiff made some efforts to

minimize her driving when it was difficult for her to travel.

However, the plaintiff was not advised by a doctor to leave her

job and "did not attempt to preserve her job by requesting an

accommodation, such as a leave of absence," despite the employer

sending her information on how to take one. Although requesting

a leave of absence is not required for a plaintiff to

demonstrate an attempt to preserve employment, it is a proper

factor for an examiner to consider. See Dohoney v. Director of

Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 333, 336 (1979).

Additionally, the plaintiff did not notify the employer about

the difficulty of her commute due to her glaucoma before

resigning, making it impossible for the examiner to evaluate

which specific accommodations the employer would have been

willing to provide. See Ducharme v. Commissioner of Dep't of

Employment & Training, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 209 (2000)

(analysis of employee's efforts to preserve employment included

willingness of employer to make accommodations). The

plaintiff's evidence of the steps she took to preserve her

employment, such as taking the train or staying at a nearby

hotel, lacked detail. For example, she wrote in her application

5 for unemployment benefits that the train once was delayed due to

flooding on the track but did not provide enough detail for the

examiner to conclude the train was generally not a viable

option. Because the plaintiff did not seek a leave of absence

to explore other arrangements to address her health concerns,

notify the employer of her need for accommodations, or explain

her independent attempts to preserve employment in sufficient

detail, the examiner's determination that she "did not prove she

left for urgent and compelling reasons" was supported by

substantial evidence. See Sohler v. Director of the Div. of

Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 785, 788 n.1 (1979) (burden of proof

for all aspects of eligibility for unemployment benefits rests

with worker).

b. Futility. At her hearing, the plaintiff did not argue

that accommodation requests would have been futile or present

any evidence that would support such a finding. To the

contrary, when asked by the examiner why she did not request a

paid leave of absence, the plaintiff said she was not aware she

had the option and suggested it could have helped her take time

off for medical appointments.3 The examiner was required to make

findings on "material issues presented by the record," but he

3 The examiner found that the employer sent the plaintiff information on how to take medical leave.

6 need not have addressed futility sua sponte when the plaintiff

did not raise it. Smith v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,

376 Mass. 563, 566 (1978) (remand necessary where employee

argued workplace policy leading to his termination was not

typically enforced, and examiner made no findings on credibility

of his evidence on this contention).4

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, C.J., Meade & Brennan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: July 21, 2026.

4 Even if the examiner had addressed futility, the record did not support a finding that efforts by the plaintiff to correct the conditions of employment that she claimed justified resignation would have been futile. At her hearing and in response to earlier DUA questionnaires on her eligibility for benefits, the plaintiff described a variety of health issues contributing to her resignation, including high blood pressure, stress, and glaucoma. She also presented a doctor's note stating it was "difficult for her to drive at night." Although the plaintiff contends on appeal that a leave of absence would not have had any impact on her glaucoma, it could have ameliorated her other conditions, and accommodations like an earlier schedule to limit her nighttime driving might have been possible. However, because she neither requested these options from her employer nor presented evidence on them at her hearing, the examiner could not have made findings on their potential efficacy. See Ducharme, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 209 (employee failed to demonstrate seeking accommodations would have been futile where employer signaled openness to accommodations that employee did not pursue).

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.