Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. 6.85 Acres of Land

537 F. Supp. 2d 223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15353
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedFebruary 29, 2008
DocketCivil 08-30-B-H
StatusPublished

This text of 537 F. Supp. 2d 223 (Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. 6.85 Acres of Land) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. 6.85 Acres of Land, 537 F. Supp. 2d 223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15353 (D. Me. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY

D. BROCK HORNBY, District Judge.

Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC (“Maritimes”) is constructing facilities to add regasified liquified natural gas (“LNG”) to its pipeline services from Canada. It has obtained a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for that purpose. 1 Possession of that certificate gives it certain condem *225 nation powers under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), provided that just compensation is paid to the landowners.

In this condemnation proceeding, Mari-times seeks a preliminary injunction to allow it immediate possession and entry onto property known as Woodchopping Ridge via a corridor known as the Stud Mill Road so as to construct a compressor station at Woodchopping Ridge. At oral argument, Maritimes’ lawyer limited its request for injunctive relief regarding the Stud Mill Road to construction access (i.e., temporary access). The defendant Echo Easement Corridor, LLC (“Echo”) claims property rights in these locations and has objected on various grounds.

After oral argument and upon consideration of affidavits and exhibits, I GraNT the motion for a preliminary injunction.

The STANDARDS FOR A PRELIMINARY Injunction

Maritimes must meet four requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits of its condemnation claim; (2) irreparable injury if the injunctive relief is denied; (3) a balance of harms in its favor as compared to the injury to the defendant; and (4) an effect on the public interest that is not detrimental. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2006); Gorman v. Coogan, 273 F.Supp.2d 131, 133-34 (D.Me.2003).

(1) Likelihood of Success

To succeed on the merits of its condemnation claim, Maritimes must show:

(a) The existence of a FERC certificate that covers the property it proposes to condemn;
(b) An inability to obtain the property by private contract; and
(c)Value of the property exceeding $3,000.

See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. Decoulos, 146 Fed.Appx. 495, 498 (1st Cir.2005) (noting that “[o]nce a CPCN is issued by the FERC, and the gas company is unable to acquire the needed land by contract or agreement with the owner, the only issue before the district court in the ensuing eminent domain proceeding is the amount to be paid to the property owner as just compensation for the taking”). I approach them in reverse order.

It is undisputed that the property value here exceeds $3,000.

Echo contends that Maritimes has not engaged in good faith negotiations to acquire the disputed property interests privately and voluntarily. I have previously held that there is no good faith negotiation requirement in § 717f(h). Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys. v. 1.28 Acres of Land, Order on Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., No. 98-50, slip op. at 5-7 (D. Me. June 5, 1998). The First Circuit agrees. Decou-los, 146 Fed.Appx. at 498 (“Absent any credible authority making good faith negotiation a requirement precedent to the condemnation action, we decline the invitation to create one in this case.”) (internal citations omitted).

Echo maintains that Maritimes did not even notify it of any intent to acquire its interest in the Stud Mill Road until very recently. Aff. of David C. Hooper, ¶ 8, attached to Def. Echo’s Opp’n to PL’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Docket Item 29). The reason was that Maritimes believed that it had sufficient ownership of easement rights by private deed that it did not need consent from Echo. 2 In any event, *226 Maritimes had a private independent appraisal performed of the interests it proposes to take, it offered Echo more than the appraisal, and Echo rejected the offer. Aff. of Franklin S. Gessner, ¶¶ 13-14 (Feb. 22, 2008), attached to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Docket Item 17). No more is required. See Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys., slip op. at 5-7.

Finally, Echo claims that Mari-times’ FERC certificate does not cover the property it proposes to condemn. 3 I disagree. The Quad Map and Aerial Site Plan filed with the application for the certificate sufficiently identify the location of the Woodchopping Ridge compressor station and the Stud Mill Road, identifying the latter as an “access road.” Aff. of Franklin S. Gessner, ¶ 4 & Exs. A, B (Feb. 27, 2008) (Docket Item 33). Later filings with FERC continue to identify the locations. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8 & Exs. C, E.

Echo argues that the Environmental Conditions (attached to the FERC order granting the certificate) limit Maritimes to condemning “facilities” and that “facilities” as defined in the certificate nowhere includes the Stud Mill Road. What the Environmental Conditions actually say is this: “The authorized facility locations shall be shown in the [Environmental Assessment], as supplemented by filed alignment sheets.... Maritimes’ exercise of eminent domain authority granted under [§ 717f(h) ] in any condemnation proceedings related to the Order must be consistent with these authorized facilities and locations.” FERC Order, Appx. B: Environmental Conditions for Maritimes’ Phase IV Project, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). This precise language does not support Echo’s narrow interpretation that Maritimes’ condemnation authority is specifically limited to only the expressly authorized facilities.

In granting a certificate, FERC has the power to authorize “the whole or any part of the operation ... covered by the application” and to attach conditions to the certificate “as the public convenience and necessity may require.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e). In accordance with the Environmental Assessment, the FERC Order authorizes Maritimes “to construct and operate facilities, as described more fully in this order and in the application.” FERC Order ¶ 43. While the FERC order does not specifically mention the Stud Mill Road, it expressly authorizes the proposed compressor facilities at Woodchopping Ridge. See id. ¶ 7. As explained supra, Maritimes’ application to FERC clearly identified the Stud Mill Road as an “access road” to the Woodchopping Ridge property. FERC did not attach any conditions to, or otherwise limit, Maritimes’ application in a way that would exclude access to the Stud Mill Road as part of the approved operations.

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Related

Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Decoulos
146 F. App'x 495 (First Circuit, 2005)
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas
445 F.3d 13 (First Circuit, 2006)
Gorman v. Coogan
273 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Maine, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
537 F. Supp. 2d 223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maritimes-northeast-pipeline-llc-v-685-acres-of-land-med-2008.