9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11
12 MARISOL ROMO, Case No. 1:25-cv-00147-SAB
13 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 14 v. (ECF Nos. 13, 14) 15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff Marisol Romo (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 19 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability benefits 20 pursuant to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, 21 which were submitted without oral argument. 22 Plaintiff requests the decision of Commissioner be reversed and the case be remanded for 23 further proceedings, arguing that the decision below was not supported by substantial evidence. 24 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his analysis of 25 Plaintiff’s severe impairments and Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 26 For the reasons explained herein, the Court will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. 27 / / / / / / 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND 3 A. Procedural History 4 On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff protectively field an application for supplemental security 5 income, alleging disability beginning January 3, 2020. (ECF No. 10, Administrative Record 6 (“AR”), 21.) Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on October 5, 2021, and denied upon 7 reconsideration on March 28, 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. On April 8 20, 2023, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared via telephone for a hearing in front of an 9 ALJ. (Id.) Plaintiff and vocation expert (“VE”) David M. Dettmer testified. (Id.) On January 8, 10 2024, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 34.) On 11 September 23, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 5-9.) 12 B. The ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 13 In the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 14 since April 12, 2021, the application date. (AR. 24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 15 following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; arthritis; obesity; 16 hearing loss; asthma; borderline intellectual functioning; depression; and anxiety. (Id.) However, 17 Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 18 the severity of one of the listed in impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 19 (AR 25.) 20 After considering the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 21 capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) except she is 22 frequently able to climb ramps and stairs, but is never able to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. 23 She could frequently kneel and occasionally balance, crawl, crouch, and stoop. Plaintiff should 24 not work in environments subjecting her to concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants such as 25 gases, dust, smoke and/or fumes and she should not work in environments exposing her to 26 unprotected heights or machinery with dangerous, moving mechanical parts or which would 27 subject her to more than moderate levels of background noise. Plaintiff could perform jobs of a 1 she should not work in environments subjecting her to more than moderate levels of background 2 noise. (AR 28.) 3 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, she was 4 47 years old on the application date, and she had at least a high school education. (AR 32-33.) 5 The ALJ discussed that transferability of job skills was not material to the determination of 6 disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supported a finding that 7 Plaintiff was “not disabled,” whether or not she has transferable job skills. (AR 33.) Considering 8 Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs that 9 existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id.) 10 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under disability, as defined by the 11 Social Security Act, since April 12, 2024, the date the application was filed. (AR 34.) 12 Plaintiff sought timely review of the Commissioner’s final decision in the federal courts. 13 (ECF No. 1.) The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 14 (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9.) Thereafter, the parties filed their briefs on the matter.1 (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) 15 II. 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 A. The Disability Standard 18 To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 19 show she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 20 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 21 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 22 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation process to 23 1 On December 1, 2022, the Supplemental Rules for Social Security became effective. Rule 5 states, “[t]he action is 24 presented for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Appx. Rule 5. The 2022 Advisory Committee noted that “Rule 5 states the procedure for presenting for decision on the merits a [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g) review action that 25 is governed by the Supplemental Rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Appx. Rule 5 advisory committee note 2022. Like an appeal, “the briefs present the action for decision on the merits. This procedure displaces summary judgment or such devices as a joint statement of facts as the means of review on the administrative record.” Id. The 2022 26 Advisory Committee unambiguously clarified that “Rule 5 also displaces local rules or practices that are inconsistent with the simplified procedure established by these Supplemental Rules for treating the action as one for review on 27 the administrative record.” Id. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court will construe as a brief in support of her position on whether the Court should affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the 1 be used in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;2 Batson v. 2 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the 3 sequential evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are: 4 Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 5 Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or her 6 ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 7 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the 8 claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 9 Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 10 proceed to step five. 11 Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that exists in 12 significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 13 14 Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is 15 on the claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020). A 16 claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once she has carried the burden of 17 proof from step one through step four. 18 Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 19 RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] 20 limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 21 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all the claimant’s impairments, including 22 those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e); 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling 23 (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).3 “[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the
24 2 The regulations which apply to disability insurance benefits, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 et seq., and the regulations 25 which apply to SSI benefits, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.901 et seq., are generally the same for both types of benefits. Accordingly, while Plaintiff seeks only Social Security benefits under Title II in this case, to the extent cases cited herein may reference one or both sets of regulations, the Court notes these cases and regulations are applicable to the 26 instant matter.
27 3 SSRs are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” issued by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). While SSRs do not have the force of law, the Court gives the rulings deference “unless they 1 claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 2 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1546(c). 3 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show that there are a 4 significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her RFC, 5 age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(g); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 6 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To do this, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines 7 (“grids”) or rely upon the testimony of a VE. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P, Appendix 2; 8 Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ ‘is responsible for determining credibility, 10 resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149, 11 quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 12 B. Standard of Review 13 Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision 14 of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In 15 determining whether to affirm, modify, or reverse an ALJ’s decision, the Court reviews only 16 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 17 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, the Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one; 18 the Court may not disturb the Commissioner’s final decision unless it is based on legal error or 19 the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Reddick v. 20 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is 21 not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Rather, “[s]ubstantial evidence is more 22 than a mere scintilla, and means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 23 adequate to support a conclusion.” Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024), 24 quoting Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. In other words, “[s]ubstantial evidence is relevant evidence 25 which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 26 a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of 27 1 Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 Should the ALJ err, the Court will not reverse where the error was harmless. Stout, 454 3 F.3d at 1055-56. “An error is harmless only if it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 4 determination.’” Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2023), quoting Lambert v. 5 Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020). The burden of showing that an error is not harmless 6 “normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 7 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). 8 Finally, “a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 9 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 10 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). 11 Nor may the Court affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he or she did not rely; rather, the 12 Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 13 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). It is 14 not this Court’s function to second guess the ALJ’s conclusions and substitute the Court’s 15 judgment for the ALJ’s; rather, if the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational 16 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154, quoting 17 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 18 III. 19 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in two ways. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 21 his consideration of Plaintiff’s anemia, finding that it was not a severe impairment at Step Two. 22 (ECF No. 13, pp. 5-8.) Second, Plaintiff generally argues that the ALJ erred in his analysis of 23 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) The Commissioner opposes, arguing that 24 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 14.) The Court agrees with the 25 Commissioner. 26 A. Severe Impairment Analysis at Step Two 27 At Step Two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether a claimant has a 1 (ii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2 1996, citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987). An impairment or combination of 3 impairments may be found ‘not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has 4 no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work.’” Glanden v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 5 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2023), quoting Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 6 in original), quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. The Ninth Circuit has observed that the 7 Commissioner’s policy statement reads that “[i]f an adjudicator [i.e., an ALJ] is unable to 8 determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the individual’s 9 ability to do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation should not end with the not severe 10 evaluation step.” Id. at 687, quoting Titles II & XVI: Med. Impairments That Are Not Severe, 11 SSR 85-28 (S.S.A. 1985) (“SSR 85-28”). Step Two, then, is “a de minimis screening device 12 [used] to dispose of groundless claims,” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290, and “an ALJ may find that a 13 claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments only when his 14 conclusion is ‘clearly established by medical evidence.’” Webb, 433 F.3d at 687, quoting SSR 85- 15 28. Therefore, on judicial review, courts must determine “whether the ALJ had substantial 16 evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established that [the claimant] did not have a 17 medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Gladen, 86 F.4th at 844, quoting 18 Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. 19 At Step Two, and as relevant here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s anemia did not cause 20 more than a minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic work activates, and therefore, her 21 anemia was not severe. (AR 24.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff reported experiencing 22 some fatigue with weakness, and physicians diagnosed Plaintiff with anemia. (Id.) Despite not 23 finding that Plaintiff’s anemia was a severe impairment, the ALJ nonetheless found that Plaintiff 24 did have the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; arthritis; 25 obesity; hearing loss; asthma; borderline intellectual functioning; depression; and anxiety. (AR 26 24.) Moreover, the ALJ clarified that “I considered all the claimant’s medically determinable 27 impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the claimant’s residual functional 1 Though the Court tends to agree with Plaintiff insofar as that the ALJ did not give much 2 analysis with regard to Plaintiff’s anemia, the Court also agrees with the Commissioner’s opening 3 argument that any error here was harmless. In particular, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had eight 4 other severe impairments, meaning that the sequential evaluation continued; indeed, the ALJ 5 continued through Step Five. In addition, the ALJ also highlighted that he considered Plaintiff’s 6 anemia when calculating the RFC. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007); 7 Hickman v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 399 Fed. App’x 300, 302 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem) 8 (“The ALJ found [the plaintiff] suffered from other severe impairments and, thus, step two was 9 already resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”). 10 Plaintiff does not otherwise articulate how any error by the ALJ was harmful, nor can the 11 Court discern one—especially, given the Court’s discussion of the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s 12 testimony below. Therefore, the Court finds that any error that occurred at Step Two was 13 harmless. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). 14 Plaintiff has not demonstrated reversable error at Step Two. 15 B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 16 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 17 testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014), 18 quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995). As relevant here, where the ALJ 19 “determines that a claimant . . . is not malingering and has provided objective medical evidence of 20 an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms she 21 alleges, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of those symptoms only by 22 providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277, 23 quoting Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). “Ultimately, the ‘clear 24 and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to show his work.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 25 499 (9th Cir. 2022). An ALJ must show their work by “identify[ing] the testimony [from a 26 claimant] she or he finds not to be credible and . . . explain[ing] what evidence undermines that 27 testimony.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277, quoting Treichler v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 1 without more, are not enough. Id. at 1277-78. That said, an ALJ is not required “to perform a 2 line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony” or “draft dissertations when denying benefits.” 3 Id. at 1277. 4 While “an ALJ cannot insist on clear medical evidence to support each part of a claimant’s 5 subjective pain testimony when there is no objective testimony evincing otherwise, . . . [w]hen 6 objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, 7 the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498 (emphasis 8 in original). Indeed, “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the 9 claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 10 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). “The standard isn’t whether [a] court is convinced, but instead 11 whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt, 53 F4th at 12 499. 13 In addition, an ALJ may consider “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the 14 claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 15 testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid,” and “unexplained or inadequately 16 explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Ghanim v. 17 Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, an ALJ may also consider “whether 18 the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Lingenfelter v. 19 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony 20 when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are 21 transferable to a work setting.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded 22 on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). “Even where those activities suggest some 23 difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent 24 that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Id., citing Turner v. 25 Commissioner of Social Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2010). 26 In the decision, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony at length, including separate 27 analyses for Plaintiff physical and mental impairments. The Court begins by quoting the ALJ’s 1 The claimant was measured as 64 inches tall and 270 pounds (see Exhibit C1F, p. 3) with a bod mass index (BMI) over 40 (see 2 Exhibit C1F, pp. 3, 5) and physicians assessed her as obese (see Exhibits C2F, pp. 10-12; C4F, pp. 92, 117; C5F, p. 4; C9F, p. 186). 3 She further reported having some impaired hearing (see Exhibits C4F, p. 164; C5F, p. 20), including having difficulty carrying on 4 with a normal conversation in a room with a lot of background noise (see Exhibit C9F, p. 55). However, she can communicate 5 effectively, as evidenced by her ability to communicate with consultative examiners (see Exhibits C6F-C7F) and by her 6 participation during the hearing. The claimant reported experiencing some wheezing (see Exhibit C5F, p. 48) with 7 shortness of breath and physicians diagnosed asthma (see Exhibit C5F, p. 48). She reported taking medication, including Albuterol 8 for the condition (see Exhibit C14E, p. 1) and examination showed the lungs were clear to auscultation with non-labored respirations, 9 equal breath sounds, and symmetrical chest wall expansion (see Exhibits C4F, p. 87; C5F, p. 13; C9F, p. 25). In addition, she 10 exhibited a normal respiratory effort with no wheezes, crackles, or rubs (Exhibit C2F, p. 12). 11 The claimant reported experiencing low back pain with numbness 12 and tingling to the lower extremities (see Exhibits C1F, p. 3; C4F, pp. 5, 30; C5F, p. 7) and there is evidence of degenerative disc 13 disease (see Exhibit C1A). Examinations revealed tenderness to palpitation in the lower back with a reduced range of motion (see 14 Exhibits C4F, pp. 20, 35; C5F, pp. 13, 30; C9F, pp. 25, 53) and she underwent bilateral lumbar facet joint steroid injection (Exhibit 15 C1F, p. 5). However, in March 2022, a straight leg raise test was negative in the seated position and she was easily able to bend at 16 the waist to take off her shoes and socks and put them back on (Exhibit C7F, pp. 3-6). She further reported experiencing knee 17 pain and indicated she has osteoarthritis (see Exhibit C7F, p. 6), but an examination of the musculoskeletal system showed a 18 normal range of motion with normal strength and tone and no edema, cyanosis, digital clubbing, or discoloration in the 19 extremities (Exhibit C2F, p. 12). She also exhibited a normal gait and station (see Exhibit C7F, p. 5), physicians encouraged her to 20 exercise (see Exhibit C9F, p. 100) and a report from February of 2023 indicates she walks and works all day long (see Exhibit C9F, 21 p. 185). 22 (AR 28-29.) 23 The Court finds that the ALJ adequately identified Plaintiff’s testimony and used gave clear 24 and convincing reasons for discounting portions thereof. For example, the ALJ identified that 25 Plaintiff reported problems with hearing loss, but the ALJ discounted this testimony based on 26 ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation—i.e., the ALJ observed her ability to communicate at 27 the hearing—as well as noting that Plaintiff was able to communicate with the consultative examiners. Though Plaintiff complained of wheezing and shortness of breath, the ALJ observed 1 that she had been placed on medication and that an “examination showed the lungs were clear to 2 auscultation with non-labored respirations, equal breath sounds, and symmetrical chest wall 3 expansion,” in addition to having normal respiratory effort in another record. (AR 29.) And while 4 the ALJ gave some credence to Plaintiff’s low back pain testimony, the ALJ gave many examples 5 of examinations or other records that gave a fuller picture to Plaintiff’s limitations. 6 For Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the Court again quotes the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s 7 testimony: 8 The claimant reported experiencing feelings of sadness and anxiousness with panic attacks (see Exhibit C4F, p. 5) and 9 clinicians diagnosed anxiety and depression (see Exhibits C4F, pp. 8, 12, 42; C9F, pp. 101, 160). She reported taking medication, 10 including paroxetine for her conditions (see Exhibit C14E, p. 2) and she exercises to attempt to reduce anxiety and stress (see 11 Exhibits C4F, pp. 37, 113; C5F, p. 92; C9F, p. 195). She further reported having difficulty functioning while on medication for 12 anxiety (see Exhibit C9F, p. 195), but reports from primary care providers also showed she exhibited an appropriate mood (see 13 Exhibit C2F, p. 12) and she was alert and interactive with a normal affect (see Exhibit C9F, p. 186). The claimant previously 14 underwent intelligence testing with results that placed her in the borderline range of functioning (see Exhibit C1A), but a 15 subsequent examination of no evidence of a formal thought disorder and she also graduated from high school and worked for 16 16 years as a preschool teacher (see Exhibit C6F, pp. 2-4). In addition, there is little to no evidence of continuing psychiatric 17 treatment or counseling and during a consultative examination, she was able to follow a three-step command and could recall five 18 digits forward and backward (Exhibit C6F, p. 3). 19 (AR 30-31.) 20 The Court likewise finds that the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her 21 mental impairments was sufficient. The ALJ first discussed Plaintiff’s difficulty on medication, 22 which the ALJ found were undercut by reports from her primary care doctor reporting she had 23 appropriate mood, she was alert, and she had normal affect.4 Though Plaintiff tested previously as 24 borderline range for functioning with regard to intelligence testing, a subsequent examination 25 found no evidence of a formal thought disorder. Moreover, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff 26 27 4 The Court finds that this discussion by the ALJ sufficiently addresses Plaintiff’s concern that she testified that at 1 graduated high school and worked for 16 years as a preschool ‘teacher assistant.’5 Finally, the 2 ALJ noted that there was a lack of psychiatric treatment or counseling. 3 Following a discussion of the medical opinions in the record, the ALJ found that though 4 Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 5 symptoms, Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 6 symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record 7 for the reasons explained in this decision.” (AR 32.) 8 Furthermore, 9 In this case, the claimant’s statements and allegations are not fully consistent with the medical and other evidence. For example, she 10 alleged her ability to bend is “affected” (see Exhibit C6E, p. 8), but that is inconsistent with Dr. Wagner’s examination findings, which 11 showed she was easily able to bend at the waist to take off her shoes and socks and put them back on (see Exhibit C7F, pp. 3-6). 12 The claimant further alleged her ability to talk is “affected” (see Exhibit C6E, p. 8), but that is inconsistent with Dr. Dixit’s report, 13 which showed her speech was clear, coherent, spontaneous and 100% intelligible with no articulation errors (see Exhibit C6F, p. 14 3). Overall, the claimant alleges suffering from significant limitations, which prohibit her from working (see Exhibits C2E, p. 15 2; C6E; hearing testimony), but that is inconsistent with her report to Dr. Wagner that she cooks, cleans, drives, shops, performed her 16 own activities of daily living without assistance and walks for some exercise (see Exhibit C7F, p. 3). An alleged inability to work 17 is also inconsistent with the prior administrative medical findings of Drs. De Souza (see Exhibit C2A) and Gross (see Exhibit C4A). 18 (Id.) 19 Thus, in addition to the ALJ’s discussions above, the ALJ gave further reasons here for 20 discounting portions of Plaintiff’s testimony as it related to her ability to bend, ability to talk, 21 significant limitations contrasted with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and the prior 22 administrative medical findings, which the ALJ found were persuasive. 23 In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s general argument that the ALJ did not sufficiently give 24 clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony is unpersuasive. Additionally, 25 the Court notes that Plaintiff’s formulation of what the law requires in this area of Social Security 26
27 5 The Court notes that the ALJ characterized Plaintiff in this section as working as a “preschool teacher.” (Compare AR 31 with AR 100.) That said, the Court discerns no error in the ALJ’s this characterization here, given that the 1 | appears to be in incongruent with Smartt v. Kijakazi, the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion discussing 2 | the standard of review regarding an ALJ’s analysis of a claimant’s testimony. See 53 F.4th 498 3 | (‘When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective 4]| testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.”) (emphasis in original). 5 The Court finds that the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince. 6 | Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err. 7 IV. 8 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the 10 | Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be 11 | entered in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff Marisol 12 | Romo. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action. 13 14 | IS SO ORDERED. ZEA [Ee 15 | Dated: _ March 2, 2026 ; STANLEY A. BOONE 16 United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28