Marion Longfellow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 31, 2017
Docket34A02-1704-CR-817
StatusPublished

This text of Marion Longfellow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Marion Longfellow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marion Longfellow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 08/31/2017, 10:01 am

this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court

court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Matthew J. Elkin Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marion Longfellow, August 31, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 34A02-1704-CR-817 v. Appeal from the Howard Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable George A. Appellee-Plaintiff. Hopkins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-1605-F1-97

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1704-CR-817 | August 31, 2017 Page 1 of 7 Statement of the Case [1] Marion Longfellow appeals his sentence for child molesting, as a Level 4

felony, following a guilty plea. He raises two issues for our review, one of

which we find dispositive, namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in

light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On May 13, 2016, M.W., who was then thirteen-years-old, reported to a

Howard County Child Protective Services Caseworker that Longfellow, her

grandfather, had touched her inappropriately. Law enforcement officers

monitored the interview from another room. In her interview, M.W. stated

that, during a visit to Longfellow’s house on May 8, 2016, Longfellow, who

was then eighty-one-years old, had touched her breast on the outside of her

clothing. She moved his hand away but he attempted to touch her a second

time. At that point, M.W. walked out of the garage.

[4] On May 25, an officer with the Kokomo Police Department interviewed

Longfellow regarding M.W.’s allegations. Longfellow admitted that “he placed

his hand on her breast” while in the garage at his house. Appellant’s App. Vol.

II at 25. Longfellow also stated that, while he “has difficulty remembering

details,” he remembered touching her breast. Id. Longfellow claimed that he

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1704-CR-817 | August 31, 2017 Page 2 of 7 believed M.W. was “teasing him sexually” and that she “was wanting things to

happen.” Id. 1

[5] On May 31, 2016, the State charged Longfellow with one count of child

molesting, as a Level 1 felony, for touching M.W.’s breast. On December 12,

Longfellow entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to

plead guilty to the lesser included offense of child molesting, as a Level 4

felony. During a plea hearing on March 17, 2017, Longfellow pleaded guilty to

child molesting, as a Level 4 felony. On that same date, the trial court entered

judgment of conviction and held a sentencing hearing.

[6] According to the presentence investigation report, Longfellow has had four

heart attacks and a light stroke, suffers shortness of breath, has high cholesterol

and high blood pressure, has memory loss, and has heart problems. The report

also indicates that Longfellow takes seven different medications. During the

sentencing hearing, Scott Comfort, an investigator with a medical background,

testified that several of Longfellow’s medications “have known possible side

effects of altering one’s mental state in some way, shape[,] or form,” including

being unable to remember things. Tr. at 52. Comfort further testified that

strokes “can cause impulsive behavioral actions.” Id. Longfellow introduced

1 The interview is included as an attachment to the probable cause affidavit. During the sentencing hearing, the court asked the parties whether there was a factual basis for the guilty plea. The parties provided the following responses: “[The State]: The State would stipulate to the facts contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and the attachments thereto to establish a factual basis. [Longfellow]: And the defendant would so stipulate as it relates to those allegations that are specifically Level 4 allegations.” Longfellow did not provide any further clarification as to which facts he was stipulating.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1704-CR-817 | August 31, 2017 Page 3 of 7 as evidence a letter from his neurologist that states he “is at risk for further

stroke” and that the “incarceration of Mr. Longfellow increases his risk of being

unable to receive the standard of care” for an acute stroke. Appellant’s App.

Vol. II at 104.

[7] During the sentencing hearing, the trial court identified as an aggravating

circumstance that Longfellow was in a position of trust and responsibility over

his granddaughter. The court also found as a “slight” aggravating circumstance

that Longfellow had tried to minimize his responsibility or the nature of the

offense by blaming M.W. The court identified as mitigating circumstances

Longfellow’s lack of criminal history and his guilty plea. The trial court

sentenced Longfellow to an executed term of ten years in the Indiana

Department of Correction and ordered him to register as a sex offender. This

appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [8] Longfellow contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of

the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he

Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of

the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The

Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1704-CR-817 | August 31, 2017 Page 4 of 7 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.) as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E. 2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 637, 642 (Ind. 2017).

[9] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we

regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to

others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather

whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless

overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the

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Related

Cardwell v. State
895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Anglemyer v. State
875 N.E.2d 218 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Anglemyer v. State
868 N.E.2d 482 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Childress v. State
848 N.E.2d 1073 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2006)
King v. State
894 N.E.2d 265 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2008)
Charles Stephenson v. State of Indiana
29 N.E.3d 111 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2015)

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