Marion E. Bourgeois v. Linden Interest

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 1, 2012
DocketCA-0011-1130
StatusUnknown

This text of Marion E. Bourgeois v. Linden Interest (Marion E. Bourgeois v. Linden Interest) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marion E. Bourgeois v. Linden Interest, (La. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1130

MARION E. BOURGEOIS, ET AL.

VERSUS

LINDEN INTEREST

**********

APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 115410-E HONORABLE KEITH RAYNE JULES COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN D. SAUNDERS JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and J. David Painter, Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Burton Enoch Cestia Jr. Burton & Cestia P. O. Box 10337 New Iberia, LA 70562-0337 (337) 365-6628 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Linden Interest Stephen Francis Mestayer Attorney at Law P. O. Box 12340 New Iberia, LA 70562-2340 (337) 365-8181 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Marion E. Bourgeois, et al. SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is a dispute over the boundary between two adjacent tracts of land and

of ownership of an existing road that each tract owner uses for access to their land.

The two tracts were created by a common ancestor‟s partition in 1950. The

property descriptions of the two tracts note that the center of the existing road and

a canal are to be the boundary between them. Attached to that partition is a plat

drawn by a civil engineer that depicted the boundary between the two tracts as a

straight line between two points. Both groups of tract owners agree that the

straight line does not accurately depict the road.

The trial court found that the straight line depicted on the plat was the

boundary between the two tracts and that, while the parts of the existing road were

owned by each group of owners dependent on the boundary it fixed, use and

maintenance of the road were predial servitudes of each tract. We reverse and

render judgment that the boundary between the two tracts is fixed according to the

property descriptions because the plat was erroneous and that the road is jointly

owned and is to be jointly maintained by the owners of the two tracts.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On March 6, 1951, the eleven shareholders of St. Paul Bourgeois, Inc.

liquidated the company assets consisting primarily of immovable properties

situated in Iberia Parish. The eleven shareholders comprised five family branches

of the Bourgeois family.

The shareholders then partitioned, by Act of Partition dated March 7, 1951,

recorded in COB 196, under Entry Number 81325 of the public records of Iberia

Parish, all of the said immovable properties into five groups. The shareholders

hired T.F. Kramer, a civil engineer, to survey all of their properties for purposes of the Act of Partition. Kramer‟s plats of the various tracts were attached to the

Partition and made a part thereof.

A dispute arose between the owners of West Linden Plantation (West

Linden) and East Linden Plantation (East Linden) regarding their common

boundary. West Linden contends that the boundary between the two tracts of land

is supposed to be a canal and the centerline of a road that separated the two tracts

as according to the property descriptions for each tract. East Linden contends that

the boundary is supposed to be a straight line between two points, A2 and Y, as

depicted on the plats drawn by Kramer. On October 28, 2009, West Linden filed a

petition for boundary action.

After a trial on the merits, the trial court reached a judgment in favor of East

Linden that the boundary between the two tracts was a straight line between points

A2 and Y. West Linden timely filed this appeal and asserts three assignments of

error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The trial court erred in failing to render a decision based on the intent of the

parties to the original partition agreement, as reflected by a clear reading of

the agreement and the other evidence produced by West Linden at the trial

of this matter.

2. The trial court failed to take into consideration and recognize that the owners

of West Linden physically possessed all of the land west of and up to the

road since 1951, as owners, unequivocally, and within visible boundaries,

and should also be recognized as owners of that property by virtue of

acquisitive prescription.

2 3. The trial court erred in ruling that the private road which separates West

Linden from East Linden is not owned jointly by the owners of West Linden

and East Linden.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

West Linden contends in its first assignment of error that the trial court erred

in failing to render a decision based on the intent of the parties to the original

partition agreement, as reflected by a clear reading of that agreement and the other

evidence produced by it at the trial of this matter. We find that this assignment of

error has merit.

An appellate court may not set aside a trial court‟s or a jury‟s finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). The Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for the reversal of a fact finder‟s determinations: (1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court or jury, and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987); Stobart v. State Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

This dictates that a reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports the finding of the trial court or jury. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court‟s or jury‟s finding was “manifestly erroneous” or “clearly wrong.” Stobart, 617 So.2d 880. Furthermore, the reviewing court must always keep in mind that if the trial court or jury‟s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact it would have weighed the evidence differently. Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990).

Kimbrough v. Hirsch, 98-967, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/99), 736 So.2d 871, 875-

76, writ denied, 99-613 (La. 4/23/99), 742 So.2d 886.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 784 states that “[a] boundary is the line of

separation between contiguous lands. A boundary marker is a natural or artificial

object that marks on the ground the line of separation of contiguous lands.” 3 [T]he legal guides for determining a question of boundary, or the location of a land line, in the order of their importance and value, are: (1) [n]atural monuments; (2) artificial monuments; (3) distances; (4) courses; and (5) quantity. But the controlling consideration is the intention of the party or parties.

Meyer v. Comegys, 147 La. 851, 858, 86 So. 307, 309 (1920).

Our supreme court, in Hurst v. Ricard, 514 So.2d 14, 17 (La.1987),

reinforced that the primary objective in fixing a boundary “is to determine and

implement the intention of the parties and that the rules of interpretation set forth

in statutes and jurisprudence must be considered as auxiliary rather than as

absolutely controlling.” In the case before us, East and West Linden‟s tracts were

given to each by the 1951 partition of a St. Paul Bourgeois‟ land. Present in the

record is the property description of the West Linden tract that indicates the line

between East and West Linden travels from “Point Y on the east property line of

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Related

Stobart v. State Through DOTD
617 So. 2d 880 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1993)
Hebert v. Insurance Center, Inc.
706 So. 2d 1007 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1998)
Rosell v. Esco
549 So. 2d 840 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
558 So. 2d 1106 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1990)
Housley v. Cerise
579 So. 2d 973 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1991)
Mart v. Hill
505 So. 2d 1120 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1987)
Hurst v. Ricard
514 So. 2d 14 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1987)
Meyer v. Comegys
86 So. 307 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1920)
Kimbrough v. Hirsch
736 So. 2d 871 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Lamson Petroleum Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum Inc.
824 So. 2d 1194 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2001)

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