Marion County Fire District 1 v. Marion-Polk County Boundary Commission

526 P.2d 1031, 19 Or. App. 108, 1974 Ore. App. LEXIS 700
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedSeptember 30, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 526 P.2d 1031 (Marion County Fire District 1 v. Marion-Polk County Boundary Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marion County Fire District 1 v. Marion-Polk County Boundary Commission, 526 P.2d 1031, 19 Or. App. 108, 1974 Ore. App. LEXIS 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

*110 LANGTRY, J.

This is an appeal via the circuit court by a fire protection district from an order of the Marion-Polk County Local Government Boundary Commission providing for annexation (a minor boundary change, ORS 199.415(13)) to the city of Salem of an area in Marion County of approximately 65 acres. The same area was already in the Fire District, which protests that the irregular boundaries of the area make rendering of emergency services to the neighborhood difficult, and that the concept, by reason of the irregular shape, is illogical and arbitrary. The Boundary Commission was created by ORS 199.425 (2) as a state agency; its seven members are appointed by the Governor. Authority and procedure for the Commission are provided in ORS 199.410 through 199.514. Appeal from the Commission’s orders within 30 days of final order is provided for in ORS 199.461 and ORS 34.010 to 34.100 (the writ of review procedure).

The circuit court’s judgment upheld the Commission’s action and dismissed the writ.

The Fire District’s contentions primarily are that the Commission acts in a quasi-judicial role and should be limited to the restrictions placed upon local governmental bodies in zone-change matters by Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973), and that under the facts of this case the Commission’s action was arbitrary and not based upon authority or evidence.

With reference to the Fasano argument, it is contended that the quasi-judicial requirements made there *111 in should be adhered to in this type of proceeding. There, the court said:

“* * * With future eases in mind, it is appropriate to add some brief remarks on questions of procedure. Parties at the hearing before the county governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter — i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue — and to a record made and adequate findings executed * * *” 264 Or at 588.

An examination of the statutory procedures which were assiduously adhered to as shown by the record in the case at bar, and the record itself, discloses that the Commission may, and did, commence the proceeding (ORS 199.490 (l)(d)); detailed notice is required and was given to all interested parties (ORS 199.461, 199.-463); hearings are required and were provided where interested parties were heard (ORS 199.461, 199.463). The order made after the hearings stated the reasons for the decision of the Commission as provided for in ORS 199.461(3). The .detailed record in the proceeding, including a transcript of two public hearings, contains no hint that any Commissioner had prehearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question. Thus, the due process kinds of requirements included in Fascmo for zone-change matters were statutorily provided for in these proceedings, and followed. The transcript indicates the Commissioners were familiar with the area, its fire, water and sewer districts, its prospects as an urban growth area, etc. This should be expected, given the kind of public service the Commissioners render.

We conclude that the statutory scheme of author *112 ity and procedure for such Commissions, plus the adherence to the prescribed procedure shown by the record here, means that the part of Fasano we have quoted is not applicable.

There remains the question of the test we put to the substance of the Commission’s decision. The court in Fasano stated:

“Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test * * 264 Or at 580-81.

The circuit judge in the case at bar concluded that the test we used in Millersburg Dev. Corp. v. Mullen, 14 Or App 614, 514 P2d 367, Sup Ct review denied (1973), is applicable. There, in a case involving the setting of boundaries for an area in which some inhabitants had petitioned for an election to create a city, we said:

“* * * [W]e conclude the action * * * was legislative in character. Certainly, the determination of the boundaries of a city — a political subdivision of the state — transcends the individual interests of each parcel of property proposed to be located therein. It becomes a matter of general interest in the whole area — a matter of general policy.” 14 Or App at 623.

See also Schmidt et al v. City of Cornelius, 211 Or 505, 515, 517, 316 P2d 511 (1957). The legislature in setting *113 up the Boundary Commission also set policy and guidelines :

“(1) The Legislative Assembly finds that:
“(a) A fragmented approach has developed to public services provided by local government and such an approach has limited the orderly development and growth of Oregon’s urban areas for the maximum interest of all its citizens.
“(b) The programs and growth of each unit of local government affect not only that particular unit but also the activities and programs of a variety of other units within each urban area.
“(c) As local programs become increasingly intergovernmental, the state has a responsibility to insure orderly determination and adjustment of local government boundaries to best meet the needs of the people.
“(2) The purpose of ORS 199.410

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Bluebook (online)
526 P.2d 1031, 19 Or. App. 108, 1974 Ore. App. LEXIS 700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marion-county-fire-district-1-v-marion-polk-county-boundary-commission-orctapp-1974.