TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00343-CR NO. 03-25-00344-CR NO. 03-25-00345-CR NO. 03-25-00346-CR NO. 03-25-00347-CR
Mario Villarreal, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 277TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NOS. 24-1140-K277, 24-1139-K277, 20-1510-K277, 20-1507-K277, & 20-1509-K277 THE HONORABLE RICK J. KENNON, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Mario Villarreal was charged with five counts of possessing child pornography.
See Tex. Penal Code § 43.26. At the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found him
guilty in all five counts. During the punishment hearing, the jury assessed his punishment at six
years’ imprisonment in each count. See id. § 12.34. At the hearing, the trial court read the jury’s
verdicts and then excused the jury. The trial court then mentioned that the State had filed a
motion to stack the sentences, and the State explained that it was asking for three charges to be
stacked based upon the severity of the offenses. Villarreal objected to stacking any of the sentences. After the parties presented their arguments, the following exchange occurred after
which the proceedings concluded:
[Trial Court]: So what I’m going to do is I’m going to stack two of these. I will stack 20-1507- and 20-1509-, and I will run the other three concurrent with the first one, 20-1507-. And then if you could just prepare the judgments to reflect all that.
...
[Prosecutor #1]: Chase states, and it makes sense, that for the judgments that run concurrent, the fines will run concurrent. For the judgments that run consecutively, the fine will be consecutive. So then that effect would be a $10,000 between the two, and then the remainder would all be a concurrent running of the fines.
[Trial Court]: Okay. I kind of assumed that’s what it would be as well. Okay. Mr. Villarreal, do you understand what we’re doing?
[Defendant]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Okay. And you understand that you have a six-year sentence on 20-1507-. When you complete that sentence, the sentence in 20-1509- will begin.
[Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Okay. And then all the other three would run concurrent with the first one.
[Trial Court]: Okay. Okay. Anything else we need to do at this time?
[Prosecutor #1]: No, Your Honor. If I may have leave of the Court, I’m going to
2 go upstairs to provide this to our paralegal, and she’ll begin working on the judgments.
[Trial Court]: Yeah. That’s fine and just let me know. I’m going to talk to the jury if anybody is left. Do y’all want to talk to them?
[Prosecutor #2]: Yes, Judge.
[Trial Court]: Okay. I figured you would. Okay. So let me go get them.
Villarreal appealed his convictions. In the third issue in his brief, he argues that
although the trial court read the verdict of the jury and ordered the stacking of one of his
sentences, the trial court did not formally orally pronounce his sentences for the five counts. He
also notes that the trial court did not ask him whether there was any reason why the sentences
could not be pronounced against him as required under article 42.07 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.07 (requiring trial court to ask if defendant had
anything to say about whether sentence could be pronounced against him and listing only three
reasons for why sentence cannot be pronounced). For these reasons, he requests that the cases be
abated and remanded to the trial court so the trial court may formally oral pronounce all of his
sentences. In response, the State asserts that abatement is unnecessary because the sentences
were communicated to him through the jury verdicts, because he did not object during the
hearing, because the trial court discussed one of the six-year sentences and informed him how
stacking would be applied, because he understood his sentences, and because there is no
discrepancy between the written judgment and the discussion in the punishment hearing.
Under the circumstances present here, we believe that the safest course of action
is to abate the cases and remand for formal pronouncement of Villarreal’s sentences. See
3 Suniga v. State, No. 03-25-00081-CR, 2025 WL 2347190, at *1, *2 (Tex. App.—Austin
Aug. 14, 2025, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (abating for pronouncement of
sentence where trial court “read the jury’s verdict” before releasing jury but did not “formally
orally pronounce[] the sentence”). Although a jury assesses a defendant’s sentence, the trial
court imposes the sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 37.01 (explaining that verdict is
written declaration by jury of its decision), 42.01, § 1 (stating that judgment is written
declaration by trial court showing conviction or acquittal of defendant and that sentence will be
based on information in judgment), .02 (noting that sentence is part of judgment ordering
punishment to be carried into execution). Additionally, with certain statutory exceptions, courts
must orally pronounce the sentence in the defendant’s presence. See id. arts. 42.03, § 1(a), .14;
Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d
131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.04 (noting that jury
verdict may be “read aloud by the judge, the foreman, or the clerk”); Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d
511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (distinguishing between trial court’s reading of jury’s verdict
and its later oral pronouncement of judgment). The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is
merely a written manifestation of that oral pronouncement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
42.01, § 1; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135.
“[I]t is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable event, and the written
sentence or order simply memorializes it and should comport therewith.” Coffey v. State,
979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If no sentence was ever rendered, there is no
valid judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also
Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that “[p]unishment and
sentence are incorporated in the judgment” and that “‘sentence is a necessary component of a
4 “judgment of conviction”’” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985))). Without
a valid judgment, there is no “conviction” for a defendant to appeal. See Thompson, 108 S.W.3d
at 290.
Here, because the trial court failed to fully orally pronounce Villarreal’s sentences
in his presence, no valid judgments yet exist, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over his
appeals. See Keys v. State, 340 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)
(concluding that trial court’s failure to orally pronounce defendant’s sentence deprived court of
appeals of jurisdiction); Meachum v.
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00343-CR NO. 03-25-00344-CR NO. 03-25-00345-CR NO. 03-25-00346-CR NO. 03-25-00347-CR
Mario Villarreal, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 277TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NOS. 24-1140-K277, 24-1139-K277, 20-1510-K277, 20-1507-K277, & 20-1509-K277 THE HONORABLE RICK J. KENNON, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Mario Villarreal was charged with five counts of possessing child pornography.
See Tex. Penal Code § 43.26. At the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found him
guilty in all five counts. During the punishment hearing, the jury assessed his punishment at six
years’ imprisonment in each count. See id. § 12.34. At the hearing, the trial court read the jury’s
verdicts and then excused the jury. The trial court then mentioned that the State had filed a
motion to stack the sentences, and the State explained that it was asking for three charges to be
stacked based upon the severity of the offenses. Villarreal objected to stacking any of the sentences. After the parties presented their arguments, the following exchange occurred after
which the proceedings concluded:
[Trial Court]: So what I’m going to do is I’m going to stack two of these. I will stack 20-1507- and 20-1509-, and I will run the other three concurrent with the first one, 20-1507-. And then if you could just prepare the judgments to reflect all that.
...
[Prosecutor #1]: Chase states, and it makes sense, that for the judgments that run concurrent, the fines will run concurrent. For the judgments that run consecutively, the fine will be consecutive. So then that effect would be a $10,000 between the two, and then the remainder would all be a concurrent running of the fines.
[Trial Court]: Okay. I kind of assumed that’s what it would be as well. Okay. Mr. Villarreal, do you understand what we’re doing?
[Defendant]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Okay. And you understand that you have a six-year sentence on 20-1507-. When you complete that sentence, the sentence in 20-1509- will begin.
[Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Okay. And then all the other three would run concurrent with the first one.
[Trial Court]: Okay. Okay. Anything else we need to do at this time?
[Prosecutor #1]: No, Your Honor. If I may have leave of the Court, I’m going to
2 go upstairs to provide this to our paralegal, and she’ll begin working on the judgments.
[Trial Court]: Yeah. That’s fine and just let me know. I’m going to talk to the jury if anybody is left. Do y’all want to talk to them?
[Prosecutor #2]: Yes, Judge.
[Trial Court]: Okay. I figured you would. Okay. So let me go get them.
Villarreal appealed his convictions. In the third issue in his brief, he argues that
although the trial court read the verdict of the jury and ordered the stacking of one of his
sentences, the trial court did not formally orally pronounce his sentences for the five counts. He
also notes that the trial court did not ask him whether there was any reason why the sentences
could not be pronounced against him as required under article 42.07 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.07 (requiring trial court to ask if defendant had
anything to say about whether sentence could be pronounced against him and listing only three
reasons for why sentence cannot be pronounced). For these reasons, he requests that the cases be
abated and remanded to the trial court so the trial court may formally oral pronounce all of his
sentences. In response, the State asserts that abatement is unnecessary because the sentences
were communicated to him through the jury verdicts, because he did not object during the
hearing, because the trial court discussed one of the six-year sentences and informed him how
stacking would be applied, because he understood his sentences, and because there is no
discrepancy between the written judgment and the discussion in the punishment hearing.
Under the circumstances present here, we believe that the safest course of action
is to abate the cases and remand for formal pronouncement of Villarreal’s sentences. See
3 Suniga v. State, No. 03-25-00081-CR, 2025 WL 2347190, at *1, *2 (Tex. App.—Austin
Aug. 14, 2025, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (abating for pronouncement of
sentence where trial court “read the jury’s verdict” before releasing jury but did not “formally
orally pronounce[] the sentence”). Although a jury assesses a defendant’s sentence, the trial
court imposes the sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 37.01 (explaining that verdict is
written declaration by jury of its decision), 42.01, § 1 (stating that judgment is written
declaration by trial court showing conviction or acquittal of defendant and that sentence will be
based on information in judgment), .02 (noting that sentence is part of judgment ordering
punishment to be carried into execution). Additionally, with certain statutory exceptions, courts
must orally pronounce the sentence in the defendant’s presence. See id. arts. 42.03, § 1(a), .14;
Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d
131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.04 (noting that jury
verdict may be “read aloud by the judge, the foreman, or the clerk”); Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d
511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (distinguishing between trial court’s reading of jury’s verdict
and its later oral pronouncement of judgment). The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is
merely a written manifestation of that oral pronouncement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
42.01, § 1; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135.
“[I]t is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable event, and the written
sentence or order simply memorializes it and should comport therewith.” Coffey v. State,
979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If no sentence was ever rendered, there is no
valid judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also
Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that “[p]unishment and
sentence are incorporated in the judgment” and that “‘sentence is a necessary component of a
4 “judgment of conviction”’” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985))). Without
a valid judgment, there is no “conviction” for a defendant to appeal. See Thompson, 108 S.W.3d
at 290.
Here, because the trial court failed to fully orally pronounce Villarreal’s sentences
in his presence, no valid judgments yet exist, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over his
appeals. See Keys v. State, 340 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)
(concluding that trial court’s failure to orally pronounce defendant’s sentence deprived court of
appeals of jurisdiction); Meachum v. State, 273 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (same); see also State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (explaining that jurisdiction is threshold issue and may not be ignored), overruled on other
ground by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Although this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeals, that does not require us to
dismiss the appeals in these circumstances. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that we
not dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s omission can be corrected. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.4.
Here, the trial court’s omission can be corrected by allowing the trial court to orally pronounce
Villarreal’s sentences with him present. Accordingly, we abate the appeals and remand the
causes to the trial court for the trial court to orally pronounce the sentences in open court with
Villarreal present. See id.; see also Keys, 340 S.W.3d at 529 (abating appeal and remanding
cause to trial court to orally pronounce sentence assessed by jury in defendant’s presence);
Meachum, 273 S.W.3d at 806 (same).
On remand, the trial court is directed to cause notice of a hearing to be given and,
thereafter, formally orally pronounce the sentences assessed in Villarreal’s presence. Prior to
pronouncing sentence, the trial court should inquire from Villarreal whether he has anything to
5 say concerning whether the sentences should be pronounced against him as directed by article
42.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.07. The new
sentencing hearing is to be held within 30 days of the date of this memorandum opinion.
Supplemental reporter’s records of the hearing shall be prepared and filed in the appellate record
in these cases along with supplemental clerk’s records containing the trial court’s new judgments
of conviction. These supplemental records are to be filed in this Court within 45 days of the date
of this memorandum opinion. The appeals will be reinstated when the supplemental records
are filed.
It is ordered on May 6, 2026.
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump
Abated and Remanded
Filed: May 6, 2026
Do Not Publish