Marine v. Packham

52 F. 579, 3 C.C.A. 210, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1416
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit·Decided October 11, 1892·No. No. 14·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinions

Gone, Circuit Judge.

Packham, De Witt & Co., on December 6, 1890, imported into the port of Baltimore, from Hamburg, a lot of empty bottles and demijohns, upon which duty was assessed by the collector at the rate of 40 per centum ad valorem. Paragraphs 108 and 104 of the “Act to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports, and for other purposes,” approved October 1, 1890, under which the collector acted, read as follows:

“(103) Green and colored, molded or pressed, and flint and lime glass bottles, holding more than one pint, and demijohns and carboys, (covered or uncovered,) and other molded or pressed, green or colored, and flint or lime bottle glassware, not especially provided for in this act, one cent, per pound. Green and colored, molded or pressed, and flint and lime glass bottles, and vials-holding not more than one pint, and not less than one quarter of a pint, one and one half cents per pound; if holding less than one fourth of a pint, fifty cents per gross.
[580] ‘(104) All articles enumerated in the preceding paragraph, if filled, and not otherwise provided for in this act, and the contents are subject to an ad valorem, rate of duty, or to a rate of duty, based upon the value, the value of such bottles, vials, or other vessels shall be added to the value of the contents, for the ascertainment of the dutiable value of the latter; but if filled, and not otherwise provided for in this act, and the contents are not subject to an ad valorem rate of duty, or to rate of duty based on the value, or are free of duty, such bottles, vials, or other vessels shall pay, in addition to the duty, if any, on their contents, the rates of duty prescribed in the preceding “paragraph; provided, that no article manufactured from glass described in the preceding paragraph shall pay a less rate of duty than forty per centum ad valorem.

The specific duty laid by paragraph 103 not amounting in this case to as much as 40 per centum of the value of the importation, the collector assessed the duty at that rate, under the proviso of paragraph 104. Packham, De Witt & Co. claimed that the articles so imported should have been classified as empty bottles and demijohns, dutiable at 1 cent and 1% cents per pound, under paragraph 103, but they paid the duty assessed by the collector under protest. Their claim was sustained by the board of general appraisers, the action of the collector being reversed by it. The collector appealed to the circuit court of the district of Maryland, and that court affirmed the ruling of the board of general appraisers. The collector prayed an appeal from the decision of the circuit court, which was allowed.

By the act of congress alluded to, it is provided “that on and after the sixth day of October, eighteen hundred and ninety, unless otherwise specially provided for in this act, there shall be. levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported from foreign countries, and mentioned in the schedules herein contained, the rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs respectively prescribed, namely;” and then iollows the many schedules and paragraphs of that act, including 103 and 104, as quoted. It will be observed from this that not only are the “paragraphs,” as such, particularly recognized and numbered, but that congress had a special purpose in so doing, and used the word “paragraph” as synonymous with the word “section.” If we keep this in mind, and give the words of the proviso of paragraph 104 their usual and natural meaning, we will have no difficulty in finding the intention of congress, and in ascertaining the rate of duty imposed on importations of the character mentioned. The supreme court of the United States, in Thornley v. U. S., 113 U. S. 310, 313, 5 Slip. Ct. Rep. 491, say: “Where the meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it, according to its obvious terms. In such a case there is no necessity for construction.” The same court, in the case of Lewis v. U. S., 92 U. S. 618, 621, said: “Where the language of a statute is transparent and the meaning clear, there is no room for the office of construction. There should be no construction where there is nothing to construe.” U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 621.

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Marine v. Packham, 52 F. 579, 3 C.C.A. 210, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1416 (4th Cir. 1892).

52 F. 579 (Marine v. Packham) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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