Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Halik

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Halik

28 A.D.2d 1077, 285 N.Y.S.2d 136, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3207

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 26, 1967

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 28 A.D.2d 1077 (Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Halik) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Halik, 28 A.D.2d 1077, 285 N.Y.S.2d 136, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3207 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967).

Pincite

Opinion

Memorandum: Special Term in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment against respondents Ray Royce Aircraft, Inc., and Ray H. Royce, Jr. erroneously , assumed that both respondents had pleaded discharge in bankruptcy as a defense to appellant’s third-party complaint and denied the motion as to both respondents on the ground that there was a question of fact as to whether the respondents were guilty of such fraud as would avoid the defense of discharge in bankruptcy. It appears that the corporation did not assert the affirmative defense of bankruptcy discharge. Its sale of the aircraft while it was incumbered by a chattel mortgage was a breach of its implied warranty that it was free from incumbrances. (Personal Property Law, .§ 94, subd. 3.) Appellant’s motion for summary judgment should, therefore, have been granted against the corporation. (Appeal from order of Brie Special Term denying motion for summary judgment.) Present — Williams, P. J., Henry, Del Vecehio and Marsh, JJ.

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Memorandum: Special Term in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment against respondents Ray Royce Aircraft, Inc., and Ray H. Royce, Jr. erroneously , assumed that both respondents had pleaded discharge in bankruptcy as a defense to appellant’s third-party complaint and denied the motion as to both respondents on the ground that there was a question of fact as to whether the respondents were guilty of such fraud as would avoid the defense of discharge in bankruptcy. It appears that the corporation did not assert the affirmative defense of bankruptcy discharge. Its sale of the aircraft while it was incumbered by a chattel mortgage was a breach of its implied warranty that it was free from incumbrances. (Personal Property Law, .§ 94, subd. 3.) Appellant’s motion for summary judgment should, therefore, have been granted against the corporation. (Appeal from order of Brie Special Term denying motion for summary judgment.) Present — Williams, P. J., Henry, Del Vecehio and Marsh, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

28 A.D.2d 1077, 285 N.Y.S.2d 136, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marine-midland-trust-co-v-halik-nyappdiv-1967.

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