Marine Midland Bank v. Stukey

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Marine Midland Bank v. Stukey

99 A.D.2d 662, 472 N.Y.S.2d 55, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16923

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 27, 1984

StatusPublished

This text of 99 A.D.2d 662 (Marine Midland Bank v. Stukey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marine Midland Bank v. Stukey, 99 A.D.2d 662, 472 N.Y.S.2d 55, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16923 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).

Pincite

Opinion

Order unanimously modified and, as modified, affirmed, without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: The record does not establish, as a matter of law, that the claims asserted in the counterclaim of Edwin J. Stukey were intended to be discharged through an accord and satisfaction on October 10,1979 when a new [663]*663note was given representing Mr. Stukey’s obligation to the bank as endorser under the 1969 Fallon note. The court erred, therefore, in granting plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and for a dismissal of the counterclaim based on the defense of accord and satisfaction. So much of the order as dismisses the counterclaim of Edwin J. Stukey is reversed and the counterclaim is reinstated. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, McKennan, J. — dismiss counterclaim.) Present — Hancock, Jr., J. P., Callahan, Doerr, Denman and Moule, JJ.

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Order unanimously modified and, as modified, affirmed, without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: The record does not establish, as a matter of law, that the claims asserted in the counterclaim of Edwin J. Stukey were intended to be discharged through an accord and satisfaction on October 10,1979 when a new [663]*663note was given representing Mr. Stukey’s obligation to the bank as endorser under the 1969 Fallon note. The court erred, therefore, in granting plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and for a dismissal of the counterclaim based on the defense of accord and satisfaction. So much of the order as dismisses the counterclaim of Edwin J. Stukey is reversed and the counterclaim is reinstated. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, McKennan, J. — dismiss counterclaim.) Present — Hancock, Jr., J. P., Callahan, Doerr, Denman and Moule, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

99 A.D.2d 662, 472 N.Y.S.2d 55, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16923, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marine-midland-bank-v-stukey-nyappdiv-1984.