Marine Midland Bank v. McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen & Smith

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Marine Midland Bank v. McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen & Smith

271 A.D.2d 414, 705 N.Y.S.2d 651, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3812

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 3, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 271 A.D.2d 414 (Marine Midland Bank v. McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen & Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Marine Midland Bank v. McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen & Smith, 271 A.D.2d 414, 705 N.Y.S.2d 651, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3812 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered May 19, 1999, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Effective September 4, 1996, the Legislature amended CPLR 214 (6) to provide that the Statute of Limitations for all claims of professional malpractice, other than medical, dental, or podiatric, was to be three years, regardless of how the claim was pleaded (see, L 1996, ch 623, § 1; cf., Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700). Where, as here, a claim for legal malpractice accrued and would have been timely under prior case law, but was not yet interposed on the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), a party is given a reasonable [415]*415time from the effective date to interpose the claim (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, 262 AD2d 391; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447). Under the facts of this case, the interposition of the plaintiff’s claim against the appellant 57 days after such date was within a reasonable time. Ritter, J. P., Altman, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered May 19, 1999, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Effective September 4, 1996, the Legislature amended CPLR 214 (6) to provide that the Statute of Limitations for all claims of professional malpractice, other than medical, dental, or podiatric, was to be three years, regardless of how the claim was pleaded (see, L 1996, ch 623, § 1; cf., Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700). Where, as here, a claim for legal malpractice accrued and would have been timely under prior case law, but was not yet interposed on the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), a party is given a reasonable [415]*415time from the effective date to interpose the claim (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, 262 AD2d 391; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447). Under the facts of this case, the interposition of the plaintiff’s claim against the appellant 57 days after such date was within a reasonable time. Ritter, J. P., Altman, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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271 A.D.2d 414, 705 N.Y.S.2d 651, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marine-midland-bank-v-mccarthy-fingar-donovan-drazen-smith-nyappdiv-2000.

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