Marincovich v. Lautenbacher

553 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 67 ERC (BNA) 1534, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26560, 2008 WL 917122
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMarch 31, 2008
DocketCivil 07-6228-HO
StatusPublished

This text of 553 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (Marincovich v. Lautenbacher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marincovich v. Lautenbacher, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 67 ERC (BNA) 1534, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26560, 2008 WL 917122 (D. Or. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

MICHAEL R. HOGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs allege damage and continuing harm as a result of the listing of the Lower Columbia River Coho salmon ESU, as defined by defendants, under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., which listing occurred on or about June 28, 2005. Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring the defendants’ listing determination of June 28, 2005, as to the Lower Columbia River (LCR) Coho salmon invalid and unlawful under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs further pray for an injunction prohibiting defendants or others from taking any action to enforce the listing determination of June 28, 2005, as to Lower Columbia River Coho salmon.

In Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacher, 06-6093, similarly situated plaintiffs challenged, among other listings, the listing decision of defendant the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to list the *1239 Lower Columbia River Coho ESU as illegally distinguishing between naturally spawned and hatchery salmon in violation of the ESA and as arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 3706(2)(A). The plaintiffs in this case sought to intervene, but filed this separate suit because they had failed to give the required 60 day notice.

The court in Alsea Valley found that the NMFS did not violate the ESA and APA by distinguishing between hatchery stocks and “natural” salmon populations in its listing process, promulgating a protective regulation that distinguishes between hatchery stocks and natural populations and including salmon populations that do not interbreed in listed population segments with respect to 16 population segments including the challenged listing in this case.

Plaintiffs here argue that the Lower Columbia River Coho population is stable and/or increasing and not in danger of extinction. Plaintiffs also argue that the defendants failed to consider the adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms and efforts to protect the coho in its listing decision and that the listing does not show the population is threatened over all or a significant portion of the defined range. Plaintiffs also assert that defendants failed to consider the Washington and Oregon departments of fish and wildlife notations of errors.

A. Motion to Supplement the Record (#9)

Before the court can evaluate plaintiffs’ challenge to the listing, the court must first consider plaintiffs motion to supplement the administrative record or alternatively for judicial notice of facts contained in the documents sought to be added.

Judicial review of an agency decision typically focuses on the administrative record in existence at the time of the decision and does not encompass any part of the record that is made initially in the reviewing court. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). Review may, however, be expanded beyond the record if necessary to explain agency decisions. Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir.1988). In the Ninth Circuit, extra record materials are allowed only

(1) if necessary to determine “whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,”
(2) “when the agency has relied on documents not in the record,” or (3) “when supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter.”

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir.1996)). Extra-record materials may also be admitted “when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.” National Audubon Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 1437, 1447 n. 9 (9th Cir.1993). These exceptions are narrowly construed and applied. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.2004) (superceded on other grounds by The Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.2005)).

To the extent plaintiffs seek to provide post decision data or documents already included in the record, the motion to supplement is denied. Additionally, to the extent that plaintiffs seek to add documentation regarding data unrelated to the ESU in question, the motion is denied. The motion is otherwise granted.

B. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

This case essentially boils down to plaintiffs contention that the abundance of *1240 hatchery coho (which plaintiffs contend defendants ignored) in the ESU demonstrates no risk. The NMFS found that a loss of naturally spawning populations, the low abundance of extant populations, diminished diversity, and fragmentation and isolation of the remaining naturally produced fish confer considerable risks to the ESU. This court has already determined that the ESA does not prohibit this approach. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacher, 2007 WL 2344927 at *1 (D.Or. August 14, 2007). 1 Given the deferential standards in the ESA and APA, the court must deny plaintiffs challenge in this case.

The ESA requires NMFS to publish lists of endangered 2 and threatened 3 species in the Federal Register. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1), (c)(1). “The term ‘species’ includes any subspecies of fish ... and any distinct population segment of any vertebrate fish ... which interbreeds when mature.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). The term “distinct population segment” (DPS) is not defined in the ESA. NMFS considers a stock of Pacific salmon as a DPS if it “represents an evolutionarily significant unit (ESU) of the biological species.” 58 Fed.Reg. 58,612, 58,618 (Nov. 20, 1991).

A stock must satisfy two criteria to be considered an ESU:

(1) It must be substantially reproductively isolated from other conspecific population units; and
(2) It must represent an important component in the evolutionary legacy of the species.

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Related

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States
371 U.S. 156 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Camp v. Pitts
411 U.S. 138 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council
490 U.S. 360 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Universal Health Services Inc. v. Thompson
363 F.3d 1013 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
The Lands Council v. Powell
379 F.3d 738 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
The Lands Council v. Powell
395 F.3d 1019 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans
161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Oregon, 2001)
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 1976)
Animal Defense Council v. Hodel
840 F.2d 1432 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
553 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 67 ERC (BNA) 1534, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26560, 2008 WL 917122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marincovich-v-lautenbacher-ord-2008.