Marin Metro v. Colorado Bondshares

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 25CA130
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0130 Marin Metro v Colorado Bondshares 11-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0130 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22CV30866 Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge

Marin Metropolitan District, a quasi-municipal corporation and political subdivision of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Colorado Bondshares – A Tax Exempt Fund and UMB Bank, N.A.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

Century at Landmark, LLC,

Interested Party-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 20, 2025

Anderson Notarianni McMahon LLC, Kimberly A. Bruetsch, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kutak Rock LLP, Neil L. Arney, Thomas W. Snyder, Kathleen F. Guilfoyle, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants Fox Rothschild LLP, Marsha M. Piccone, Patrick J. Casey, Risa B. Brown, Denver, Colorado, for Interested Party-Appellee ¶1 Defendants, Colorado Bondshares, a tax-exempt fund

(Bondshares), and UMB Bank, N.A. (UMB), appeal the trial court’s

order awarding litigation costs to plaintiff, Marin Metropolitan

District (MMD), and an interested party, Century at Landmark, LLC

(Century). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 MMD is a special district that issued bonds to fund certain

improvements; Century owns the land within MMD; Bondshares is

a tax-exempt fund that purchased the bonds; and UMB is the bank

that held the bond proceeds in trust. See Landmark Towers Ass’n

v. UMB Bank, N.A., 2018 COA 100, ¶¶ 1-13; Marin Metro. Dist. v.

Colo. Bondshares, slip op. at 1 (Colo. App. No. 24CA1092, June 12,

2025) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The present appeal

addresses solely the trial court’s award of costs in favor of Century

and MMD and against Bondshares and UMB. In the interest of

brevity, we assume the readers’ knowledge of the factual and

procedural history of the prior litigation.

II. Analysis

¶3 Bondshares and UMB raise five issues related to the cost

award: They claim the trial court erred by (1) awarding costs to

1 MMD and Century because they should not have prevailed on the

merits; (2) awarding Century costs because it asserted no claims for

relief and no claims were asserted against it; (3) awarding Century’s

coding expenses because they were not adequately justified; (4)

awarding MMD’s and Century’s deposition expenses because their

necessity was not adequately explained; and (5) awarding MMD’s

and Century’s expenses for trial transcripts because the parties

agreed to split those costs without reserving the ability to seek them

as costs. We address these contentions in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶4 We review a trial court’s award of costs for an abuse of

discretion. Archer v. Farmers Bros. Co., 90 P.3d 228, 230 (Colo.

2004). We will disturb the award only “if it is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair.” Id. The parties agree that each issue

raised on appeal is preserved.

¶5 With these standards in mind, we turn to the specific issues

that Bondshares and UMB raise.

B. The Merits Decision

¶6 In Marin Metropolitan District, a division of this court affirmed

the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of MMD and

2 Century. No. 24CA1092, slip op. at 2 Thus, for the reasons stated

in that decision, the trial court did not err by entering judgment in

favor of MMD and Century.

C. Century Was Entitled to an Award of Costs

¶7 Bondshares and UMB argue that the trial court erred by

awarding Century costs because it did not assert any claims and

none were asserted against it. We are not persuaded.

¶8 The trial court relied on the supreme court’s decision in

Archer, which holds as follows: “A ‘prevailing party’ is one who

prevails on a significant issue in the litigation and derives some of

the benefits sought by the litigation.” Archer, 90 P.3d at 230; see

also Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 985 P.2d 59, 64 (Colo. App. 1999)

(“[T]he prevailing party is one that has succeeded on a significant

issue and has achieved some of the benefits sought in the

lawsuit.”), aff’d, 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); C.R.C.P. 54(d)

(“[R]easonable costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing

party . . . .”).

¶9 Contrary to Bondshares and UMB’s argument, Archer does not

hold that a prevailing party must have asserted a claim or had a

claim asserted against it. In any event, MMD asserted a claim, and

3 Bondshares and UMB asserted counterclaims that exposed Century

to significant liability — a potential mill levy on its property for

millions of dollars. Indeed, Century was properly named as a

necessary party by MMD because the declaratory judgment sought

by MMD would materially impact Century’s property. See C.R.C.P.

57(j) (“When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made

parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by

the declaration . . . .”). In the litigation, Century’s interest aligned

with that of MMD. Thus, Century had little reason to duplicate the

same claim for declaratory relief that MMD had already articulated.

But Century still incurred costs as a result of being drawn into the

litigation, and Century obtained a significant benefit as a result of

MMD’s declaratory judgment claim — the defeat of Bondshares and

UMB’s counterclaims. Furthermore, Century clearly derived a

benefit from the declaratory judgment — it was no longer burdened

by the possibility of a mill levy on its property.

¶ 10 Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding that Century

was a prevailing party.

4 D. Coding and Deposition Expenses

¶ 11 Bondshares and UMB challenge the trial court’s award of

costs incurred by Century to code case-related documents. Century

justified these expenses on the grounds that the case was

document-intensive and a “vendor’s initial review and coding of

these documents was necessary and reasonable for purposes of

disclosures, productions in response to discovery requests,

preparation for depositions, and trial.”

¶ 12 The trial court allowed the expenses, noting that it was “very

familiar with the complexities of this case and the volume of

exhibits involved in the preparation and trial of the case.” The

court noted,

Century has stated that the outside vendor’s services were “necessary and reasonable for purposes of disclosures, productions in response to discovery requests, preparation for depositions, and trial.” . . . While Century could have provided more robust support for this item of costs, the Court recognizes the importance of efficient and effective document management in a document intensive case such as this . . . [and finds] these costs to be reasonable and necessary . . . .

¶ 13 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

awarding these coding expenses as costs. See Gf Gaming Corp. v.

5 Taylor, 205 P.3d 523, 527 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[W]e defer to the trial

court’s finding that the document coding expenses were ‘reasonably

incurred in this particular case,’ which is consistent with the

court’s observations about the complexity of the case.”); cf. Moye

White LLP v. Beren, 2013 COA 89, ¶ 44 (court did not abuse its

discretion by awarding scanning expenses that assisted counsel in

efficiently preparing for trial and responding to discovery requests).

¶ 14 The trial court also awarded MMD and Century the expenses

they incurred taking the depositions of people with information that

was essential to the case. Century provided the following rationale

supporting this request: “The deponents . . . were key witnesses

who testified at trial [and the trial court] relied on testimony of

these witnesses in its decisions and these depositions and

deposition transcripts were necessary for developing the facts and

preparing a record for trial.” The trial court awarded these

expenses, reasoning as follows: “These depositions were permitted

under this Court’s rules and discovery orders; the deposition

transcripts were necessary for preparing the direct and cross-

examination of each of these witnesses at trial. As a result, the

6 costs of deposition transcripts were ‘reasonably necessary’ for

litigation.”

¶ 15 Again, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by awarding these deposition-related expenses. See

Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805, 814 (Colo.

1993) (trial court’s findings that discovery depositions were integral

to preparation for trial and necessary for the efficient presentation

of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses were more than

sufficient to satisfy the standard for recovery of deposition costs).

In doing so, we expressly reject UMB and Bondshares’ argument

that MMD and Century were required to provide a detailed rationale

establishing that each deposition was necessary and essential to

the development or presentation of the case. The trial court found

counsel’s general description sufficient, and given the court’s

superior knowledge of the history of this case, we defer to that

judgment.

E. Costs for Trial Transcripts

¶ 16 The parties agreed prior to trial that they would evenly share

the expenses of obtaining expedited trial transcripts for use at trial

and in post-trial motions. MMD and Century do not dispute this

7 agreement, nor do they dispute that those expenses were in fact

split between the parties. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed MMD

and Century to obtain reimbursement for their portion of the

transcript expenses. The court reasoned that the transcript

expenses were not a luxury and were justified in view of the prior

appeal and the anticipation that its ruling following the bench trial

would also be appealed.

¶ 17 Bondshares and UMB argue that the court abused its

discretion because MMD and Century had agreed to share the

transcript expenses but did not reserve the right to seek

reimbursement of those expenses pursuant to a cost award.

¶ 18 The general rule is that if the parties agree to share certain

expenses, they are bound by that agreement unless they expressly

reserve the right to seek reimbursement as costs. See Moye White,

¶ 48 n.8 (noting that a trial court should not award costs under

section 13-16-122, C.R.S. 2025, when the parties agreed to split the

requested expenses); Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co.,

252 P.3d 1182, 1192 (Colo. App. 2011) (same).

¶ 19 Here, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to split the

transcript expenses, and MMD and Century point to nothing in the

8 record reserving any party’s right to pursue reimbursement at the

conclusion of the proceedings. The closest Century comes is its

argument that “the record before this Court supports that, while the

parties initially agreed to split trial transcript expenses, they

recognized that it was ‘standard practice’ for the prevailing party to

later recover such costs.” But the quoted language is not reflected

in any agreement between the parties. Rather, it is taken from

Century’s reply in support of its bill of costs. In other words, this

language was merely an argument by counsel. Thus, it provides no

evidentiary support for MMD and Century’s contention that they

reserved the right to recover their portion of those expenses as

costs. See Robertson v. People, 2017 COA 143M, ¶ 35 (“[A]rguments

of counsel, of course, are not evidence.” (quoting City of Fountain v.

Gast, 904 P.2d 478, 482 n.5 (Colo. 1995))).

¶ 20 Thus, Century did not meet its burden of demonstrating that

it reserved the right to seek reimbursement of its share of the

transcript expenses. Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1187 (“The burden is

on the requesting party to provide ‘sufficient information and

supporting documentation to allow [the court] to make a reasoned

decision for each cost item presented.’” (quoting City of Aurora v.

9 Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 627 (Colo. 2005))). Accordingly,

this portion of the trial court’s cost award must be reversed.

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The trial court’s order awarding MMD and Century costs for

their share of the trial transcripts is reversed. In all other respects,

the trial court’s cost order in favor of MMD and Century is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.