EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division In re: ) ) MARIETTA CHEEKS, ) Case No.19-10516-BFK ) Chapter 13 Debtor. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING: (A) U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION’S MOTION TO CONFIRM ABSENCE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY (DOCKET NO. 13); AND (B) CLEAR SKY PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY (DOCKET NO. 32) This matter came before theCourt on the Motion of U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) to Confirm Absence of the Automatic Stay, and ontheMotion of Clear Sky Properties, LLC (“Clear Sky”) for Relief from the Automatic Stay. Docket Nos. 13, 32. The Motions essentially seek thesame relief-U.S. Bank, the formerbeneficiary ofthe Deed of Trust at issue in this case, and Clear Sky, the successful bidder at theforeclosure sale of real property located at 17160 Belle Isle Drive,Dumfries, VA (hereinafter, the “Property”), assert that the Property was always titledin the name of the Debtor’s husband and that the Debtor had no legal or equitable interest in the Property at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition. U.S. Bank requests, in thealternative, that the Court grant relief from theautomatic stay,nunc pro tunc. Clear Sky argues, also inthe alternative, that if the automatic stayapplied to the Property,Clear Skyis entitled to be treated as a bona fide purchaser for value. See11 U.S.C. §§549(c), 550(b)(1). The Debtor opposes both Motions, acknowledging that legal title was in thename of her husband but arguing that she possessedan equitable interest in the Propertyat the time she filed her bankruptcy petition. She argues that the Deed can and should be reformed under applicable 37. The Court heard the evidence and the parties’arguments onJune14and24, 2019. The
Court finds that the Debtor’s evidence falls short of establishinga claim for equitable title and that reformationof the Deed is not available in this case. The automatic stay, therefore, did not come into effect with respect to theProperty whenthe case was filed. The Court further finds, in light of the foregoing, that: (a) U.S. Bank’s alternative request for nunc pro tuncrelief is moot; and (b)the Court need not address Clear Sky’s argument that it is a good faith purchaser for value. TheCourt will grant U.S. Bank’s and Clear Sky’s Motions. Findings of Fact The Court, having heard the evidence, makes the following findings of fact: 1. The Debtor, Marietta Cheeks, is an individual residingthe town of Dumfries, in Prince William County, Virginia.
2. Ms. Cheeks and her husband, Frederick Cheeks, have been married for 43 years. They have two children, who are adults, and two grandchildren. 3. The Property is the Cheeks’principal residence. 4. Mr. Cheeks worked as a lineman for Dominion Power for 45 years. He is now retired. 5. Ms. Cheeks operates a daycare business, though she testified that she does not bring any children into the Property and that her activities are largely confined to picking up and dropping off the children from school and from after-school activities. 6. Ms. Cheeks generally handles the family’s finances. She pays the bills,handles the bank accounts and prepares the tax returns. (a) Prior to the foreclosure sale of the property known as 17160 Belle Isle Drive, Dumfries, VA 22026 (the property), Robert Butler contacted Brock & Scott, PLLC and advised the representative for the firm, that Marietta Cheeks has filed bankruptcy and that the sale should be placed on hold. (b) Robert Butler is not an attorney licensed to practice law and is not an employee of, or affiliated with Debtor’s counsel, Nathan Fisher, or his law firm. (c) Brock & Scott, PLLC received notice of Marietta Cheeks’bankruptcy filing from Robert Butler only. (d) The Note attached to the Joint Stipulation is a true and exact copyof the original signed Note. (e) The Deed of Trust, Deed, & Corrected Deed all attached to the Joint Stipulationare true and exact copies of documents on file in the Prince William Circuit Court Clerk’s Office, among the land records for that county. (f) The Note and Deed of Trust are signed by Frederick Cheeks. Joint Stipulationof Facts, Docket No. 55. A. The Contract of Sale. 8. Mr. and Ms. Cheeks began searching for a home in 2013. They employed a realtor recommended by their daughter,who brought them to the Potomac Shores neighborhood in Dumfries. 9. NVHomes is one of thehome builders in the PotomacShores development. 10. Mr. and Ms. Cheeks visited and viewedmodel homes. Theypicked out a lot, and chose the Portsmouthmodel fortheirhome. 11. On May 17, 2015, Frederick Cheeks individually entered intoaPurchase Agreement for thepurchase of a homewith NVHomes. CSP Ex. 22.1 12. The original purchase price was $753,475.00. Id., ¶ 2.
1 Clear Sky’s Exhibits are referred to herein as “CSP No. __.”U.S. Bank’s Exhibits are referred to as “USB No. __.”TheDebtor’s Exhibits arereferredto as “DR Ex. __.” Cheeks, entered into a Purchase Agreement for the purchaseof the same property, with the same purchaseprice. CSP Ex. 23.
14. OnMay 28 and 29, 2015, Mr. Cheeks individually signed aChange Order Addendum and a Flooring Selection Sheet (together, the“Change Orders”) as addenda to the Purchase Agreements. DR Exs. C and D. 15. Ms. Cheeks was the primary point of contact for NVHomes forthe selection of finishes and upgrades to the Property. She testified that she was present and assisted her husband onthe computer in their home in affixing his electronic signatures to the Change Orders. 16. On October 6, 2015, VirginiaWahab (known to Ms.Cheeks as Ginnie) of NVR Settlement Services e-mailed a letter toMs. Cheeks. DR Ex. I. The letter enclosed a Tenancy form.Ms. Wahab requested that the form be signed and returned to the closing attorney. Id. 17. Mr. Cheeks returned two Tenancy forms to the closing attorney, Benjamin C.
Winn. The first (somewhat inconsistently) stated: “Frederick L. Cheeks, Tenants by the Entirety.”The second checked the box that stated: “Sole Owner (If you are buyingthe property alone then this will be your option.)”) DR Ex. U. 18. Mr. and Ms. Cheeks understood that Ms. Cheeks would not be a borrower on the mortgage loan becauseshe had student loan debt that would have made approval of the loan more difficult. This notwithstanding, Ms. Cheeks and Mr.Cheeks both testified convincingly that they have always owned their properties jointly during their 43-year marriage and that it was their intent to take title tothis Property jointly. B. The Applications for Financing. 19. Mr. andMs. Cheeks intended to use $400,000.00 of Mr. Cheeks’ retirement
savings (401(K)) for the downpayment, financing the rest of the purchase price with an FHA mortgage. Mortgage. DR Exs. O, P, Q. Each of these Applications indicatedthat Mr. Cheeks was to be the sole borrower, but that title would be taken jointly with Ms. Cheeks. SeeDR Exs. O(“Titleheld
jointly”), P (“Title held jointly”), Q (“Title held jointly”). 21. On October 13, 2015, Russell Turner of NVR Mortgagewrote an e-mail to Ms. Cheeks advising her that “we arerunninginto a little issue with regards to the debt to income [ratio] on our end.” DR Ex. K. He referred Mr. andMs. Cheeks to George Mason Mortgage.Id. 22. NVR Mortgagesent Mr. Cheeks a Notice of Action Taken, Statement of Reasons and Counterofferdenying loan approval on October 15, 2015. CSP Ex. 37.The stated reason for the denial was “DTI [Debt to Income] –Unreimbursed Exp.”2 23. Mr. Cheeks then submitted a Uniform Residential Loan Applicationto George Mason Mortgage. DR Ex. S. The section labeled “Manner in which Title will be held”was left blank. Id.
24. George Mason Mortgage approved the loan in the amount of $424,297.00, with an interest rate of 4.0% and a 30-year amortization,on November 25, 2015. CSP Ex. 66. 25. Mr. Cheeks signeda second Uniform Residential Loan Application withGeorge Mason Mortgage as of the date of the settlement on the Property, November 30, 2015. DR Ex. T. This time, the section entitled “Manner in which title will beheld”stated: “Married Man.”Id. C. The Closing. 26. About three weeks prior to the closing, on November 5, 2015, Mr. Cheeks signed a Title Addendum to Purchase Agreement. CSP Ex. 49. The Title Addendum stated that he
2 The First Payment Letter issued at the closing indicated that the monthly mortgage payment would be $3,144.02. CSP Ex. 80. Mr.Cheeks listed his monthly income including overtimeas $7,127.82 in his Loan Application with George Mason Mortgage. DR Ex. S, p.2. Ms. Cheeks’ day care business didnot appear to contribute significantly to the family’s income. CSP Exs. 13 (2012 Tax Return), 14 (2013 Tax Return), 16 (2014 Tax Return), 18 (2015 Tax Return). Thus, the monthly mortgage payment would have been approximately 44% ofMr. Cheeks’ gross (i.e., beforetax) monthly income. conditions: (a) Purchaser shall provide Seller written evidence from the Lender (as defined in the Agreement), satisfactory to Sellerin its solediscretion, that adding the Additional Title Holder to the deed of conveyance shall not affect Purchaser’s ability to obtain a loan from Lender. In the event that Purchaser does not provide suchwritten evidence to Seller prior to Settlement, title shall be conveyed to Purchaser as provided in the Agreement. (b) Purchaser agrees that adding the Additional Title Holder to the deedof conveyance shall in no way delay,prevent, or otherwise adversely affect Settlement as contemplated under the Agreement, and any such delay, failure to obtain financing, or failure to settle due, in Seller’s sole determination, to the addition of the Additional Title Holder, shall be adefault under the terms of the Agreement. Id., ¶¶ 2 (a) and (b). 27. The closingonthesale of the Property took place onNovember 30, 2015. CSP Ex. 83 (HUD-1 Settlement Statement). Ms. Cheeks testified that she and Mr. Cheeks had to wait for two closings to be completed before theirs, and that when it came to their closing they felt very rushed. 28. The final purchase price with all of the additions and upgrades was $859,400.00. Id., Line 401. The Cheeks paid $418,929.06in cash at closing, in addition to their $30,000.00 deposit, both of which came from Mr. Cheeks’401(K) retirement account. Id., Lines 507 (Deposit), 303 (Cash from Borrower). 29. The Deed to the Property from NVR, Inc., identified Mr. Cheeks as the sole Grantee. CSP Ex. 7(recorded 12/2/2015).3 30. Mr.Cheeks signed the Note payable to George Mason Mortgage; Ms. Cheeks did not.CSP Ex. 6.
3 NVR, Inc. later recorded a Correction Deed, which included information concerning the Cherry Hill Community Development Authority District (CDA). CSP Ex. 7. Ms. Cheeks was quite unhappy tolearn aftertheclosingthat she and Mr. Cheeks would owe taxes to two taxing authorities–Prince William County and the Cherry HillCDA (in addition to their Homeowners Association dues). CSP Exs. 3, 4. 32. No evidence was presentedthat Mr. andMs. Cheeks ever complied with the
condition stated in paragraph2(a) of the Title Addendum, which required the written consent of the lender. 33. Ms. Cheeks testified that she did not notice at the closing that the Deed was made out solely to Mr. Cheeks as Grantee and that she was not on the Deed. In fact, she testified, she was not aware of this until after she filed her bankruptcy petition in this case in February 2019. 34. Mr. and Ms. Cheeks movedintothe Property on December 20, 2015. 35. The servicing of their loan was later transferred to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank.CSP Ex. 88. D. The Prior Bankruptcy Cases. 36. Mr. Cheeks received a discharge in a Chapter 7 case in 2013 (before theCheeks’ purchase of the Property). In re FrederickLeeCheeks, Case No. 13-13628-BFK.4
37. Ms. Cheeks filed two previous bankruptcy cases. The first case was a Chapter 13 casefiled in September 2003, and was dismissed in June 2004. In re Marietta Cheeks, Case No. 03-14173-SSM. The second case was filed as a Chapter 13 case in August 2004, and was dismissedin November2004. In re Marietta Cheeks, Case No. 04-13487-SSM. Both ofthese cases preceded,by many years,the Cheeks’purchase of the Dumfries Property. 38. After defaulting on the loanwith U.S. Bank,Mr. Cheeks filed two Chapter 13 cases.In reFrederick L. Cheeks,Case No. 17-14027-KHK; In re Frederick L. Cheeks, Case No. 18-13245-KHK. The first case was dismissed for failureto pay the filing feeandthe failure to
4 The Court can take judicial noticeof its own records. In re Heilig-Meyers Co., 328 B.R. 471, 488-89 (E.D. Va. 2005);In re Rivera, No. 13-14351-BFK, 2014 WL 287517, at *2 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2014);In re Ryan, 472 B.R. 714, 727-28 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012);In re Giordano, 472 B.R. 313, 335 n.15(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). second casewas dismissed for the same reasons. CaseNo. 18-13245-KHK, Docket No. 21. E. Ms. Cheeks Files the Instant Bankruptcy Case.
39. Ms. Cheeks filed this case as a VoluntaryPetition underChapter 13 at 4:00 p.m. onFebruary 16, 2019. Docket No. 1. She was representedbycounsel in the filing. Id. 40. Ms. Cheeks testified that she and Mr. Cheeks had consulted with anattorney from California whoadvised them that Mr. Cheeks was not eligible to file another bankruptcy petition becauseof his previous bankruptcy cases. 41. Ms.Cheeks’Schedule A/Blists the Property as being “Owned as husband and wife.”Docket No. 16, Schedule A/B. 42. She listedthe Property withavalue of $989,000.00, andwith secured debt in the amount of $420,000.00 as of the petition date. Id., Schedules A/B,D. F. The Foreclosure of the Propertyand the Sale to Clear Sky.
43. Ms. Cheeks testified that they were able to make the payments for about one year, through December 2016. The last payment that she and Mr. Cheeks made to U.S. Bank was in early 2017. 44. Ms. Cheeks worked on a loan modificationand hired a company to help her in that effort. She testified that she sent all of the required documents to U.S. Bank in January 2017, and that she and Mr. Cheeks wereapproved for a reducedmonthly payment of $2,889.00. She testified that they made these payments in February and March 2017. 45. In April 2017, U.S. Bank started returningthe payments and asserted that they were againindefault.As a result, Mr. and Ms. Cheeks stopped makingpayments to U.S. Bank in April 2017 and thereafter.
46. U.S. Bank noticed a foreclosure on theProperty for the morning of February 19, 2019, at 2:00 p.m.USB Ex. 8. third time that the Propertyhad been noticed for a foreclosure, the first two having been stayed by Mr. Cheeks’bankruptcy filings.
48. On February 19th,just before conducting the foreclosure, the Substitute Trustee called his office to determine whether the record titleholder, Mr. Cheeks, had filed a bankruptcy petition; the answer was no. Unbeknownst to the Substitute Trustee, Ms. Cheeks had filed her Voluntary Petition on February 16th, three days beforethe foreclosure sale. 49. Clear Sky was the successful bidder at the foreclosure,havingbid $493,624.00. USB Ex. 7. The Substitute Trustee signed a Memorandum of Trustee’s Foreclosure Sale dated February 19, 2019, and Clear Sky paid the Substitute Trustee $45,000.00as adeposit. Id. 50. Both Mr. and Ms. Cheeks testified that, in their view, the Property has a value of approximately what they paid for it, $859,000.00. 51. Mr. Einsmann was not able to conduct an inspection of the Property before he
made the bid at the foreclosure sale. He testified that Clear Sky generally calculates its bids at foreclosure sales based on neighborhood comparable sales, less anticipated costs for the repair and renovation of the property. In Mr. Einsmann’s words, “we buy wholesale, and we sell retail.” In this case, Mr. Einsmann estimated the “after-repair” value of the Property to be, conservatively, $750,000.00. 52. Mr. Einsmann furthertestified that the values in this neighborhood for secondary sales were somewhat depressed (perhaps 5 to 7% of theirvalue) owing to the fact that NV was still selling homes in the project, so sellers arestill competing against the builder of the homes. 53. He further estimated the repairs for this Property, a new property which has been well-maintained, to be approximately $30,000.00. Thus, his “before repair” value was
approximately $700,000.00. Clear Sky’s foreclosure bidrepresented 70% of Mr. Einsmann’s $859,000.00. Conclusions of Law
The Court has jurisdiction overthis matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334and the Order of Reference entered by the District Court for this District on August 15,1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(2)(A) (matters concerning the administration of the estate)and (G) (motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay). Section 362(d)(1) of the Code allows the automatic stay to be terminated for cause, including a lack of adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1). Clear Skyand U.S. Bankseek relief from theautomatic stay to complete theforeclosure sale by recording a Trustee’s Deed to thePropertyand to proceed with State law remedies to gain possession of the Property. Here, there is causeto grant Clear Sky’s and U.S. Bank’s Motions becausethe Property never
constituted property of Ms. Cheeks’bankruptcy estate. A. Property of the Estate andtheAutomatic Stay. The nature and extent of the bankruptcy estate’s interest in property is determined under State law, unless there is a competing bankruptcy law consideration,which there is not in this case. Butner v. U.S.440 U.S. 48,55(1979). Bankruptcy Code Section 541(a)(1) provides that property of the estate shall consist of “all of the followingproperty wherever located and by whomever held…[including] all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in propertyas of the commencement of the case.”11U.S.C. §541(a)(1)(emphasis added). The automatic stay precludes creditor action against property of the estate, with certain exceptions not relevant here. 11 U.S.C.§362(a). A number of courts have heldthat the
automatic stay can extend to a debtor’s equitable interest in property, where title to the property is recorded in another entity. For example, in In re Ealy, the bankruptcycourt held that the automatic stay protected certainproperty that was held in thename of alimitedliability company E.D. Ark. 2004). In Ford v. A.C. Loftin (In re Ford), the bankruptcy court held that “the Debtor has a continuing beneficial ownership interest in the residence on thebasis of an implied trust
under Georgia cases.”296 B.R. 537, 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003). In Fadel v. DCB United LLC (In re Fadel), the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel employed a “form of title” presumption –that the description of title in the deed presumptively reflects actual ownership – but that this presumption couldbe rebuttedby a showingof undue influencein the transaction. 492 B.R. 1, 11-12 (9thCir. B.A.P. 2013). Ms. Cheeks,therefore, couldpossiblydemonstratethat the Property was titled solelyin her husband’s name as a product of a mutual mistake, for which she would be entitled to a reformation of the Deed under State law. B. Virginia Law on Mistake, Equitable Title and Reformation. The legal burden to demonstratean entitlement to reformation of instruments as a result
of a mutual mistake is a heavy one in Virginia. In Gibbs v. Price, the Virginia Supreme Court held: Equity has undoubted jurisdiction to reform an instrument if it does not express the intent of the parties. Equity should give effect tothe true intent of the parties, despite a contrary intent reflected by a writing the parties mistakenly believed to monument their bargain. But equity should not act lightly….To support reformation on the ground of mutual mistake, the proof ‘must be clear and satisfactory, leaving but little, if any, doubt of the mistake’. 150 S.E.2d 551,552(Va. 1966)(emphasis added).5 In determining whether a mutual mistake has been made, ‘“the inquiry is not ... who initially made the mistake, but rather, whether each party held the same mistaken belief with respect to a material fact at the time the agreement was executed.’”Tiger Fibers, LLC v. Aspen
5 Virginia law also allows for reformation where the mistake is unilateral, but is accompanied by a misrepresentation or fraud by the otherparty to the instrument. Ward v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 460,462(Va. 1990). Thereisno suggestion in this case that NVcommitted a fraud at the closing. citations omitted).6 C. TheApplication of Virginia Law to the Facts of this Case.
The Court found Ms. Cheeks’and Mr. Cheeks’testimony to be highly credible on the issue of how theyintended to taketitle. Mr. andMs. Cheeks have been married for 43 years. They have always acted jointly in their financial affairs.Ms. Cheeks acknowledged that she was not going to be a borrower on the mortgageloan becauseof her student loan debt, but she was adamant that she was to beon the title. Although Clear Sky introduced evidencethat Mr. and Ms. Cheeks may have significant tax problems with the IRS, this did not shake the Court’s conclusion on thecore issue that Mr. and Ms. Cheeks intendedto take title jointly to theirhome. This is not the end of the matter, however,because Mr. and Ms.Cheeks were not the only parties to the transaction. NVHomes was the seller and George Mason Mortgage was the lender andthe beneficiary of the Deed of Trust (later assigned to U.S. Bank). The Title Addendum
clearly indicated that Mr. Cheeks intended to add Ms. Cheeks as an Additional Title Holder. CSP Ex. 49. However,just as clearly, the Title Addendum contained the condition that Mr. and Ms. Cheeks produce the written consent of thelender. Id.,¶2(a). Mr. Cheeks signed this on November 5,2015, about three weeks beforethe closing, so there was time to obtainthe lender’s
6 Although Ms. Cheeks did not press the issue at the final hearing in this matter, her pleadings allude to the fact that this Property was marital property under Virginia law. SeeDocket Nos. 22, ¶8 (“the debtor asserts an equitable interest in the $400,000.00 in marital equity in the subject property”), 37, ¶11 (same). TheCourt agrees withthe bankruptcy court’s analysis in In re Balzano,399 B.R. 428 (Bankr. D.Md. 2008), that thiswould have been insufficient to cause the Property tobecomeproperty of Ms. Cheeks’bankruptcy estate. Under Va. Code §20- 107.3(A), theCircuit Court “upon decreeing the dissolutionof marriage”shalldetermine“the legaltitle as between the parties.”Thestatute furtherprovides that all orders or decrees that divide or transfer propertybetweenthe parties shall be indexed and recorded in the city or county where the property is located. Va. Code §20-107.3(C). The statute expressly states: For thepurposes of this section only,both parties shall be deemed to have rights and interests in the marital property. However, such interests and rights shall not attach to the legal title of such propertyand are only to be used as a consideration in determining a monetary award, if any, as provided in this section. Va.Code §20-107.3(B) (emphasis added). Of course, in this case, Mr. and Ms. Cheeks never instituted divorce proceedings and a decree with respect to the Property was never recorded. Cheeks ever requested the lender’s consent. A representative of George Mason Mortgage did not testify,and the Court is left to speculate as to whether it would have consented to adding Ms.
Cheeks as a record title holder.NV, the Grantor of the Deed, had no real interest in the identity of the party or parties to whom it was granting title, but it did require a writtenstatement from the lender that adding Ms. Cheeks to the title was acceptable and would not delay the closing for any reason. The Title Addendum indicates that Mr. andMs. Cheeks were aware that Ms. Cheeks wouldnot be on the titleandthat, unless they produced a letter from George Mason Mortgage consenting to adding Ms. Cheeks to the title, only Mr. Cheeks would be on the Deed as the Grantee. Having heard the evidence, the Court is constrained to hold that the Cheeks’ proof fell short of their burden to demonstrate a mutual mistake under Virginia law. The Court is aware that this is a highly unfortunate result for Mr. and Ms. Cheeks. Mr. Cheeks was in fact eligible to file a bankruptcy petition in his own name, despite the fact that it
would have been his third bankruptcy case (he would have had thebenefit of the automatic stay for 30 days had he filed a third case, because a new case wouldhave been his second case within 12 months; he could have moved to extendtheautomatic stay under Bankruptcy Code Section 362(c)(3)). Mr.Cheeks put over $400,000.00 of his hard-earned 401(K) savings into this property. Clear Sky purchased the property for a foreclosure bid of only $493,000.00.Virginia law, however, requires clearand satisfactoryproof of amutual mistake,not a unilateral misunderstanding.7 The Court, therefore, will grant Clear Sky’s and U.S. Bank’s Motions for Relief from the Automatic Stay.
7 It is possible that, had Mr. and Ms. Cheeks known that Ms. Cheeks was not on the title, Mr. Cheekscould have transferred the property to himself and Ms. Cheeksas joint tenants or tenants by the entirety without triggering a due on sale clause from the lender. See12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d)(6) (preempting State law ondue on sale clauses where the transfer is to a spouse); 12 CFR § 591.5 (same). For the foregoing reasons it is ORDERED: 1. U.S. Bank’s andClearSky’s Motions for Relief from the Automatic Stay are both
granted, to permit them to record a Trustee’s Deed and to exercise their State law remedies with respect to possession of the Property. 2. The Clerk will mail copies of this Memorandum Opinionand Order, or will provide cm-ecf notice of its entry, tothe parties below. Date: _A _u _g _ _1 _2 _ 2 __0 _1 _9 __________ _/s_/_ B__ri_a_n_ _F_. _K_e_n__n_e_y_______________ Brian F. Kenney Alexandria, Virginia United States Bankruptcy Judge Entered on Docket: August 13, 2019 Copies to: Marietta Cheeks 17160 Belle Isle Drive Dumfries, VA 22026 Chapter 13Debtor Nathan A. Fisher, Esquire 3977 Chain Bridge Road, #2 Fairfax, VA 22030 Counsel for Debtor Edward J. Grass, Esquire 9501 Burke Road #10784 Burke, VA 22015 Counsel for Clear Sky Financial, LLC M.Christine Maggard, Esquire Brock & Scott, PLLC 484 Viking Drive, Suite 203 Virginia Beach, VA 23452 Counsel for U. S. Bank, National Association Thomas P. Gorman, Esquire 300 N. Washington St. Ste. 400 Alexandria, VA 22314 Chapter 13 Trustee