Maricondo v. Maricondo, No. Fa92 029 71 27 S (Jan. 16, 1998)

1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1279
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 16, 1998
DocketNo. FA92 029 71 27 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1279 (Maricondo v. Maricondo, No. Fa92 029 71 27 S (Jan. 16, 1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maricondo v. Maricondo, No. Fa92 029 71 27 S (Jan. 16, 1998), 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1279 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FORMODIFICATION OF ALIMONY AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT By way of background, a judgment of the dissolution was entered by this court on December 22, 1993, ending a twenty-one year marriage (Petroni, J.) A separation agreement signed by the parties was incorporated into the judgment, which in relevant part provided for the defendant to pay the plaintiff periodic alimony of $400 a week for the first three years and a week for the next seven years ending on December 23, 2003. The defendant CT Page 1280 also obligated himself to pay the plaintiff a lump sum alimony award of $185,000 upon her vacating the marital home on or before December 30, 1996.

There is no dispute that the defendant stopped paying the $600 alimony order on or about June 6, 1997, claiming he had retired on Social Security on or about June 1, 1997, and his retirement caused a substantial change in his financial circumstances.

When considering this motion to modify or terminate alimony orders pursuant to § 46b-86a, the moving party must first prove a substantial change in his or her circumstances has occurred to either party from the date the original alimony order was entered on December 22, 1993, the date of the judgment, to the present time. Theonnes v. Theonnes, 181 Conn. 111-113 (1980). If the court finds a substantial change in the circumstances of either party, it then must consider the statutory factors in § 46b-82 of the Connecticut General Statutes, the alimony statute, and decide what, if any, alimony would be fair and equitable at the present time. Borkowski v. Borkowski,228 Conn. 729, 737-38 (1994). These factors are relevant in deciding whether an alimony order may be modified or terminated since the prior order was entered and primarily have to do with the needs and financial resources of the parties. Sanchione v. Sanchione,173 Conn. 397, 401-402 (1977). Other factors which the court is required to consider are the present age, health, station, occupation, employability and the cause of the dissolution and the amount and sources of income of the parties. Hardisty v.Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 258-59.

On December 11, 1997, a hearing was held on both motions, the defendant's motion for modification and the plaintiff's motion for contempt. Both parties testified as well as the defendant's accountant and his attorney. Some of the background facts are not in dispute.

The defendant, a carpenter by trade, has been in the building business for the past twenty-five years constructing and selling residential homes in the Bridgeport region. From approximately 1970 to 1981, he did business through a corporation, Robert Maricondo, Inc., in which he was the sole stockholder. In 1981, he transferred all the stock and assets of that corporation to M M Building Associates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as M M Builders) a corporation in which Jon Maricondo, his son, owned CT Page 1281 all the stock. The defendant was the President and Treasurer of the son's corporation, and the defendant continued to build and sell residential homes, as he had been doing under his own corporation, to the present time.

At the time of the judgment, the defendant's financial affidavit dated December 22, 1993, listed gross weekly wages paid to him by M M Builders of $1,300, and after deductions, a net weekly wage of $825. His total weekly expenses were $1,545 with net assets of $101,200, which consisted of an $89,000 loan from M M Builders and $12,700 for a gun and coin collection. The defendant had no cash or banks listed in this affidavit. In his current affidavit dated December 11, 1997, he lists a weekly wage of $200 from M M Builders and $287 from Social Security for a total net weekly income of $487. He claims this reduction of income and his retirement on Social Security for health reasons warrants a modification or termination of the $600 alimony order pursuant to § 46b-86 (a).

The plaintiff's affidavit filed at the time of judgment listed no income from employment but showed she was receiving temporary alimony and child support of $1,000 a week from the defendant. Her net assets were $22,528 and total liabilities amounted to $1,710.09. Her current affidavit dated December 11, 1997, lists no income from employment and living expenses of $588 per week. Her net assets are now $147,155, of which $134,000 is the value of the condominium in which she now lives.

The plaintiff is presently 59 years of age and her efforts over the past four years to find a job has been unsuccessful. She has been interviewed numerous occasions and was told she lacks the secretarial and computer skills needed in the present job market. She lists no income from employment on her current financial affidavit and testified she has been living on the $50,000 she received on May 31, 1997, as part of the lump sum alimony award.

There is no dispute the defendant paid the $400 per week alimony order for the first three years and the $600 per week alimony order until June 6, 1997, when he stopped making any payments claiming he retired on social security causing a substantial change in his financial circumstances. His reason for retiring at age 67 was because he had prostrate cancer and a heart condition, which now warrants a modification or termination of the $600 per week alimony order pursuant to § 46b-86(a) CT Page 1282 of the Connecticut General Statutes.

From the defendant's own testimony and the testimony of Jon Maricondo, his 37-year old son from a prior marriage, the court finds the following facts. Prior to June 6, 1997, the defendant was receiving wages of $1,000 per week and living rent free in a residence-office owned by M M Builders, the son's corporation. The defendant also had use of a pickup truck and an automobile with all expenses paid by the corporation. When the defendant went on Social Security on June 1, 1997, he and his son agreed to a reduction of the defendant's wages from $1,000 to $200.00 a week. The defendant also agreed to pay his son rent of $200.00 a week and he would endorse the weekly wage check back to the son (see pages 11 and 12 of Transcript, Testimony of Jon Maricondo). Since the date of judgment and prior to this agreement, the defendant was living in the same premises rent-free.

In the judgment, the defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiff lump sum alimony of $185,000 by December 31, 1996. This alimony order was satisfied by the plaintiff accepting title to a condominium owned by M M Builders valued at $135,000 and accepting a promissory note of $50,000 from the defendant (see plaintiff's exhibit 1). The note was paid to her on May 30, 1997 by check from Robert T. Rosati, Attorney for M M Builders, who also represented the son (see plaintiffs exhibit 4).

The court found credible and probative the son's testimony that he or his corporation would give the defendant a loan or whatever money was in the corporation to satisfy any of his obligations. (See Transcript at p. 18, testimony of Jon Maricondo.) The defendant had worked for the corporation full time for the past sixteen years supervising the construction of residential houses, and in 1997, was supervising and coordinating construction of four houses. In the prior year, 1996, this corporation completed and sold two houses.

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Related

Theonnes v. Theonnes
434 A.2d 343 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Hardisty v. Hardisty
439 A.2d 307 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
Tobey v. Tobey
345 A.2d 21 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Sanchione v. Sanchione
378 A.2d 522 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1977)
Borkowski v. Borkowski
638 A.2d 1060 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1994)
Hart v. Hart
561 A.2d 151 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1989)
Connecticut National Bank v. Investors Capital Corp.
613 A.2d 1370 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1992)
Misinonile v. Misinonile
645 A.2d 1024 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maricondo-v-maricondo-no-fa92-029-71-27-s-jan-16-1998-connsuperct-1998.