Maribel Hill v. Dwight L. Hill
Opinion
ACCEPTED 15-25-00051-cv FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/6/2025 12:31 PM NO. 15-25-00051-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS In the Court of Appeals 15th Judicial District of Texas 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM at Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Originating out of the Fifth Court of Appeals for the State of Texas Clerk at Dallas, Texas
MARIBEL L. HILL, Appellant
vs.
DWIGHT L. HILL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Cause No. DF-22-14398 (Hon. Sandra Jackson, Judge Presiding)
DWIGHT L. HILL APPELLEE’S BRIEF
ORSINGER, NELSON, DOWNING & ANDERSON, LLP 425 Soledad, Suite 550 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: (210) 225-5567
Richard R. Orsinger State Bar No. 15322500 richard@ondafamilylaw.com EPSTEIN FAMILY LAW, P.C. 5949 Sherry Lane, Suite 1070 Dallas, Texas 75225 Telephone: (972) 232-7673
Robert Epstein State Bar No. 24065206 robert@epsteinpc.com
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Record references used in this Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Abbreviations Used in this Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
RESPONSES TO APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Response to Appellant’s First Issue Presented
The property division is supported by the evidence and Maribel has not shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Trial Court’s Discretion; Standard of Appellate Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Sufficiency of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Presumptions in support of the judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The property division in this case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 This issue is really a valuation question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Dwight’s Insurance Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The LLC is an agent of State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Records belong to State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Policy-holder information belongs to State Farm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 All cash belongs to State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Return of property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Solicitation of clients prohibited for one year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 No assignment without State Farm’s consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Post-divorce labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Personal goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
iii Non-compete. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Factors to consider. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Nature of the marital property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Relative earning capacity and business opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Relative financial condition and obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The parties’ education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The size of the separate estates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Age, health, and physical conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Fault in breaking up the marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Benefits which the party not at fault would have received had the marriage continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The probable need for future support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Dwight’s separate estate benefitted the community and Maribel’s separate estates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Cannot render a different property division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Response to Maribel’s Second Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the present value of Dwight’s extended termination payments. There was sufficient evidence to support this decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Response to Maribel’s Third Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maribel’s request for post-divorce spousal maintenance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Standard of Appellate Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Minimum Reasonable Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Presumption against maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Relevant Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Support is considered in the property division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Response to Maribel’s Fourth Issue Presented
The absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not require further action by this Court because the appellate record is sufficient to review Appellant’s complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iv PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ad Villarai v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Banakar v. Krause, 674 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) .................................................................. 9
Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 9
Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . .
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ACCEPTED 15-25-00051-cv FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/6/2025 12:31 PM NO. 15-25-00051-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS In the Court of Appeals 15th Judicial District of Texas 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM at Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Originating out of the Fifth Court of Appeals for the State of Texas Clerk at Dallas, Texas
MARIBEL L. HILL, Appellant
vs.
DWIGHT L. HILL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Cause No. DF-22-14398 (Hon. Sandra Jackson, Judge Presiding)
DWIGHT L. HILL APPELLEE’S BRIEF
ORSINGER, NELSON, DOWNING & ANDERSON, LLP 425 Soledad, Suite 550 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: (210) 225-5567
Richard R. Orsinger State Bar No. 15322500 richard@ondafamilylaw.com EPSTEIN FAMILY LAW, P.C. 5949 Sherry Lane, Suite 1070 Dallas, Texas 75225 Telephone: (972) 232-7673
Robert Epstein State Bar No. 24065206 robert@epsteinpc.com
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Record references used in this Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Abbreviations Used in this Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
RESPONSES TO APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Response to Appellant’s First Issue Presented
The property division is supported by the evidence and Maribel has not shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Trial Court’s Discretion; Standard of Appellate Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Sufficiency of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Presumptions in support of the judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The property division in this case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 This issue is really a valuation question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Dwight’s Insurance Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The LLC is an agent of State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Records belong to State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Policy-holder information belongs to State Farm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 All cash belongs to State Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Return of property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Solicitation of clients prohibited for one year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 No assignment without State Farm’s consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Post-divorce labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Personal goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
iii Non-compete. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Factors to consider. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Nature of the marital property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Relative earning capacity and business opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Relative financial condition and obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The parties’ education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The size of the separate estates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Age, health, and physical conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Fault in breaking up the marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Benefits which the party not at fault would have received had the marriage continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The probable need for future support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Dwight’s separate estate benefitted the community and Maribel’s separate estates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Cannot render a different property division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Response to Maribel’s Second Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the present value of Dwight’s extended termination payments. There was sufficient evidence to support this decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Response to Maribel’s Third Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maribel’s request for post-divorce spousal maintenance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Standard of Appellate Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Minimum Reasonable Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Presumption against maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Relevant Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Support is considered in the property division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Response to Maribel’s Fourth Issue Presented
The absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not require further action by this Court because the appellate record is sufficient to review Appellant’s complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iv PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ad Villarai v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Banakar v. Krause, 674 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) .................................................................. 9
Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 9
Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 17, 27, 28
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Carlin v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2002, no pet.). . . . . . . . 33
Ceniseros v. Rychlik, No. 03-17-00532-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Dillon v. Anderson, 358 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Harwood v. Harwood, No. 03-23-00455-CV (Tex. App.–Austin Aug. 6, 2025, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2018, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . 36
v In re J.Y.O., 709 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2013, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 19
In re Marriage of Day, 497 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
In the Interest of L.C.W., No. 05-23-00815-CV (Tex. App.--March 14, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 19
In the Matter of Marriage of Santopadre, No. 05-07-00027-CV (Tex. App.--Dallas August 19, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
In the Matter of Marriage of Williams and Williams, No. 06-18-00041-CV (Tex. App.--Texarkana Dec. 7, 2018, pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
In the Matter of the Marriage of Combs, 958 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1997, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
LaFrensen v. LaFrensen, 106 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.) . 7, 19
Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Zavala County, 682 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Mehta v. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2025). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5,30-32, 34, 36
Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, pet. denied) . . . . . . 9
Munai v. Munai, No. 05-12-01409-CV (Tex. App.--Dallas Feb. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 19, 26
Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
vi O’Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, no pet.) . . . . . . 31
Rathmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Reisler v. Reisler, 439 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . 7
Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2015, no pet.) . . . . 8, 19, 32
Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ) . . 7, 9, 24
Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Ulmer v. Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, no writ) . . . . . . 29
Statutes
Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.001(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.052 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 36
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.055 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.055(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
vii Record references used in this Brief
Clerk’s Record CR[pg.#]
Supplemental Clerk’s Record Supp.CR[pg.#]
Reporter’s Record [Vol.]RR[pg.#]
Petitioner’s Exhibits P-[#]
Respondent’s Exhibits W-[#]
Abbreviations Used in this Brief
Maribel Hill Wife, W, Appellant Dwight Hill Husband, H, Appellee Wife’s Sworn Inventory and Appraisement W’s I&A; Px2 at 2RR212-33 Husband’s Sworn Inventory and Appraisement H’s I&A; Px3 at 2RR234-52 Decree of Divorce Decree, CR84-113
viii RESPONSES TO APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED
The property division is supported by the evidence and Maribel has not shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion.
Response to Appellant’s Second Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in dividing Dwight’s extended termination payments. There was sufficient evidence to support this decision.
Response to Appellant’s Third Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for post-divorce spousal maintenance.
Response to Appellant’s Fourth Issue Presented
The absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not require an abatement of the appeal because the appellate record is sufficient to review Appellant’s complaints.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Much of the property was divided by agreement of the parties. The primary
contested issues at trial were the value of Dwight’s insurance agency; the
characterization and division of Dwight’s extended termination payments from State
Farm; and whether Maribel would receive post-divorce maintenance payments.
The parties married on October 19, 2001. [2RR28] Dwight filed for divorce on
September 27, 2022. Id. The case went to trial on June 17, 2024. [2RR1] Judgment
was rendered on June 20, 2024. [3RR85-ff.] Other relevant information is discussed
1 under the responses to issues presented by Maribel.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First Issue: Value of the Insurance Agency. Trial courts have wide discretion in
dividing the community estate upon divorce. An appellate court can only reverse if
the trial court abused its discretion. Legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are
included within the abuse of discretion review. There can be no abuse of discretion
if the property division is supported by some evidence. The Supreme Court has said
that the appellate court presumes that the trial court exercised its discretion properly.
A court of appeals cannot overrule the trial court’s decision except where the trial
court acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules
or principles. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court's
reasonable judgment even if it would have reached a contrary conclusion. The Dallas
Court of Appeals has applied these standards in many cases, some of which are cited
in this Brief. Appellant has not shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion in the
property division. Also, Appellant requests that this Court modify the property
division to award her a substantial sum of money. This Court cannot do that. If the
property division were to be reversed, the only remedy would be to remand the case
to the trial court for a new division.
Second Issue: Actuarial Discount of Deferred Compensation. There are no fact
issues regarding the extended termination payments. They are a form of deferred
2 compensation. The exact number of months of total employment and the number of
months of employment during marriage are known. From these two numbers, by
following the rulings of the Texas Supreme Court, a fraction can be calculated to
determine the community property interest in the payments. When a spouse continues
employment after divorce, Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983), requires the
court to cut off the accrual of benefits to the community estate by imagining
retirement on the date of divorce. In this case, if Husband were to elect to start
receiving his extended termination payments as of the date of divorce, it would be
premature and under the rules in place the benefits must be actuarially adjusted
downward because of the early start date. State Farm has done the calculation of the
actuarial adjustment, permitting the Trial Court to make the Berry adjustment with
complete accuracy. One final factor is involved: under the controlling Agent’s
Agreement the future deferred payments are based on earnings during the 12 months
before termination, or the 12 months after termination, of employment whichever is
less. Because of this, the actual payment could be lower on the date of termination
than on the date of divorce. If the Trial Court gave a fixed percentage of the
retirement payments and it turns out that the actual payments are less than divorce-
time calculation, it would lead to a taking of Husband’s separate property in violation
of Berry. To comply with Berry, the Trial Court awarded Wife half of the community
percentage applied to the divorce-time payment, or half of the community percentage
3 of the actual payment Husband receives upon termination, whichever is less.
Third Issue: Post-Divorce Spousal Maintenance. Wife requested post-divorce
spousal maintenance payments. In June of this year, the Supreme Court decided
Mehta v. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2025), the appeal of an award of spousal
maintenance. The Court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, and a legal-
sufficiency-of-the-evidence (i.e., more than a scintilla) test in affirming the trial
court’s ruling. Post-divorce maintenance is not available unless the spouse cannot pay
his/her minimum reasonable needs out of employment or his/her share of the property
division. Here Wife was awarded more than a million dollars of wealth in the
property division. Her justification for wanting spousal maintenance is largely
attributable to her desire to not wanting to sell the investment real estate she was
awarded. The Family Code requires a showing that a spouse seeking maintenance
exercised diligence in: (1) earning sufficient income; or (2) developing the necessary
skills to provide for those needs during a period of separation and during the time the
suit for the dissolution of the marriage is pending. Wife is a licensed real estate broker
with more than 32 years of experience with investment real estate. In this case, Wife
has had 21 months of the pending divorce to find employment and she has failed to
do so.
Fourth Issue: The failure of a trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions
of law does not require remedial action if the record demonstrates that the
4 complaining party suffered no harm. In this case, most of the property division was
agreed upon. Both parties introduced spreadsheets reflecting their positions on all of
the properties. At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court meticulously ruled on
each issue raised by the parties. At a post-rendition hearing on motion to enter
judgment, the attorneys had the opportunity to advocate or object to each part of the
Divorce Decree. Wife’s First Issue Presented is a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge regarding the value of Husband’s insurance agency. Her contention is that
the agency is worth $728,000. From that she contends that the property division
disproportionately favored husband. That contention is evaluated on appeal by
reviewing the evidence. Appellant’s Second Issue Presented is that the Court should
not have applied an actuarial discount to extended termination payments. In the
hearing on Motion to Enter Judgment the Court said: “We’re going to follow what
State Farm has said in the actuarial table.” [5RR8] It is now a question for this Court
whether the evidence supporting this decision negates Appellant’s abuse of discretion
challenge. Appellant’s Third Issue Presented is the denial of post-divorce spousal
maintenance. This reduces to an assessment of whether the Trial Court’s decision is
supported by legally-sufficient evidence. In the Mehta case, there were no findings
of fact but the Supreme Court nonetheless reviewed the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s decision as part of its abuse-of-discretion
analysis. The remedy for a lack of findings and conclusions is not reversal and
5 remand, but is instead to abate the case and remand to the trial court to forward
findings and conclusions. In this case,that would not accomplish anything. The issues
in this appeal are narrow and the appellate record is amply sufficient for this Court
to conduct its appellate review.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
The property division is supported by the evidence and Maribel has not shown that the Trial Court abused its discretion.
Trial Court’s Discretion; Standard of Appellate Review. In a divorce, “the court
shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just
and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the
marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. “It is well-established that Texas divorce
courts are given wide discretion in making division of the property of the parties.
That discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has clearly abused its
discretion.” Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974); accord, Murff v. Murff, 615
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981) (“[t]he trial court has wide discretion in dividing the
estate of the parties and that division should be corrected on appeal only when an
abuse of discretion has been shown”). “Texas courts have held that such division does
not have to be equal, and appellate courts have held it must be presumed that the trial
court exercised its discretion properly, and that a case should be reversed only where
6 there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Bell, supra at 22. “[U]nder an abuse of discretion
standard, the court of appeals cannot overrule the trial court’s decision unless the trial
court acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules
or principles.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
“Moreover, the court of appeals cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s
reasonable judgment even if it would have reached a contrary conclusion.” Id. “The
trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the trial
court’s decision.” Id.
This Court has recognized these standards in earlier divorce cases: Smith v.
Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ) (“the trial court
is not required to make an equal division of community assets, but has a wide
discretion which will be disturbed only when abuse of discretion is shown. ... In
exercising its discretion, the court may consider all the circumstances of the
parties.”); LaFrensen v. LaFrensen, 106 S.W.3d 876, 877 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003,
no pet.) (“A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a
substantive and probative character to support the decision”); In re Marriage of
C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“The
property division need not be equal, and a trial court may consider many factors when
exercising its broad discretion to divide the marital property”); Reisler v. Reisler, 439
S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“The trial court is afforded broad
7 discretion in dividing the community estate, and an appellate court must indulge
every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s proper exercise of its
discretion”); Munai v. Munai, No. 05-12-01409-CV, 2015 WL 737037, at *2 (Tex.
App.--Dallas Feb. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to
support the decision”); Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 858 (Tex. App.--Dallas
2015, no pet.) (“The party complaining of the division of the community estate has
the burden of showing from the evidence in the record that the trial court’s division
of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of
discretion”); In the Interest of L.C.W., No. 05-23-00815-CV, at *23 (Tex. App.--
March 14, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“We review the trial court’s division of a
community estate for an abuse of discretion. ... A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to
support the decision.”). “The trial court is best able to ‘observe the demeanor and
personalities of the witnesses and [to] ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that
cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.” Ceniseros v. Rychlik, No.
03-17-00532-CV, 2018 WL 4265679, at *3 (Tex. App.--Austin Sept. 7, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
Sufficiency of the evidence. “In family law cases, the abuse of discretion standard
of review overlaps with the traditional sufficiency standards of review; as a result,
8 legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversible error, but
instead constitute factors relevant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused
its discretion.” Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, pet.
denied). In Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1981, no
writ), this Court said: “In exercising its discretion, the court may consider all the
circumstances of the parties.” In Banakar v. Krause, 674 S.W.3d 564, 573-74 (Tex.
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.), the Court said: “[i]n a bench trial, the trial
court, as the fact finder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight
to be given their testimony. ... The trial court may choose to believe some witnesses
over others. ... We are mindful that the trial [court] is best able to observe and assess
the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility, and to sense the forces, powers, and
influences that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal.”
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Presumptions in support of the judgment. In Bell, supra at 22, an appeal of a
divorce property division, the Supreme Court said: “it must be presumed that the trial
court exercised its discretion properly, and that a case should be reversed only where
there is a clear abuse of discretion.” In In the Matter of Marriage of Santopadre, No.
05-07-00027-CV (Tex. App.--Dallas August 19, 2008, no pet.) (memo. op.), this
Court said: “We indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial judge’s
proper exercise of discretion in dividing the community estate.” Accord, In the
9 Interest of L.C.W., supra, at *23 (“an appellate court must indulge every reasonable
presumption in favor of the trial court’s proper exercise of its discretion”).
The property division in this case. Much of the property division in this case was
agreed to by the parties.
Agreed1 Division:
1. Agreed that 1211 Ft Velasco was W’s separate property and would be awarded to her; the value was not agreed: W’s value=$265,000; appraisal district value=$307,370; H’s value= $350,000.2 2. Agreed H to receive 123 Nesmith Place at the agreed value of $75,000. 3. Agreed to sell 107 Nesmith Pl; agreed value=$546,000; Court awarded 65% to Wife and 35% to Husband. [Decree, CR 85 & 88]. 4. Agreed W to receive 118 Nesmith Place at an agreed value of $75,000. 5. Agreed H to receive cash on hand of $10,000. 6. Agreed H to receive PNC #6618 with $126. 7. Agreed H to receive PNC # 2065 with $2. 8. Agreed to split 50/50 State Farm FCU #2289, $102 to each party. 9. Agreed to split 50/50 PNC #4643, $4,616 to each party. 10. Agreed to give daughter Ava PNC #2033. 11. Agreed H to receive PNC Bank #2183 with $14,327. 12. Agreed to divide 50/50 State Farm Funds Brokerage # 608, $8,972 to each party. 13. Agreed to divide 50/50 JP Morgan Chase #2507 ($52,742 to each party). 14. Agreed W to receive JP Morgan Chase #2380 with $52,742 (from Chase #2507). 15. Agreed W to receive Restore Entertainment, LLC with $544. 16a. Agreed to divide 50/50 PNC #3338; W’s I&A=omitted; H’s I&A=$5,246.20. 16b. Agreed 2022 Toyota 4Runner (in W’s possession) to be given to daughter Ava. 17. Agreed W to receive Grateful Hippies, LLC with $264 cash.
1 Dwight’s proposed property division is P-1, Ex. A, admitted at 2RR14 and found at 2RR204, App. 1. Maribel’s proposed property division is Amended W-2, at 3RR133, App. 2. Dwight agreed to his exhibit at 2RR33. Maribel agreed to her exhibit at 3RR34. 2 Maribel’s value and the appraisal district value are in W’s I&A, 2RR215; Dwight’s value is in H’s I&A, 2RR236).
10 27. Agreed H to receive Honda Scooter Elite valued at $600. 28. Agreed W to receive 2014 Club Car Gas xtr 850 valued at $5,000. 29. Agreed H to receive 2010 Lexus LX570 valued at $20,000. 30. Agreed W to receive 2021 Mazda CX-5, W’s I&A=$24,000, H’s I&A=$25,000. 31. Agreed 2022 Ford F-150 to be given to son Jacob. 32. Agreed H to receive clothes, bicycle, books, guitar, tools in his possession, $5,000. 33. Agreed household furnishings, musical instruments & tools go to H, $8,000. 34. Agreed computer monitors (x2) (to H) $100. 35. Glock 26 (to H) $500. 36. Sig P238 (to W) $600. 37. Agreed W to receive 4.53 ct Diamond/Platinum Ring; H valued at $75,000.3 38. Agreed W to receive diamond necklace; H valued at $15,000.4 39. Agreed Maribel Hill Music 40. Unknown jewelry
Division Not Agreed
16. Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. awarded to H.5 18. State Farm Fund Maribel Hill Roth IRA ending in 9212 awarded to W, $34,521. 19. State Farm Fund Dwight Hill Roth IRA ending in 9211 awarded to H, $34,471. 20. State Farm Pershing 4620 ROTH IRA $625,882 awarded, $312,941to each party. 21. State Farm 9931 Roth IRA $157,490 awarded, $78,745 to each party. 22. Ascensus Trust IRA #2370, $64,963 awarded, $32,482 to each party. 23. Ascensus Trust IRA #2370, $49,752 awarded, $24,876 to each party. 24. State Farm Blackrock #C17dn, $109,964 awarded, $54,982 to each party. 25. State Farm Roth IRA #C9ASY, $143,926 awarded $71,963 to each party. 26. Termination payments: Court divided community interest 50/50, 31.63% to each.
This issue is really a valuation question. Maribel’s claim that the Trial Court gave
Dwight a disproportionate division of the community estate is premised on her
3 Dwight’s value was $75,000, [2RR207, ¶37]; Maribel had no value [3RR135, ¶37]. 4 Dwight’s value was $15,000 [2RR207, ¶38]; Maribel had not value [3RR135, ¶38]. 5 Dwight had zero value [2RR205, ¶16]; Maribel valued at > $728,000 [3RR134, ¶16].
11 assertion that the value of the community estate’s interest in Dwight Hill’s insurance
agency was worth $728,000, “based on net income.” [Appellant’ Brief. at 9.] At one
time Fuqua valued the agency between $100,000 and $150,000. [2RR186] That was
back in 2022. [2RR190] In that valuation Fuqua did not consider the Agent’s
Agreement, or the fact that all furniture, equipment, software, client information, and
insurance policies belonged to State Farm. He did an income approach that assumed
ownership of all the assets. [2RR192] However, that calculation has no application
to this agency. Id
Dwight’s Insurance Agency. Dwight is an agent of the State Farm Insurance
Company. [2RR30] He has an employment contract with State Farm and is paid a
commission to service State Farm’s clients. Id. Dwight started as a State Farm agent
on August 1, 1988. Id. He was an agent for about 13 years before he married Maribel.
Id. Dwight does business through Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, LLC. The agency
has no employees other than Dwight himself. [2RR87] Dwight does not own the
office furniture or equipment he uses in his business, he does not own the client
information, he does not own the insurance policies. Id. The only assets of the
business are about $3,000, a vehicle (which the parties agreed to give to their
daughter), and some chairs. [2RR87-88] Dwight’s forensic CPA Stephen Fuqua
testified that the only asset the LLC could sell is the vehicle. [2RR155] The
September 30, 2022 letter from State Farm regarding the Agent’s Agreement between
12 Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. and State Farm [2RR1117-18], explained the
ownership rights regarding Dwight’s insurance agency:
The Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. has no proprietary interest in the business generated under the Agent’s Agreement (AA04 INC) with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm Life Insurance Company, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company (collectively referred to herein after as “State Farm”). The policies credited to the Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. account belong to State Farm and may be reassigned by State Farm to the accounts of other State Farm agents when the Agent’s Agreement terminates. The policyholder records and the right to use those records to solicit renewals - commonly referred to as the “expirations” - belong to State Farm. Compensation or payments due or to become due under the Agreement may, however, be assigned with the written consent of the Companies and, of course, by operation of law.
Dwight’s Agency Agreement with State Farm [2RR461, App. 5] sets out the terms
of his agency relationship as follows:
The LLC is an agent of State Farm. On page 1 State Farm appoints Dwight
Hill Insurance Agency, LLC as an agent to represent “the Companies” in Texas. Id.
The Records belong to State Farm. Section I, ¶C says that State Farm “will
furnish the Agent, without charge, manuals, forms, records, and such other materials
and supplies as the Companies may deem advisable to provide. All such property
furnished by the Companies shall remain the property of the Companies.” Id.
Policy-holder information belongs to State Farm. Paragraph D says that
information regarding names, addresses, and ages of policyholders, description of
property insured, etc. “are trade secrets wholly owned by the Companies.” Id. “All
13 forms and other materials, whether furnished by State Farm or purchased by the
Agent, upon which this information is recorded shall be the sole and exclusive
property of the Companies.” Id.
All cash belongs to State Farm. Paragraph I says: “All moneys collected on
behalf of the Companies shall be held in trust by the Agent as the absolute property
of the Companies, and the Agent will be responsible for these moneys until they are
safely transmitted to the Companies.” Id.
Termination. Section III, ¶A, gives either party the right to “terminate this
Agreement by written notice delivered to the other or mailed to the other’s last known
address.” No minimum notice is required. The date of termination is the date
specified in the notice. Paragraph B says that “[a]fter termination of this Agreement,
the Agent agrees not to act or represent itself in any way as an agent or representative
of the Companies.” [2RR463]
Return of property. Paragraph C says: “Within ten days after the termination
of this Agreement, all property belonging to the Companies shall be returned or made
available for return to the Companies or their authorized representative.” Id.
Solicitation of clients prohibited for one year. Paragraph D says that “For a
period of one year following termination of this Agreement, neither the Agent, the
President, nor any of the licensed sales representatives, will either personally or
through any other person, agency, or organization (a) induce or advise any State Farm
14 policyholder credited to the Agent's account at the date of termination to lapse,
surrender, or cancel any State Farm insurance coverage or (b) solicit any such
policyholder to purchase any insurance coverage competitive with the insurance
coverages sold by the Companies. In the event the ‘period of one year’ conflicts with
any statutory provision, such period shall be the period permitted by statute.” Id.
No assignment without State Farm’s consent. Section VI, ¶B, says: “Since
each party is relying upon the other or others to carry out the provisions of this
agreement, neither the agreement nor any interest thereunder can be sold, assigned,
pledged, and no right in any sum due or to become due to the agent hereunder can be
sold, assigned, or pledged without prior written consent of the companies.” [2RR64
& 467, App. 5] Dwight has no right to assign any aspect of his business to anyone,
except with State Farm’s consent – an unknown future contingency. Dwight cannot
sell or assign insurance policies. [2RR64 & 155]. He can’t sell or assign client
information. Id. He can’t sell or assign any of the equipment. Id. Dwight testified:
“My computer, my phone systems, any technology all belongs to State Farm. My
printers, faxers, scanners, all of that is State Farm equipment. I have a lease
agreement and a maintenance agreement with them. And I cannot store any State
Farm data on any other device of any kind.” [3RR65] The Agent’s Work Station Loan
Agreement [2RR513 App. 6], ¶1, is where Dwight borrows his office equipment:
“STATE FARM agrees to loan to AGENT and AGENT agrees to borrow from
15 STATE FARM the items of equipment (collectively, the “Equipment”) listed on
Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein. The parties agree that the
Equipment becomes part of the ECHO system in AGENT’s possession under the
ECHO System Agreement.” Paragraph 2 is where Dwight borrows the computer
software: “STATE FARM agrees to loan to AGENT and AGENT agrees to borrow
from STATE FARM the software (collectively, the ‘Software’) listed on Exhibit A
attached hereto and incorporated herein.” Paragraph 3 says that the equipment and
software are loaned until terminated on 30-days’ written notice, but the loan
terminates immediately upon termination of the State Farm Agent’s Agreement.
Paragraph 6 prohibits Dwight from adding any equipment or software, or using State
Farm’s equipment to access the internet for anything except the State Farm home
page. Paragraph 8 says: “STATE FARM leases, owns or licenses the Equipment and
Software under this Agreement.” [2R514] The Memorandum of Agreement re: Block
Assignments [2RR532], says: “it may be of mutual benefit to the Companies and the
Agent for policies to be assigned from time to time to the Agent for service.” If State
Farm assigns policies to Dwight to manage, his compensation is set in a Schedule of
Payments Agreement. “Assigned” policies are policies credited to Dwight’s account
for less than ten years that were freed up by the termination of another agent, or by
release by another agent, or that resulted from the merger between companies.
In sum, Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, LLC has no assets except a small amount
16 of cash on deposit and a vehicle which the parties agreed will be given to their
daughter. Dwight has been appointed as an agent to handle clients whose contracts
State Farm assigns to him, but in doing so he must use State Farm equipment and
software, which cannot be used for any other purpose. Dwight’s agency relationship
with State Farm can be canceled at any time with no minimum notice. If canceled,
Dwight cannot solicit any existing policy-holders for a period of one year or he
forfeits his termination payments. The money Dwight receives from policyholders
belongs to State Farm and he holds those funds in trust for State Farm until they are
paid over to State Farm. There is no business to divide in the divorce. Fuqua testified
that there is no ability to sell a revenue stream to a buyer. [3RR196]
Post-divorce labor. Contrary to Maribel’s assertion, a divorce court cannot value
the community estate’s interest in a personal-service business based on post-divorce
income because post-divorce income belongs to a person who is no longer married,
and the community estate has no claim to post-divorce labors. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 3.002 (“Community property consists of the property, other than separate property,
acquired by either spouse during marriage”); Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 947 (post-
divorce employee compensation is separate property and cannot be awarded to the
other spouse); In re J.Y.O., 709 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Tex. 2024) (“we hold that the
characterization of a bonus—like any compensation—depends on when it was
earned”).
17 Personal goodwill. Additionally, the personal goodwill of the working spouse
must be excluded from any division of the estate of the parties. Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (“the accrued good will ... of ... Dr. Nail ... did not possess
value or constitute an asset separate and apart from his person, or from his individual
ability to practice his profession. It would be extinguished in event of his death, or
retirement, or disablement, as well as in event of the sale of his practice or the loss
of his patients, whatever the cause.”). Accord, Rathmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6,
18 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (applying Nail’s description of
personal goodwill to the owner of an insurance business). Dwight Hill’s insurance
agency had no employees, no assets except a few side-chairs, no client information,
and its ability to service policy-holders is subject to termination with no minimum
notice. The business had no value separate and apart from Dwight’s person, and his
individual ability to practice his profession. The value of the community estate’s
interest was limited to $5,247.20 cash in a bank account [P-3, 2RR239], and a vehicle
which was awarded by agreement to the parties’ daughter. [Decree, CR97 ¶b].
Non-compete. Dwight’s Agency Agreement provides that the agency arrangement
can be terminated at any time by either party upon delivery of notice of termination.
[2RR63; 2RR463] There is no minimum notice period. After termination of his
agency relationship with State Farm, Dwight cannot “act or represent itself in any
way as an agent or representative of the companies.” Id. For a period of one year after
18 termination, Dwight cannot “induce or advise any State Farm Policy credited to the
agent’s account at the time of termination to lapse, surrender, or cancel any State
Farm Insurance coverage or (B) solicit any such policyholder to purchase any
insurance coverage competitive with the insurance coverages sold by the companies.”
Id. If he violates these terms, Dwight forfeits his termination payments. [3RR62]
A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a
substantive and probative character to support the decision. LaFrensen v. LaFrensen,
supra at 877. “The party complaining of the division of the community estate has the
burden of showing from the evidence in the record that the trial court’s division of the
community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”
In re Marriage of C.A.S., Supra at 384; see also Slicker v. Slicker, supra at 858.
Factors to consider. In In the Interest of L.C.W., supra at *8, this Court wrote:
When exercising its broad discretion to divide the community estate, the trial court may consider many factors, including the nature of the marital property; the relative earning capacity and business opportunities of the parties; the parties’ relative financial condition and obligations; the parties’ education; the size of the separate estates; the age, health, and physical conditions of the parties; fault in breaking up the marriage; the benefits which the party not at fault would have received had the marriage continued; and the probable need for future support. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699; In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d at 384.
In our case, the Trial Court heard evidence regarding the Murff factors among other
matters.
Nature of the marital property. The present wealth of the estate was almost
19 entirely in real estate and retirement benefits. The total community property real
estate was valued by Dwight at $1,046,000 [2RR204 ¶¶1-4] and was valued by
Maribel at $961,000. [2RR133, ¶¶ 1-4] The Court awarded Maribel 100% of Ft.
Velasco (either $265,000 or $350,000), 65% of the proceeds from the sale of 107
Nesmith (65% of the agreed value equals $354,900), and 100% of 118 Nesmith
(agreed value of $75,000). [P-1, Ex.A; 2RR203; Decree CR88-89] The parties agreed
that Dwight would be awarded 123 Nesmith (agreed value $75,000). [P-1, Ex.A;
2RR203; Decree CR88-89] The Court also awarded Dwight 35% of 107 Nesmith (his
35% share of the agreed value is $191,100). So Maribel was awarded $694,900 (using
her values) or 72.3%, and Dwight was awarded $266,100 or 27.7%, of the community
property real estate. If we use Dwight’s value for Ft. Velasco, Maribel received
$779,900 out of a total value of $1,046,000, which is 74.6% of the total, while
Dwight received $266,100 of the total which is 25.4%
Community property retirement accounts totaled $1,157,552.6 [P-1 at ¶¶ 18-25;
W’s I&A, P-2, 2RR220-21; H’s I&A, P-3, 2RR24-42] The Court awarded Maribel
the following (the number shown is her % share of the value): 50% of Roth IRA
#9212 (W’s half is $17,260.44); 50% of Roth IRA #4620 ($312,940.96); 50% of Roth
IRA #9931 ($78,744.98); 50% of Ascensus Trust IRA #2370 ($32,481.50); 50% of
6 The Parties did not use the same dates for the balances in the retirement plans. This Brief uses the balance on the most current date reflected on either party’s Sworn I&A.
20 State Farm IRA #4612 ($55,525.50); 50% of State Farm IRA #9964 ($73,217.50), for
a total award to Maribel of $570,170.88. [Decree, CR 89-90] The Court awarded
Dwight the following (the number shown is his % share of the value): 100% of Roth
IRA #9211 ($34,470.85); 50% of Roth IRA #4620 (H’s halfis $312,940.95); 50% of
Roth IRA 9931 ($78,744.97); 50% of Ascensus Trust IRA #2370 ($32,481.35); 50%
of State Farm IRA #4612 ($55,525.50); 50% of State Farm IRA #9964 ($73,217.50),
for a total of $587,381.12. [Decree, CR 86-87] So Maribel was awarded $570,170.88
or 49.3%, and Dwight was awarded $587,381.12 or 50.7%, of the community
property retirement funds. Cash on hand was split fairly evenly. [Decree, CR86 & 89]
Relative earning capacity and business opportunities. Dwight is an insurance
agent. He started his business from scratch in 1988 [3RR91], 13 years before his
marriage to Maribel on October 19, 2001. [2RR28] The parties’ income tax returns
show income of $345,045 in 2017 [P-16, 3RR44], $334,639 in 2018 [3RR45-46],
$335,274 in 2021 [3RR46], and $207,719.12 through June 15, 2024 [3RR47].
Maribel’s Instagram profile lists her capacity as “Broker | Consultant |
Philanthropist | Singer-Songwritier & Voiceover.” [P-43-D; 3RR113] She continues:
About
I am an Investment Real Estate Broker (CRS, GRI, e-PRO, AHWD) with a demonstrated history of working in the areas of real estate & mortgage, city planning/zoning, and music industries. I love to research and learn!
Top 5 Clifton Strengths: Strategic, Connectedness, Achiever, Arranger,
21 Learner.
For the last 21 years, I have devoted most of my time to philanthropics such as local politics, campaigns, church worship/bible studies, humanitarian issues, and local government service.
I am in a season of transformative change, and moving back into the workforce, full time.
Maribel is a licensed real estate broker (not just a realtor), with professional designations that only about one or two percent of the Realtors or brokers in the country have. [2RR84-85, 3RR30] She received a Counsel of Real Estate Specialist Designation and she is a Graduate of Realtor Institute. [3RR18] Her Instagram profile [W-43(d)] says: Experience Texas Real Estate Broker-Realtor Maribel Hill - Full-time Feb 1992 - Present - 32 yrs 4 mos Grateful Hippies Brokerage LLC, formerly Maribel Hill Realty - Hybrid Strategic Planning, Customer Service Management and +19 skills Maribel says on her Instagram page that she was a mortgage broker for 10 yrs and 2 mos. Id. Maribel used her skills in real estate in acquiring some of the real estate that is being divided in this divorce. [2RR85-86] Maribel sits on the Zoning and Planning Board for Surfside Texas, where the parties own property. [3RR20] She is a member of the Houston Association of Realtors. [2RR21] Maribel has several business entities. One is Grateful Hippies, LLC, which managed the rental of a house on Yuca Street. [2RR86; 3RR32] This entity is awarded to Maribel in the divorce and Dwight says it can be used to conduct a real estate business, rental or sales. [2RR86-87] Maribel established a music publishing business called Restore Entertainment, LLC,
22 in March of 2017. [3RR60, 84] The parties agreed to sell the property at 111 Nesmith and put those funds in this LLC. [P-14, 3RR346] Maribel testified that the parties each put $40,000 into the company. [3RR26] Restore Entertainment has recordings of Maribel’s songs, including an album. [2RR56-57; 3RR27] Maribel has 18,000 followers on her Facebook page for Maribel Hill Music. [3RR27] She also made a podcast that is on Spotify. Id. The Court awarded Restore Entertainment LLC to Maribel. [CR91, ¶ R-14] Before marriage, Maribel studied in 2006-2007 to become a gemologist [3RR27-28]; she also made jewelry. [3RR25] She sold items on Etsy. Id. She also operated a cannabis CBD business called Neurometics, which opened and closed during the COVID epidemic. [3RR29-31] Maribel is also an ordained minister and had a jewelry business during the marriage. [3RR30] While Maribel has not pursued just one career path, she is licensed and qualified to sell real estate. Relative financial condition and obligations. The property division is analyzed on pp. 9-11 and 19-20 above. Maribel owns a separate property home valued at $1,050,000, minus a mortgage of $253,000, leaving equity of $797,000. She was awarded cash of $52,742. [Decree, ¶R-6.c, CR89]. The value of community property real estate awarded to Maribel comes to $694,900 (using her value of Ft. Velasco or $779,900 (using Dwight’s value for Ft. Velasco, and the retirement funds awarded to Marabel amount to $570,170.88. She was awarded a diamond ring that Dwight valued at $75,000 and a diamond necklace that Dwight valued at $15,000. [Decree, CR89 ¶¶ R-5.d & e; 3RR135 ¶¶37 & 38] She was awarded two vehicles, valued at approximately $25,000. [Decree, CR 91 ¶¶ R-12 & R-13; 3RR135] Dwight was awarded cash of $52,742, and community property real estate valued at $266,100, and retirement funds amounting to $587,381.12. Dwight was awarded his insurance agency company which has no assets. He was awarded an automobile valued at $20,000 to $22,000. [3RR135]
23 The parties’ education. Maribel graduated from the University of Texas at Austin with a B.A. degree in Economics. [P-43-D, 3RR17] Dwight’s education is not reflected in the record. The size of the separate estates. Maribel’s separate property consists of 4647 Elsby Ave., in Dallas, Texas. Maribel valued this property at $1,050,000 based on a 10-19-2023 appraisal, minus a mortgage of $253,000, leaving equity of $797,000. [W’s I&A, 2RR232] Dwight offered an independent appraisal of the property at $1,065,000 [P-6, 2RR11073], subtracted a mortgage of $252,245.55, leaving an equity of $812,754.45. [H’s I&A, 2RR251] The parties are $15,754 apart on the equity, which is de minimis for purposes of appellate review, but the average between these two figures is $804,877.23. Dwight asserted a claim for reimbursement to his separate estate for using separate property funds to make capital improvements to the Elsby home. He testified that he sold a house he brought into the marriage and put the $79,635.27 proceeds into an account where they were used to pay for work on the Elsby home. [2RR36-37]. Maribel acknowledged that he put the sale proceeds into a community property account. [3RR14] Dwight described the improvements [2RR38-ff.] and offered a summary of expenditures. [P-16A] He testified that the expenditures increase the value of the property by $250,000. [2RR48] The Court did not award reimbursement per se, but the use of Dwight’s separate property funds to benefit Maribel’s separate estate or the community estate is a factor that the Trial Court could consider in the property division and this Court can consider in reviewing it. In Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ), this Court said that it was proper for the trial court to consider the use of wife’s separate funds, “though not precisely traced,” to make payments on community property land. Dwight’s separate property consists of: $1,031.62 in cash he received from his
24 parents’ trust [H’s I&A 2RR247, ¶16.1]; five insurance policies on his life that he owned before marriage [H’s I&A, 2RR248-250; Decree, CR95-96], 36.74% of his State Farm termination payments [CR96], 36.74% of his extended termination payments [CR96], a laptop computer ($600) [H’s I&A, 2RR250] and, a gun cabinet and gun collection ($500) [Id.] Age, health, and physical conditions. The record does not reflect Maribel’s age. Dwight is age 59 and 6 months. [2RR61] Maribel testified that she has neuropathy, RA, Hashimoto’s thyroiditis, and fibrmoyalgia. [3RR51] The record does not reflect Dwight’s health. Maribel testified that she will have a medical procedure next month for a vein in her left leg that is not functioning properly and causing pain. [3RR54] Fault in breaking up the marriage. The Court granted the divorce based on insupportability, not on a fault ground. [Decree, CR85] This factor does not apply. Benefits which the party not at fault would have received had the marriage continued. The marriage was ended because of discord or conflict of personalities between Dwight and Maribel that destroyed the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevented any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. [CR 85] This factor does not apply. The probable need for future support. Maribel listed her bills. [3RR53-54]. These include mortgage payment, maintenance, property taxes, life insurance, electricity, water, sewage, natural gas, trash, cable, cell phone, groceries, entertainment, charity, fuel, auto insurance, medical insurance, Dwight’s separate estate benefitted the community and Maribel’s separate estates. Dwight’s separate property contributions to Maribel’s separate property house have been discussed. In addition to that benefit to her separate estate, Dwight brought into the marriage his profit sharing plan, which contained $96,031 in separate property funds. [2RR66] He rolled those funds over into IRA #4620, where they added value
25 and contributed earnings inside the IRA. Dwight did not trace the account, so the entire account was treated as community property. Id. The account had a value at trial of $625,882 and the Court divided it 50/50. [CR89, ¶ R-7.b] In addition to the Murff factors, “[c]ourts may also consider whether one spouse contributed less than an equal share to the family’s finances or the development of the community estate.” In the Matter of Marriage of Williams and Williams, No. 06-18-00041-CV *12 (Tex. App.-- Texarkana Dec. 7, 2018, pet. denied). In Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d), the husband commingled the proceeds of the sale of his separate property with the community property of the parties. The trial court awarded him reimbursement, which was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court observed: “[t]hroughout the marriage the husband utilized that foundation to provide for the appellant and to establish the $3,000,000 to $4,000,000 estate. Equity is well served by reimbursing him for that initial investment.” Id. at 58. While in the present case the Trial Court did not award Dwight reimbursement for the $79,635.27 and $96,031 in separate property contributed to Maribel’s separate and the community estates, it is nonetheless a factor that the Trial Court could consider in dividing the property. Cannot render a different property division. Maribel asks this Court to reverse the property division and award $364,000 to her. [Appellant’s Brief at 31] This the Court cannot do. If “reversible error affecting the `just and right’ division of the community estate is found, the court of appeals must remand the case for a new division.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985). Response to Maribel’s Second Issue Presented The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the present value of Dwight’s extended termination payments. There was sufficient evidence to support this decision.
26 Forensic CPA Stephen Fuqua evaluated the characterization of Dwight’s termination payments and extended termination payments, based on information provided by State Farm. His Report states the results of his forensic evaluation. [P-21, 2RR535-ff.] Mr. Fuqua also testified on the subject. [2RR154-199] The salient dates are stated in his Report: 1. Mr. Hill commenced work with State Farm on 8-1-1988. 2. Dwight Hill and Maribel Hill were married 10-19-2001 3. Mr. Hill is still working for State Farm as of 6-17-24 4. Dwight Hill and Maribel Hill are seeking a divorce as of 6-17-24. Fuqua observed that the “State Farm Termination agreements deal with deferred wages.” He therefore was guided by Texas case law on deferred compensation and Professor Joseph W. McKnight’s analysis of an appellate case involving State Farm termination payments. Mr. Fuqua observed: In formulating my opinion as to the characterization of these benefits payable to Dwight Hill or Maribel Hill; I have made the following fractional determinations using the Berry formula-
Number of months prior to marriage and in the plan-8-1-1988 to 10-1-2001; 158 months
Number of months in the plan 8-1-1988 to 6-17-24; 430 months
Separate Property component as of 6-17-24; 158 months/430 months= 36.74%
Community Property component as of 6-17-24; 272 months/430 months= 63.26%
Assuming a divorce on 6-17-24;
Dwight Hill would be entitled to 68.37% of the future monthly State Farm termination benefits.
Maribel Hill would be entitled to 31.63% of the future monthly State Farm termination benefits.
27 Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983), established the controlling law on
dividing deferred compensation when a spouse continues employment after the date
of divorce. The Court said: “It is clear from the record in this case that twelve
additional years of work following divorce, which included some twelve to fourteen
pay raises, plus union contract negotiations for an improved benefits plan, brought
about the increase in retirement benefits paid to Mr. Berry. These post-divorce
increases cannot be awarded to Mrs. Berry, for to do so would invade Mr. Berry's
separate property, which cannot be done.” Dwight’s termination payments are
different from the retirement benefits in Berry because in Berry the retirement benefit
increased over time. Dwight’s termination payments, however, can fluctuate
depending on circumstances. The termination payments are based on the 12-months
of income leading up to or after termination, whichever is less. [Agent’s Agreement,
2RR463, ¶IV.A.1(a), App. 4] Dwight’s performance could decline depending on his
production in the year before he retires. If it does, his actual payments could be less
upon retirement than what was projected as of the date of divorce. The Trial Court
recognized this and divided the termination payments by applying the percent of
community ownership to the actual Berry valuation or to the actual retirement
payment, whichever is less. The extended termination payments start at age 65 if
Dwight is alive when the termination payments are exhausted. [3RR58-61] Because
Dwight is over age 55 (he was age 59 years and 6 months) at the time of trial, and had
28 30 years of service, he is entitled to terminate his agency with State Farm which
would advance the start of his early termination payments. Id. But the early start,
according to State Farm, would cause the amount of each payment too be actuarially
reduced from $6,776 to $4,169 per month. Id. [P-22, May 30, 2024 letter from State
Farm, 2RR550, App. 8]
Dwight’s extended payments are contingent on his not soliciting, directly or
indirectly, any customer to cancel a State Farm Policy, or allow it to lapse, or to buy
insurance from another company. [Agent’s Agreement, P-20, 2RR461, App. 5] In
Dillon v. Anderson, 358 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.),
this Court said that money received for a covenant not to compete is compensation
for lost future earnings of the covenanting spouse. There is a condition to the
termination payments that requires Dwight not to compete for the first year after
termination, which requires a contribution from his separate estate to the community
estate in order to avoid forfeiture of all termination payments. See Ulmer v. Ulmer,
717 S.W.2d 665, 666-68 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, no writ) (the Court reversed
an injunction prohibiting the husband from working in a particular industry after the
divorce, “because an individual's right to practice his profession is not subject to
division by the court”). The Trial Court did not deviate from the State Farm
calculation of payments, but this contribution by Dwight’s separate estate to benefit
Maribel is a factor that could be considered a factor in the property division.
29 Response to Maribel’s Third Issue Presented
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maribel’s request for post-divorce spousal maintenance.
Maribel asked the Trial Court for the maximum amount of post-divorce
maintenance for the maximum length of time, seven years at $5,000 per month (tax
free). [3RR10].
The Standard of Appellate Review. In Mehta v. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d 126, 131
(Tex. 2025), the Court said: “A trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” “While insufficiency of evidence is not an
independent ground on which to challenge a spousal-maintenance award, an award
that is not supported by legally sufficient evidence may constitute an abuse of
discretion.” Note that the standard for appellate review of spousal maintenance is
legal sufficiency of the evidence. “Evidence is legally sufficient if there is ‘more than
a mere scintilla’ to support a vital fact-finding, i.e., ‘the evidence rises to a level that
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.’” Id.
at 131. In legal sufficiency review, the appellate court does not re-weigh evidence pro
and con. The sole question is whether more than a scintilla of evidence exists to
support the trial court’s judgment.
Maintenance. “Maintenance means an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage
of periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the
30 other spouse.” Tex. Fam. Code. § 8.001(1). The purpose of spousal maintenance is
“to provide temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability for
self-support is lacking or has deteriorated over time while engaged in homemaking
activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to provide support.” O’Carolan v.
Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, no pet.). “An award of
post-divorce spousal maintenance is, in effect, an award of the husband’s future
separate property following the division of community property.” In re Marriage of
Day, 497 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). In
Mehta, at p. 133, the Court said: “To determine whether a spouse is eligible for
spousal maintenance, a court should look to the property available ‘to provide for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.’” The award of over $1.37 million of
community property to Maribel in the divorce, on top of just under $800,000 in equity
in her separate property residence, is discussed previously in this Brief.
Minimum Reasonable Needs. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 8.051 & 8.051(2)(B) provide
that “the court may order maintenance for either spouse only if the spouse seeking
maintenance will lack sufficient property, including the spouse’s separate property,
on dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs
and: ... 2) the spouse seeking maintenance: ... (B) has been married to the other
spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to provide
for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs....” In Mehta, at 113, the Supreme Court
31 said: “Neither the Family Code nor case law defines ‘minimum reasonable needs.’ ...
Rather, the trial court determines a spouse’s minimum reasonable needs on a
case-by-case, fact-specific basis.” The Supreme Court cited this Court’s decision in
Slicker, 464 S.W.3d at 860. The Court in Harwood v. Harwood, No.
03-23-00455-CV, 2025 WL 2233982, at *4 (Tex. App.–Austin Aug. 6, 2025, no pet.),
said: “‘Minimum reasonable needs’ is not defined in the Family Code. ... Trial courts
generally have discretion to determine these needs on a case-by-case, fact-specific
basis.” Accord Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (“the minimum reasonable needs
for a particular individual is a fact-specific determination that should be made by the
trial court on a case-by-case basis.”).
Presumption against maintenance. Section 8.053(a) says “[i]t is a rebuttable
presumption that maintenance under Section 8.051(2)(B) is not warranted unless the
spouse seeking maintenance has exercised diligence in: (1) earning sufficient income
to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs; or (2) developing the
necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs during a
period of separation and during the time the suit for the dissolution of the marriage
is pending.” This divorce was filed on September 27, 2022. The case was tried
beginning June 17, 2024. Maribel has had 21 months during the divorce to pursue
opportunities to find a job in real estate, where she is a licensed broker. She has not
32 done so, and is disqualified to receive post-divorce maintenance. The Court in Carlin
v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902, 910 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2002, no pet.) said: “[B]ecause
[obligee] admittedly never attempted to seek employment that would provide for her
‘minimum reasonable needs,’ a finding that [she] proved she was unable to support
herself … would be unreasonable.”
Relevant Factors. Family Code Section 8.052 lists factors that a court may
consider in deciding whether to order maintenance. It says that the court shall decide
whether to award maintenance by considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s minimum reasonable needs independently, considering that spouse’s financial resources on dissolution of the marriage;
(2) the education and employment skills of the spouses, the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income, and the availability and feasibility of that education or training;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the age, employment history, earning ability, and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
(5) the effect on each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s minimum reasonable needs while providing periodic child support payments or maintenance, if applicable;
(6) acts by either spouse resulting in excessive or abnormal expenditures or destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of community property, joint tenancy, or other property held in common;
(7) the contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased earning
33 power of the other spouse;
(8) the property brought to the marriage by either spouse;
(9) the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(10) marital misconduct, including adultery and cruel treatment, by either spouse during the marriage; and
(11) any history or pattern of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004 [there was no allegation of evidence of family violence].
“Our courts have noted that spousal maintenance is ‘intended to provide
temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability to support herself has
eroded over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets
are insufficient to provide support.’ ... Its purpose is to ameliorate the ‘very real
hardships’ that would otherwise exist as the result of a divorce” Mehta, at 133.
Tex. Fam. Code § 8.055(a) caps the amount of spousal maintenance at the lesser
of (1) $5,000; or (2) 20 percent of the spouse’s average monthly gross income.
Support is considered in the property division. In a divorce, the issue of post-
divorce maintenance is intertwined with the property division. In In the Matter of the
Marriage of Combs, 958 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1997, no writ), the
Court said: “in making a division of the marital estate, trial courts ordinarily
considered numerous factors, including: (l) relative earning capacities and business
experience of the parties, (2) educational background of the parties, (3) size of
separate estates, (4) the age, health and physical condition of the parties, (5) fault in
34 the dissolution of the marriage, (6) the benefits the innocent spouse would have
received had the marriage continued, and (7) probable need for future support.” The
Court observed: “the factors to be considered in both the marital property division
and the award of spousal maintenance are inextricably intertwined....” In the present
case, it is presumed that the Trial Court considered those factors in making the
property division. The property division amply meets Maribel’s need for support. She
has a home worth $1,065,000, with equity of $758,000. [3RR133; W’s Separate
Property ¶ 1] She was awarded $429,999 in community property real estate. She
received $52,742 in cash outright. She will receive $354,900 when 107 Nesmith sells.
She acknowledged that she could sell her beach-front property to help meet her
minimum reasonable needs. [3RR10] She received $570,170.88 in retirement
accounts. Maribel does not meet the standards for post-divorce maintenance.
The evidence is legally sufficient to support the Trial Court’s decision not to
award spousal maintenance. No abuse of discretion is shown.
The absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not require further action by this Court because the appellate record is sufficient to review Appellant’s complaints.
The failure of a trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law does
not require remedial action from the appellate court if the record demonstrates that
the complaining party suffered no harm. Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co., Inc. v.
35 Zavala County, 682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1984). “The test for determining whether
the complainant has suffered harm is whether the circumstances of the case would
require an appellant to guess the reason or reasons that the judge has ruled against it.”
Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 257 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2018, no pet.). In Tenery
v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996), the Court said: “The court of appeals
correctly held that Wilbur was not harmed by the trial court’s failure to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law about the division of the marital estate because there
was ample evidence in the record to support the judgment.” In the recent case of
Mehta v. Mehta, supra, the trial court awarded post-divorce support but did not
indicate which of the three grounds specified in Family Code Section 8.052 it found
to be the basis for maintenance. Absent findings, the Supreme Court considered the
entire record and concluded that the evidence supported one of the statutory grounds
for awarding maintenance and therefore affirmed the trial court.
In this case the record is extraordinarily clear on the Trial Court’s rulings and the
basis for them. Much of the property division was agreed to by the parties, leaving
only a few issues in dispute. The Trial Court’s oral rendition of judgment was
particularly detailed. [3RR86-ff.] In a post-rendition hearing, Maribel’s attorney and
Dwight’s attorney were able to ask the Court for clarifications of the ruling. The
remedy for not having findings and conclusions is not reversal. It is abatement and
remand for the trial court to issue findings and conclusions. In Ad Villarai v. Chan Il
36 Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. 2017), the Court said: “When the trial court’s failure
is harmful, the preferred remedy is for the appellate court to direct the trial court to
file the missing findings.” This appeal would not be changed by such a process of
abatement and remand. The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
Trial Court’s judgment and abuse of discretion will not change with findings and
conclusions. Marisol has suffered no harm from the lack of findings and conclusions.
PRAYER
Dwight L. Hill prays that the Trial Court’s judgment be affirmed, and for general
relief.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Richard R. Orsinger
ORSINGER, NELSON, DOWNING & ANDERSON, LLP Richard R. Orsinger State Bar No. 15322500 richard@ondafamilylaw.com
425 Soledad, Suite 550 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: (210) 225-5567
EPSTEIN FAMILY LAW, P.C. Robert Epstein State Bar No. 24065206 robert@epsteinpc.com
5949 Sherry Lane, Suite 1070
37 Dallas, Texas 75225 Telephone: (972) 232-7673
Attorneys for Appellee, Dwight L. Hill
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Corel WordPerfect X9, and contains 9,381 words, as determined by the computer software’s word-count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3). /s/ Richard R. Orsinger
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of this Appellee’s Brief was served in accordance with rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on each party or that party’s lead counsel as follows:
Date of service: November 6, 2025 Method of service: Via efile service and email Lead attorney: Marisol Lopez Texas State Bar No. 24050952 MARISOL LOPEZ LAW FIRM 301 W. Avenue D Garland, TX 75040 Telephone: (972) 205-1110 Marisol@lawyerforu.com
Attorney for Appellant, Maribel L. Hill
/s/ Richard R. Orsinger Richard R. Orsinger Attorney for Appellee, Dwight L. Hill, Appellee
38 APPENDIX
TAB ITEM Reference 1 Husband’s proposed property division [P-1.A] 2RR204 2 Wife’s proposed property division [W-2] 3RR133 3 Stephen Fuqua’s Report [P-21] 2RR535 4 State Farm’s September 30, 2022 letter 2RR1117 explaining the Agent’s Agreement 5 State Farm Agent’s Agreement 2RR461 6 Agents’ Work Station Loan Agreement 2RR513 7 State Farm’s April 7, 2023 letter setting out 2RR537 Termination Payments and calculating actuarial discount when extended payments are started before age 65 8 State Farm’s May 30, 2024 letter setting out 2RR550 updated Termination Payments and calculating actuarial discount when extended payments are started before age 65 [P-22]
39 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division COMMUNITY ASSETS
REAL PROPERTY (including Mineral Interests) 1211 Ft Velasco, Surfside Beach, TX 77541; 2024 tax 1 $350,000 $350,000 0% 100% appraised value $307K 123 Nesmith Pl, Surfside Beach, TX 77541 2024 tax 2 $75,000 $75,000 100% 0% appraised value $94,070 (this propoerty to H) 107 Nesmith Pl, Sufside Beach, TX 77541 (W calls 3 this 105, 103, & 101 Nesmith PZl in her I&A) (H $546,000 $364,000 $182,000 67% 33% proposes being awarded 103 & 105) 118 Nesmith Pl, Surfside Beach, TX 77541 2024 tax 4 $75,000 $75,000 0% 100% appraised value $94,070 (this property to W) CASH AND ACCOUNTS WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (including Brokerage and Mutual Funds) 5 Cash on Hand (H) $10,000 $10,000 100% 0% PNC Bank Checking account ending 6618 (H&W) a/o 6 $126 $126 100% 0% 06/07/2024 PNC Bank DLH Separate Savings account ending 7 $2 $2 100% 0% 2065 (H) a/o 06/07/2024 State Farm FCU Reglar Share Account / Dwight Hill 8 ending 8951/member ID Savings account ending 2289 $204 $102 $102 50% 50% S1 (H&W) a/o 06/07/2024 PNC Bank Personal Checking account ending 4643 9 $9,231 $4,616 $4,616 50% 50% (H&W) a/o 06/07/2024 PNC Bank Ava Education Account Checking account ending 2033 (Ava, H&W) used as a way to transfer 10 for Ava for Ava for Ava money to Ava; H&W to be removed from this account PNC Bank Checking account ending 2183 (H) a/o 11 $14,327 $14,327 100% 0% 06/07/2024
EXHIBIT
A
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 1 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division State Farm Funds Brokerage Joint Tenants account 12 $17,944 $8,972 $8,972 50% 50% ending 5608 (H&W) a/o 06/07/2024 JP Morgan Chase Bank Chase Checking ending 2507 13 Closed Closed Closed (H&W) a/o 4/10/23 (account closed) JP Morgan Chase Bank Chase Total Checking account 14 ending 2380 (W) a/o 5/8/24; W appears to have $52,742 $52,742 0% 100% transferred from Chase ending in 2507 CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS INTERESTS Restore Entertainment, LLC DBA Mousika 15 X X 0% 100% Publishing Chase Bank Complete Business Checking account a $544 $544 0% 100% ending in 6763 (W) a/o 5/8/24 Investment into Restore Entertainment from b $89,502 $89,502 0% 100% community See Termination 16 Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. X 100% 0% Payments Below PNC Bank Business Checking account ending in 3338 (H&W) Distribute cash before trial and account stays in a X 100% 0% name of business; $3K will be remaining balance for operating purposes b 2022 Toyota 4Runner (in possession of W) transfer to Ava 17 Grateful Hippies LLC X PNC Bank Business Checking account ending in 4123 a $264 $264 0% 100% (H&W) a/o 06/07/2024
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 2 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION (Including Union Benefits) State Farm Fund Maribel Hill Roth IRA ending in 9212 18 $30,500 $30,500 0% 100% (W) a/o 5/8/24 State Farm Fund Dwight Hill Roth IRA ending in 9211 19 $34,471 $34,471 100% 0% (H) a/o 06/07/2024 State Farm Pershing 4620 ROTH IRA formerly State Farm BlackRock A6KTA (current account balance as 20 $625,882 $625,882 100% 0% of06/07/2024); Dwight's account; account is of mixed character State Farm Pershing 9931 ROTH IRA formery State Farm BlackRock A6KTA (current account balance as 21 $157,490 $157,490 100% 0% of 06/07/2024); Dwight's account; account is of mixed character Ascensus Trust IRA Services account ending in 2370 22 (also known as State Farm Brokerage Investment $64,963 $64,963 100% 0% 6955 - subaccount) (H) a/o 06/06/2024 Ascensus Trust IRA Services account ending in 2370 23 (also known as State Farm Brokerage Investment $49,752 $49,752 0% 100% 6955 - subaccount) (W) a/o 5/8/24 State Farm Blackrock Maribel L Hill ending in C17dn 24 $109,964 $109,964 0% 100% (W) a/o 4/22/24 State Farm Blackrock Maribel L Hill ROTH IRA ending 25 $143,926 $143,926 0% 100% in C9ASY (W) a/o 4/22/24 OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS Termination Payments for H employment through SF paid out monthly after H retires; CP portion is 63.26%; therefore, W receives 31.63% of termination pay Unknown since 26 ($2,143.25) if, as, and when received by H. With contignent X X 68.37% 31.63% respect to extended term pay, W will receive 31.63% of asset actuarially reduced portion if, as, and when received by H
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 3 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division MOTOR VEHICLES, BOATS, AIRPLANES, CYCLES, ETC. Honda Scooter Elite (Name on title: H); at 4647 Elsby; 27 $600 $600 100% 0% W claims her name is on title 2014 Club Car Gas xtr 850 (Name on title: H); at 1211 28 $5,000 $5,000 0% 100% Surfside Beach 2010 Lexus LX570 (Name on title: H&W); in 29 $20,000 $20,000 100% 0% possession of H (No lien) 2021 Mazda CX-5 (Name on title: W); in possession of 30 $25,000 $25,000 0% 100% Ava 2022 Ford F-150 (Name on title: H&W); in possession of Jacob ($45,000 FMV less $2,157 owed a/o 31 10/25/23; paid off a/o 3/12/24) Vehicle to be given to Jacob MISCELLANEOUS ASSETS 32 Clothes, bicycle, books, guitar, tools (poss: H) $5,000 $5,000 100% 0% 33 Household furnishings, musical instruments & tools $8,000 $8,000 0% 100% 34 Computer monitors (x2) (poss: H) $100 $100 100% 0% 35 Glock 26 (poss: H) $500 $500 100% 0% 36 Sig P238 (poss: W) $600 $600 0% 100% 37 4.53 ct Diamond/Platinum Ring (poss: W) $75,000 $75,000 0% 100% 38 Diamond necklace (poss: W) $15,000 $15,000 0% 100% 39 Maribel Hill Music unknown X 0% 100% Unknown jewelry and papers in PNC Bank Safe- 40 TBD Deposit Box
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 4 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division INSURANCE State Farm ending in 2752 Whole (H); $250K face 41 value (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 09/25/1989; $ 94,997 $94,997 100% 0% therefore, it is H's SP a/o 06/04/2024 State Farm ending in 5601 Whole (H); $10K face value 42 (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 08/23/1988; $ 4,020 $4,020 100% 0% therefore, it is H's SP a/o 06/04/2024 State Farm ending in 2655 Whole (H); $25K face value 43 (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 09/25/1989; $ 9,709 $9,709 100% 0% therefore, it is H's SP a/o 06/04/2024 State Farm ending in 8176 Whole (H); $10K face value 44 (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 09/28/1990; $ 4,667 $4,667 100% 0% therefore, it is H's SP a/o 5/15/24 State Farm ending in 0889 Whole (Garrett insured; owner TBD); $50k face value; W is beneficiary; transfer to 45 however, date of issue is 05/24/1990; therefore, it is Garrett H's SP a/o 5/15/24 State Farm ending in 2774 Whole (H); $250K face 46 value (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 09/25/1989; $ 90,128 $90,128 100% 0% therefore, it is H's SP a/o 06/04/2024 47 State Farm ending in 2821 Term (H); $500K face value no CSV X 100% 0% State Farm ending in 3643 Term (W); $400K face 48 no CSV X 0% 100% value State Farm ending in 0051 Whole (H owner; Ava Hill 49 transfer to Ava insured); $50K face value (W is beneficiary) State Farm ending in 1479 Whole (H owner; Jacob Hill 50 transfer to Jake insured); $50K face value (W is beneficiary
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 5 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS Reduction of principal amount of debt on 4647 Elsby 51 $77,600 $77,600 0% 100% Avenue, Dallas, TX 75209 H's Separate Property Funds from sale of Clubway 52 $79,635 $79,635 0% 100% House lost to commingling (See Ex. P-8, HUD 1) Enhancement in value to W's SP residence at 4647 53 Elsby Avenue, Dallas, TX 75209 paid with community $250,000 $250,000 0% 100% property funds, including a loan of $100,000
Totals $3,223,392 $1,589,671 $1,633,721 49% 51% COMMUNITY LIABILITIES
CREDIT CARDS AND CHARGE ACCOUNTS 1 Chase Bank, Acct ending 9682 (W) a/o 5/8/24 ($95) ($95) 0% 100% 2 Chase Bank, Acct ending 7039 (W) a/o 5/8/24 ($870) ($870) 0% 100% 3 CapitalOne, Acct ending 0864 (H) a/o 3/12/24 $0 $0 100% 0% ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS CASE 4 Epstein Family Law, P.C. accruing X 100% 0% 5 Armstrong Divorce and Family Law, PLLC nothing owed nothing owed 0% 100% 6 Marisol Lopez unknown X 0% 100% OTHER PROFESSIONAL FEES IN THIS CASE 7 Stephen Fuqua $0 $0 100% 0% OTHER LIABILITIES NOT OTHERWISE LISTED State Farm FCU Line of Credit ending 2289 (a/o 8 $0 $0 100% 0% 3/12/24)
Totals ($965) $0 ($965) 0% 100%
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 6 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED DIVISION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY Husband Wife Grand Total of Assets $3,223,392 $1,589,671 $1,633,721 Less Community Unsecured Liabilities ($965) $0 ($965) Net Value of Estate $3,222,427 $1,589,671 $1,632,756 Payment from Wife to Husband to Equalize Division $21,542 ($21,542) Total Division $3,222,427 $1,611,213 $1,611,214 Percentage Division 50% 50%
50 Percent of Net Estate $1,611,214 $1,611,214 Over : (Short) ($0) $0
HUSBAND'S SEPARATE PROPERTY No. Description Value of Property PNC Checking Account 1641 (Inheritance from 1 $9,031.54 Parents) a/o 5/15/24 2 Levovo Laptop (bought with separate property monies) $600.00
3 Gun Cabinet with Gun Collection (gift and purchases) $5,000.00 Gibson J45 Guitar to be given to Jacob Hill (purchased 4 $2,000.00 1997) 5 Life insurance policies (see above) $202,813.00 6 Reimbursement claim against Elsby (see above) $79,000.00
Total $298,445
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 7 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Value Used Percent to Percent to Note Description for To Husband To Wife Husband Wife Division WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY No. Description Value of Property
4647 Elsby Ave 75209 (FMV=$1,065,000 - Mort $252,245.55) a/o 06/07/2024 LESS $79,000 reimbursement claim on H's SP for Clubway funds and LESS $216,654 for CP principal reduction 1 $417,100 LESS $100,000 for CP capital improements (see eimbursements above); W to refinance the property within 120 days of the date of divorce or otherwise remove H from the mortgage by such time
Total $417,100
CHILDREN'S PROPERTY Value of No. Description Property Blackrock Coverdell, Acct ending 2281 (Ava) (Maribel 1 $ 38,038.00 to be transferred to Ava Custodian) a/o 05/07/2024 Blackrock Coverdell, Acct ending 4121 (Jacob) 2 $ 78,965.00 to be transferred to Jacob (Maribel Custodian) a/o 05/07/2024 State Farm Funds Coverdell, Acct ending 9274 (Jacob) 3 $ 9,829.99 to be transferred to Jacob (Maribel Custodian) a/o 06/07/2024
**Assets and liabilities highlighted in yellow are stipulated to as to value and award. Page 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill
Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value COMMUNITY ASSETS
REAL PROPERTY (including Mineral Interests)
1 1211 Ft Velasco Surfside Beach TX 77541 $265 000 $350,000 $265,000 0% 100%
2 123 Nesmith Pl, Surfside Beach, TX 77541 (agreed) $75,000 $75,000 $75,000 100% 0% 107 Nesmith Pl , Sufside Beach, TX77541 (Lots 1, 2& 3) Lot 3 is currently for sale but price needs to be 50% 3 $546,000 $546,000 $273,000 $273,000 50% lowered (Propose Lot 1 for W , Lot 2 for H and Lot 3 sold) 4 11 8 Nes mith Pl, Surfside Beach, TX 77541 (Agreed) $75,000 $75,000 $75,000 0% 100%
CASH AND ACCOUNTS WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Including Brokerage and Mutual Funds) 5 Cash on Hand (H) $10,000 $10 000 100% 0% PNC Bank Checking account ending 6118 (H&W) a/o 6 $126 $126 100% 0% 6/10/24 ( aareed\ PNC Bank DLH Separate Savings accountending 2065 7 $27 $27 100% 0% / Hl a/o 5/15/24 / aareedl State Farm FCU Reglar Share Account/ Dwight Hill 8 ending 8951/member ID Savings account ending 2289 $204 $102 $102 50% 50% S1 /H&Wl a/o 5/15/24 (aareedl PNC Bank Personal Checking account ending 4643 9 $8,533 $4,267 $4,267 50% 50% /H&Wl a/o 6/10/24 /aareedl PNC Bank Ava Education Account Checking account 10 ending 2033 (Ava, H&W) a/o 6/10/24 used as a way $2,097 for Ava for Ava for Ava to transfer monev to Ava /aareedl PNC Bank Checking account ending 218 3 (H) a/o 11 $14,327 $14,327 100% 0% 5/15/24 / aareedl State Farm Funds Brokerage Joint Tenants account 12 $17,978 $8,989 $8,989 50% 50% endina 5608 (H&Wl a/o 6/10/24 (aareedl JP Morgan Chase Bank Chase Checking ending 2507 13 Closed Closed Closed /H&Wl a/o 4/10/23 /account closed) JP Morgan Chase Bank Chase Total Checking account ending 2380 (W) a/o 5/8/24; W transferred 14 $52,742 $52,742 $52,742 0% 100% from Chase ending in 2507 (Agreed separate acct); H had an acct also receivina same amount.
Page 1 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill
Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS INTERESTS
Restore Entertainment, LLC DBA Mousika 15 X X 0% 100% Publishina Chase Bank Complete Business Checking account a $544 $544 0% 100% endina in 6763 (Wl a/o 5/8/24 (aareedl Investment into Restore Entertainment from b $0 $80,000 $0 0% 100% communitv (both were investors & both lost monevl Dwight Hill Insurance Agency, Inc. (appraisal not 16 updated with higher numbers though income > $728,000 $0 $400,000 $400,000 50% 50% hiaherl PNC Bank Business Checking account ending in 3338 a (H&W) a/o 05/15/24 (Agreed leave$ 3k and split $2, 441 X 50% 50% remainder) 2022 Toyota 4Runner (in possession of Ava) a/o b $43,000 0% 0%% 05/31/24· (Acireed title to Ava Hill) 17 Grateful Hinnies LLC CAareed assign to wife) $0 X 0% 100% PNC Bank Business Checking account ending in 4123 a $117 $1 17 0% 100% (H&W) a/o 5/15/24 (Acireed) RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION (Including Union Benefits) 50/50 as of State Farm Fund Maribel Hill Roth IRA ending in 9212 18 $34,521 $30,500 $17,261 $17,261 50% 50% 'Wl a/o 6/10/24 State Farm Fund Dwight Hill Roth IRA ending in 9211 19 $33,815 $16,908 $1 6,908 50% 50% CHI a/o 5/15/24 State Farm Pershing 4620 ROTH IRA formerly State Farm BlackRock A6KTA (current account balance as 20 $615,382 $307,691 $307,691 50% 50% of 5/8/24); Dwight's account; account is of mixed character State Farm Pershing 9931 ROTH IRA formery State Farm BlackRock A6KTA (current account balance as 21 $155,547 $77,774 $77,774 50% 50% of 5/15/24); Dwight's account; account is of mixed character Ascensus Trust IRA Services account ending in 2370 22 (also known as State Farm Brokerage Investment $63,078 $31 ,539 $31 ,539 50% 50% 6955 - subaccount) (Hl a/o 5/8/24 Ascensus Trust IRA Services account ending in 2370 23 (also known as State Farm Brokerage Investment $50,650 $49,752 $25,325 $25,325 50% 50% 6956 - subaccountl (WI a/o 617/24 State Farm Blackrock Maribel L Hill ending in C17dn 24 $111 ,051 $109,964 $55,526 $55,526 50% 50% 'Wl same as 4612 a/o 6/10/24
Page 2 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill
Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value State Farm Blackrock Maribel L Hill ROTH IRA ending 25 $146,435 $143,926 $73,218 $73,218 50% 50% in C9ASY same as 9964 a/o 6/10/24 OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS
Termination Payments for H employment through SF paid out monthly after H retires; 66% to Husband and 34 % to wife = $ 2,710.40 first 5 years and then $ 26 66% 34% 2,680.40 after 5 years forward); H gets$ 4,472.16 first 5 years and$ 2,680.40 after first 5 years; H will actually get more by teh time he retires
MOTOR VEHICLES, BOATS, AIRPLANES, CYCLES, ETC.
Honda Scooter Elite (Name on title: H); at 4647 Elsby; 27 $600 $600 $600 100% 0% W claims her name is on title 2014 Club Car Gas xtr 850 (Name on title: H); at 1211 28 $2,500 $5,000 Surfside Beach (qoes w whoever has Velasco) 2010 Lexus LX570 (Name on title: H&W); in 29 $22,000 $20, 000 $20,000 100% 0% possession of H (No lien) ( Aoreed) 2021 Mazda CX-5 (Name on title: W); in possession of 30 $24,000 $25,000 $25,000 0% 100% Wife ( Aareedl 2022 Ford F-150 (Name on title: H&W); in possession of Jacob ($45,000 FMV less $2,157 owed a/o 31 $48,000 10/25/23; paid off a/o 3/12/24) Vehicle to be titled to Jacob Hill. Agreed
MISCELLANEOUS ASSETS 32 Clothes bicvcle, books, guitar, tools (poss: Hl $5,000 $5 000 100% 0% Household furnishings, musical instru ments & tools 33 $5,000 $8,000 $5,000 0% 100% (Aqreed) 34 Computer monitors (x2) (poss: Hl (Aareedl $100 $100 100% 0% 35 Glock 26 (poss: H) (Aoreed) $500 $500 100% 0% 36 Sia P238 (Poss: Wl (Aareedl $450 $600 $450 0% 100% 4.53 ct Diamond/Platinum Ring (poss: W) (can nsure no 37 jewlrey w no appraisal but not even insured for that $75,000 0% 100% appraisal/gift amount)· aift to W Diamond necklace (poss: W); (can insure for whatever no 38 $15,000 0% 100% but not even insured for that)· Gift to W aaaraisal/aift 39 Maribel Hill Music (Aoreed) $0 unknown $0 0% 100%
Page 3 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill
Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value Unknown jewelry and papers in PNC Bank Safe- 40 TBD 0% 100% Deposit Box (Aoreed) INSURANCE
State Farm ending in 2752 Whole (H); $250K face 41 value (Wis beneficiary); date of issue is 09/25/1989; $94,997 $ - $94,997 0% 100% acct in debt of 16,819.20 as of 10/15/2001 ; a/o 6.4.24 State Farm ending in 5601 Whole (H); $1 OK face value (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 08/23/1988; 42 $4,020 $4,020.39 100% 0% therefore, it is not H's SP a/o 6/4/24 be paid the oremiums throuahout marriaae State Farm ending in 2655 Whole (H); $25K face value (Wis beneficiary); date of issue is 09/25/1989; 43 therefore, it is not H's SP a/o 6/4/24 be paid premiums $9,709 $ - $9,709 0% 100% for 23 years State Farm ending In 8176 Whole (H); $1 OK face value (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 09/28/1990; 44 $4,684 $4,683.51 100% 0% therefore, it is not H's SP a/o 6/4/24 be paid premiums for 23 years State Farm ending in 0889 Whole (Garrett insured; owner TBD); $50k face value; W is beneficiary; 45 however, date of issue is 05/24/1990; therefore , it is $8,369 $ - 0% 0% not H's SP a/o 6/4/24 be paid premiums for 23 years 'Aareed title to Garrett) State Farm ending in 2774 Whole (H); $250K face value (W is beneficiary); date of issue is 46 $90,128 $90,128.00 100% 0% 09/25/1989;acct was in debt of $20,304.47 as of 10/15/01 a/o 6/4/24 47 State Farm ending in 2821 Term (H); $SOOK face value noCSV X 100% 0% State Farm ending in 3643 Term (W); $400K face 48 noCSV X 0% 100% value State Farm ending in 0051 Whole (H owner; Ava Hill 49 insured); $SOK face value (W is beneficiary) a/o 6/4/24 $2,841 $2,841 0% 0% 'Aareed title ownership to Ava Hill) State Farm ending in 1479 Whole (H owner; Jacob Hill 50 insured); $SOK face value (Wis beneficiary) a/o 6/4/24 $3,151 $3,318 0% 0% 'Aareed Title ownership to Jacob Hill)
Page 4 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill
Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
H claims reduction of princpal amount of debts secured by liens on W's SP residence at 4647 Elsby Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75209. But no reimbursement claim exists as the mortgage is 3 times higher than Howes$ before marriage; and H received benefit & was already 126,000.00 to 51 compensated by acquiring paid off assets with the $378,000 0% 0% Elsby (half equity money out of separate property & never paid mortgage) back the equity $ he w ithdrew on the separate property) Howes$ 126,000 to Elsby or wife needs Ft. Velasco free and clear as equity of Elsby is in that home while the mortgage remains on Elsby. H's Separate Property Funds DID NOT invest in capital improvements to W's SP residence at 4647 Elsby 52 Avenue, Dallas, TX 75209 from Clubway House. $0 $79,000 $0 0% 0% Mortgage was placed on it and W had$ 83,000 from insurance. There are no community property funds invested in capital improvements to W's SP residence at 4647 Elsby Ave, Dallas, Texas 75209 ($83,000 came from insurance claim premarital & $ 100,000 was a loan af er 53 marriage that was never paid back & is part of existing $0 mortgage debt; loan is 3 times higher than before marriage and H benefited as he is receiving property w no mortgage be derived from Elsby and Elsby has the debt $100 000 $0 $0 0%% 0%% Totals $1516109 $1,820 158 COMMUNITY LIABILITIES
CREDIT CARDS AND CHARGE ACCOUNTS
Chase Bank, Acct ending 9682 (W) a/o 5/8/24 1 ($95) ($95) 0% 100% (Aareed) Chase Bank, Acct ending 7039 (W) a/o 5/8/24 2 ($870) ($870) 0% 100% ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS CASE Page 5 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill I Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value 4 Epstein Family Law P.C. (Aareed) accruina X 100% 0% 5 Armstrona Divorce and Family Law PLLC (Aareed) unknown X 0% 0% 6 Marisol Lopez (Aareed) unknown X 0% 100% OTHER PROFESSIONAL FEES IN THIS CASE 7 Stephen Fuaua (Aareed) $0 $0 100% 0% OTHER LIABILITIES NOT OTHERWISE LISTED State Farm FCU Line of Credit ending 2289 (a/o 8 3/12/24) (Agreed) $0 $0 100% 0% Real Property taxes (50/50 paid on taxes up to date of 9 divorce) and split any tax refunds or rebates on tax returns filed durina marriaae SUMMARY OF PROPOSED DIVISION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY Husband Wife Grand Total of Assets $0 $1516109 $1 820 158 Less Community Unsecured Liabilities ($965) $0 ($965) Net Value of Estate ($965) $1.516,109 $1 819,193 Percentage Division -157183% -188605% 50 Percent of Net Estate ($482) ($482) Over : (Short) $1 516,591 $1 819,675 $ 265k Ft. rv'elasco for portion of Elsby mortgage+ $ 52k H already got) I Page 6 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Wife's Husband's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value HUSBAND'S SEPARATE PROPERTY No. Description Value of Prooer v PNC Checking Account 1641 (check issued for 1/4 1 land sale from Bill Hill) a/o 5/15/24 (not separate $9,031.54 $83,598.00 property) $167,195 $83,598 50% 50% 2 $600.00 Levovo Laptop (bouoht with separate property monies) 100% 0% 3 $5,000.00 Gun Cabinet with Gun Collection (gift and purchases) 100% 0% Gibson J45 Guitar to be given to Jacob Hill (purchased 4 $2,000.00 1997) 0% 0% 5 Life insurance policies (see above) 6 Reimbursement claim against Elsby (see above) $0 Total $91198 WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY No. Description Value of Propert 1 Elsby SP 4647 Elsby Ave 75209 (FMV=$1,065,000 - Mort $258,325.320) a/o 10/25/2023 (W FMV = $758,000) W to continue to pay loan and sign hold harmless for H. Total Separate property that is now 3 times more in debt than prior to marriage. H owes half the mortgage or W gets Ft Velasco in exchange for his portion of debt in Elsby. not relevant 100% CHILDREN'S PROPERTY No. Description Value of Prooerty 1 Blackrock Coverdell, Acct ending 2281 (Ava) (Maribel $38,038.00 Custodian) a/o 5/7/24 (Aoreed to title to Ava Hill) 0% 0% Blackrock Coverdell, Acct ending 4121 (Jacob) 2 (Maribel Custodian) a/o 5/7/24 (Agreed to titile to $78,965.32 Jacob Hill) 0% 0% State Farm Funds Coverdell, Acct ending 9274 (Jacob) 3 (Maribel Custodian) a/o 6/7/24 (Agreed to title to Jacob $9,829.99 Hill) 0% 0% OTHER REQUESTS: Page 7 of 8 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hill Wife's Husband 's Value Used Percent to Note Description Proposed Proposed To Husband To Wife Percent to Wife for Division Husband Value Value HEALTH INSURANCE ( W needs health insurance for 3 years as she suffers from autoimmune diseases) ALIMONY CW needs$ 5,000/mo for 7 vears) $5,000 100% Page 8 of 8 EXHIBIT P-21 DLH.SF-003098 DLH.SF-003099 DLH.SF-003101 DLH.SF-003102 AA4{rNC)(TX) nn-43 : STATE FARM AGENT'S AGREEMENT State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Slate Farm Life Insurance Company, State Farm Fire and Casualty 'State Farm," or "the Company, and State Farm General Insurance Company, collectively referred to in this Agreement as Companies," insurance corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois, with their principal offices located at Bloomington. Illinois, and Slate Farm County Mutual Insurance Company of Texas, an insurance corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Stale of Texas with its principal office located at Dallas, Texas, appoint DWIGHT HILL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas, with its office located at, Texas referred to in this Agreement as 'the Agent," to represent the Companies in Texas, while properly licensed so to act. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The chief executive officer of the Agent shall be the President. Schedule of Payments Forms AS4, indicated, hereto attached, constitute a pan of CMS2, FS3, GS2, HS5, LLSI, LS5a, and LS8 applicable to the respective company as this Agreement. This Agreement is to become effective August I, 2002, and shall continue until terminated as herein provided. officers and licensed sales representatives will also be invited PREAMBLE to attend meetings conducted by the Companies for the purpose of introducing new products, ideas, services and The purpose of this Agreement is to reduce to writing the procedures, promoting sales, and provide assistance, guidance, and consultation to better enable the Agent to carry out the objectives, obligations, and responsibilities essential to the relationship between the Corporate Agent, its officers and provisions of this Agreement. employees, and State Farm. It is to our mutual interest to satisfactorily serve the insuring public, to comply with all The Companies and the Agent expect that by entering into applicable laws, to increase business commensurate with the this Agreement, and by the full and faithful observance and available potential, and to maintain the Companies' operations performance of the obligations and responsibilities herein set forth, a mutually satisfactory relationship will be established on a profitable basis in order to assure the necessary financial and maintained. strength to protect the policyholders’ interest. Insurance is a closely regulated business. The Companies To these ends, the Companies, the Agent and the ITcsident agree that: and the agents must deal equitably with policyholders as to rates and claims, be trustworthy in handling money, avoid false advertising and unfair practices, and refrain from any action that would result in violation, by State Farm or any SECTION I - MUTUAL CONDITIONS AND DUTIES agent, of any applicable law or regulation. A, The Agent will solicit applications for insurance, collect The Companies do not seek and will not assert control initial premiums, membership fees and charges, over the Agent's officers or licensed sales representatives, but countemign and deliver policies, reinstate and transfer insurance, assist policyholders and cooperate with expect them to exercise their own judgment as to the time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing adjusters in reporting and handling claims, avoid conflicts of interest, and cooperate with and advance the interests policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions of of the Companies, their agents, and the policyholders. this Agreement. State Farm will make available to the Agent the B. The Officers and licensed sales representatives of the experience and technical knowledge acquired and developed Agent have full control over their daily activities, with the over the years in respect with selling, underwriting, and right to exercise independent judgment as to time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing servicing insurance. The Companies will designate specific cm ployecs of the Companies to guide and advise the Agent's policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions officers and licensed sales representatives. Tlie Agent’s of this Agreement. policyholder resides within a 25-miIc radius of the<^ C. Slate Farm will furnish the Agent, without charge, Agent's principal place of business and within a state in manuals, forms, records, and such other materials and which the Agent is duly licensed, except that the supplies as the Companies may deem advisable to Companies may, after prior written notice to the Agent, provide. All such property furnished by the Companies transfer any automobile policy to the account of another shall remain the property of the Companies. In addition, State Farm agent when the policyholder makes a bona the Companies will offer at the Agent's expense such fide request in writing. The Agent will respect the rights additional materials and supplies as the Companies feel and interests of other agents in policies credited to their may be helpful to the Agent. accounts by refraining from raiding or otherwise diverting policies from their accounts to the Agent’s D. . Infonnation regarding names, addresses, and ages of account. policyholders of the Companies; the description and location of insured property; and expiration or renewal I. All moneys collected on behalf of the Companies shall be dates of State Farm policies acquired or coming into the held in trust by the Agent as the absolute property of the Agent's possession during the effective period of this Companies, and the Agent will be responsible for these Agreement,or any prior agreement, except information moneys until they are safely transmitted to the and records of policyholdersinsured by the Companies Companies. The Agent agrees to maintain in a bank or pursuantto any governmentalor insurance industry plan similar financial institution, a premium fund account, or facility, arc trade secrets wholly owned by the which the Companies may audit at any time, in which the Companies. All forms and other materials, whether Agent will promptly deposit all cash collected for furnished by State Farm or purchased by the Agent, upon premiums, membership fees, and charges. The Agent which this information is recorded shall be the sole and further agrees to transmit promptly to the Companies the . exclusive property of the Companies. moneys so deposited, through checks drawn upon this premium fund account, along with all insurance E. The expense of any office, including rental, furniture, and applications received and all checks collected on behalf . equipment; signs; supplies not furnished by the of the Companies. Companies; the salaries of the Agent's employees; telegraph; telephone; postage; advertising; and all other J. Any amount (exclusive of premiums due on policies charges or expense incurred by the Agent in the issued to the Agent and the President) at any time owing performance of this Agreement shall be incurred by the by the Agent to any of the Companies, their subsidiaries Agent at the Agent's discretion and paid by the Agent. and affiliates, shall be a first lien on any payment due or We anticipate that in the location or relocation of the thereafter becoming due the Agent under any of the Agent's office there will be no undue infringement on the provisions of this Agreement, and the Companies are established office location of any other agent, The Agent authorized to deduct such indebtedness from any such will not establish any office in addition to the Agent’s payment due or thereafter becoming due to the Agent principal office without the prior written approval of the from any of the Companies. Companies. K. If any application is rejected or any policy is surrendered F. The Companies will advertise, provide promotional or cancelled, in whole or in part, for any reason, before materials, and participate in the cost of the Agent’s the expiration of the policy period, or if any premium is advertisements in accordance with policies determined reduced or any overpayment made to the Agent, the from time to time by the Companies. The Agent will not compensation paid to the Agent on the amount returned use any advertisements referring to or identifying the or credited to the policyholder or the amount overpaid to Companies in any way without the prior written approval the Agent shall be charged to the Agent and shall of the Companies. constitute an indebtedness of die Agent to die Companies. G. The Agent shall provide at least one licensed sales L. The Companies retain the right to prescribe all policy representative whose principal occupation will be the forms and provisions; premiums, fees, and charges for fulfillment of the Agent's obligations established by this insurance; and rules governing the binding, acceptance, Agreement. The fulfillment of the Agreement shall be renewal, rejection, or cancellation of irsks, and the Agent's principal business and neither the Agent nor adjustment and payment of losses. any licensed sales representative employed by the Agent will directly or indirectly write or service insurance for M. The Agent will not represent itself as having any powers any other Company, other than a State Farm subsidiary or except those authorized by this Agreement, and subject to affiliate or through any governmental or insurance any applicable law. Without limiting the foregoing, the industry plan or facility, or for any agent or broker, Agent shall not have authority to extend the time of except in accordance with the terms of any written payment of any premium, or to alter, waive, or forfeit any consent the Companies may give the Agent. of the Companies' irghts, requirements, or conditions in any policy of insurance, or otherwise obligate the H. The Companies will leave in the Agent's account all Companiesin any way exceptas stated in this Agreement automobile policies credited thereto so long as the or expressly authorized under the rules and regulations of / the Companies or as otherwise authorized in writing by insurance coverage competitive with the insurance ■ the Companies. coverages sold by the Companies. In the event the "period of one year" conflicts with any statutory provision, such period shall be the period permitted by I statute. SECTION II - COMPENSATION A. Each Company will make payments to the Agent as set SECTION IV - TERMINATION PAYMENTS forth in the applicable Schedule of Payments. B. As additional compensation, State Farm will maintain A. In the event this Agreement is terminated, the respective insurance upon the life of the President, payable to the Companies will, subject to the conditions set forth in beneficiary selected by the Agent, so long as this subparagraph A-5 and paragraph B of this section, pay Agreement has not been terminated and the President has the Agent, less any deductions for commission charge not attained age 65; provided, however, that in no event backs, the following termination payments; will such insurance be maintained in force during a period 1. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE commencing th irty-one days after the President has begun active duty as a member of the military, naval, or air INSURANCE COMPANY will pay: forces of any country or international organization and ending with termination of such duty. The amount of (a) For the first twelve (12) months following the date of termination the lesser of the amounts insurance during any calendar year shall be equal to the Agent’s gross compensation received from the Companies computed in (1) and (2): in the preceding calendar year, exclusive ofcompensati on based on policies issued by the Companies pursuant to (1) twenty percent (20%) of the service any governmental or insurance industry plan, pool or compensation on "personally produced" policies by the licensed sales facility, or $10,000, whichever is the greater, but in no event shall such insurance be more than $50,000. representative(s) designated by the Agent pursuant to Section V1.A(3), earned under C. Each Company reserves the right to fix and determine the the Schedule of Payments For Other Than Health Insurance Policies in the twelve (12) amount, extent, and conditions of any bonuses, awards, prizes, and allowances. preceding months, or twenty percent (20%) of the service compensation on "personally produced" policies credited to the Agent's SECTION III - TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT account, as of the date of termination, which remain in force in the same state A. The Agent or State Farm have the right to terminate this during the first twelve (12) months Agreement by written notice delivered to the other or following the date of termination, mailed to the other's last known address. The date of whichever is greater, or termination shall be the date specified in the notice, but in the event no date is specified, the date of termination shall (2) thirty percent (30%) of the service be the date of delivery if the notice is mailed. Either compensation on "personally produced" party can accelerate the date of the termination specified policies credited to the Agent's account as of the date of termination, which remain in by the other by giving written notice of termination in force in the same state during the first accordance with this paragraph. twelve (12) months following the date of termination. B. After termination of this Agreement, the Agent agrees not to act or represent itself in any way as an agent or representative of the Companies. In the event thirty percent (30%) of the service compensation as specified in (2) is less than the C. Within ten days after the termination of this Agreement, greater amount of the service compensation as all property belonging to the Companies shall be returned computed in (I) and if the number of such or made available for return to the Companies or their "personally produced" policies in force at the authorized representative. end of the first twelve (12) months following the date of termination is equal to or greater than D. For a period of one year following termination of this seventy-five percent (75%) of the number of the Agreement, neither the Agent, the President, nor any of "personally produced" policies in force at date the licensed sales representatives, will either personally or of termination, the Agent will be paid the through any other person, agency, or organization (a) amount provided for in (1). induce or advise any State Farm policyholder credited to the Agent's account at the date of termination to lapse, (b) For the first twelve (12) months following the date of termination the lesser of the amounts surrender, or cancel any State Farm insurance coverage or (b) solicit any such policyholder to purchase any computed in (1) and (2): ;j.fza4(f3 OCH4bMOr \ (1) twenty percent (20%) of the service (d) For each of the succeeding forty-eight (48) compensation the Agent earned on health months the Agent will be paid an amount equal insurance policies under the Schedule of to one-twelfth (l/12th) of the total amount Payments For Health Insurance Policies in payable in the first twelve (12) months after the twelve (12) preceding months, or termination. twenty percent (20%) of the service compensation on health insurance policies 2. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY credited to the Agent's account at date of COMPANY, STATE FARM GENERAL termination which remain in the same state INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM and in force during the first twelve months COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF following the date of termination, except TEXAS each will pay: those policies which became available in the same state for assignment to an agent as (a) For the first twelve (12) months following date a result of the termination of an agreement of termination the lesser of the amounts between the Company and an agent, or as a computed in (l)and (2): result of an agreement between an agent and the Companies pursuant to the (1) twenty percent (20%) of the commissions applicable paragraph of Section IV of a the Agent was paid on "personally State Farm Agent's Agreement, on which produced" policies by the licensed sales one year has not elapsed since date of representative(s) designated by the Agent termination; whichever is greater, or pursuant to Section VI.A(3), for those lines of insurance classified by the Companies in (2) two percent (2%) of the second and paragraphs 1-A, B and C of the applicable subsequent policy years net premium Schedule of Payments, in the twelve (12) collections received and recorded in the preceding months, or twenty percent (20%) twelve (12) months following date of of the commissions on such "personally termination on health insurance policies produced" renewal premiums, which would which remain in the same state, credited to have been paid under the applicable the Agent's account as of the date of Schedule of Payments, if this Agreement tennination, except those policies which had not been terminated, in the twelve (12) became available in the same state for months following the date of termination on assignment to an agent as a result of the such "personally produced" policies, which termination of an agreement between the remain in the same state, for those lines of Company and an agent, or as a result of an insurance designated above and credited to agreement between an agent and the the Agent's account as of the date of Companies pursuant to the applicable termination; whichever is greater, or paragraph of Section IV of a State Farm Agent's Agreement, on which one year ha.s (2) thirty percent (30%) of the commissions on not elapsed since date of tennination. such 'personally produced" renewal premiums which would have been paid In the event two percent (2%) of the net under the applicable Schedule of Payments, premium collections as specified in (2) is less if this Agreement had not been terminated, than the greater amount of the service in the twelve (12) months following the compensation as computed in (1) and if the date of termination on those "personally number of policies in force at the end of the first produced" policies designated in (!) and twelve (12) months following the date of credited to the Agent's account as of the termination is equal to or greater than seventy- date of termination. five percent (75%) of the number of policies in force at date of termination, the Agent will be In the event thirty percent (30%) of the paid the amount computed in (1). commissions as computed in (2) is less than the greater amount computed in (1) and if the (c) The payments provided for in (a) and (b) shall number of such designated "personally be made in estimated monthly installments equal produced" policies in force at the end of the first to twenty percent (20%) of the service twelve (12) months following date of compensation earned in the twelfth (12th) termination is equal to or greater than seventy- preceding month subject to appropriate five percent (75%) of the number of such I adjustments following a determination of the net designated "personally produced" policies in premium collections as specified in (a)(2) and force at date of termination, the Agent will be (b)(2) and the number of policies in force, where paid the amount provided for in (1). applicable. i / (b) The payments provided for in (a) shall be made (c) On Flexible Premium Retireinem policies in the in estimated monthly installments equal to Agent's account on which the Agent is eligible twenty percent (20%) of the commissions paid for servicing compensation at the time of on the designated "personally produced" policies terminationofthis Agreement,an amountequal in the twelfth (12th) preceding month subject to to three-fourths of one percent (3/4 of 1%) of an 1 appropriate adjustments following a average monthly premium of the policies shall determination of the commissions specified in be paid in monthly installments for each of the (a)(2) and the number of such "personally sixty (60) months after termination of this produced" policies in force, where applicable, Agreement, except that no amount shall be paid on those policies made available for assignment (c) For each of the succeeding forty-eight (48) by the termination of an agreement between the months the Agent will be paid an amount equal Company and an agent or by a release of I to onc-twelfth (1/I2th) of the total amount policies pursuant to the applicable paragraph of payable in the first twelve (12) months after Section IV of a Slate Farm Agent's Agreement. termination. The average monthly premium of a policy shall be calculated by dividing the total premium paid 3. STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY on the policy by the number of full months will pay on business written before January 1,1982: elapsing between its Policy Date and termination of this Agreement. I (a) An amount equal to the same compensation, for the second and subsequent policy years as would 5. GOVERNMENTAL OR INSURANCE INDUSTRY have been due and payable to the Agent for the PLAN OR FACILITY. All policies, premium first five years following the date of termination collections and compensation the Agent receives on all Stale Farm life policies personally written thereon, issued by the Companies pursuant to any by the licensed sales representative designated governmental or insurance industry plan or facility, shall be excluded from the calculations and by the Agent pursuant to Section VI.A(3), or assigned to the Agent by the Company for provisions for termination payments. compensation, under the terms of the applicable Schedule of Payments attached hereto, if this 6. CESSATION OF BUSINESS. In the event the Agreement had not been terminated, respective Company discontinues doing business in the state in which the agent is licensed as a (b) The payments provided for in (a) shall be made representative of the Company, that Company agrees in monthly installments for each of the sixty to pay the agent the following payments in lieu of the (60) months which would have been due and termination payments provided for in this section and payable to the Agent for that month if this Section V of this Agreement, subject to the mutual conditions herein set forth: Agreement had not been terminated. 4. STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (a) For the first twelve (12) months following the date of termination STATE FARM MUTUAL will pay on business written during the existence of AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY will this Agreement and on or after January 1, 1982: pay the amount computed in A-1 based on your (a) On life policies personally written by the earnings under the applicable Schedule of licensed sales representative designated by the Payments in the twelve (12) preceding months Agent pursuant to Section VI.A(3), an amount as provided for in A-l-(aXl)and A-l-(bXI)- equal to the writing compensation, for the second and subsequent policy years as would (b) For the first twelve (12) months following the have been due and payable to the Agent under date of termination STATE FARM FIRE AND the terms of the applicable Schedule of CASUALTY COMPANY, STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and Payments attached hereto if the Agreement had not been terminated. STATE FARM COUNTY MUTUAL I INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS will pay (b) On life policies in the Agent’s account on which the amount computed in A-2 based on the two percent (2%) servicing compensation is commissions you were paid under the applicable being paid to the Agent at the time of Schedule of Payments in the twelve (12) termination of this Agreement, an amount equal preceding months as provided for in A-2-(a)(I). to one and one-half percent (I 1/2%) of one- (c) For each of the succeeding forty-eight (48) twelfth (1/12) of the annualized premium of the months you will be paid by that Company an policies shall be paid in monthly installments for amount equal to onc-twelfth (1/I2th) of the each of the sixty (60) months after termination amount payable in the first twelve (12) months after termination. of this Agreement. (d) The foregoing payments are to be made only on (2) the President was a licensed agent for the^ your written acceptance of a termination date to Companies, or a licensed sales representative of the be determined by the applicable Company. Agent, for a combined period of twenty (20) years or more, either under this Agreement or accumulatively (e) In the event of your written acceptance as under any prior State Farm Agent's Agreement provided for in (d) the applicable Company (Form AA) or Local Agent's Appointment (Form agrees to transfer to you all its rights and LA); and ownership in the properly set forth in paragraph D of Section 1 of this Agreement. (3) the President had ten (10) years of combined continuous service as a licensed agent for the B. Paymentsunder paragraphA above shall be as follows: Companies, or a licensed sales representative of the Agent, immediately preceding the date this 1. If within ten (10) days following the date of Agreementis terminated; termination, all properly belonging to the respective Companies has been returned or made available for the respective Companies will pay the Agent monthly return to that Company or its authorized payments beginning on the last day of the 61st month representative the Agent shall qualify for the first following termination and continuing until the last day of two (2) monthly installments from that Company as the month in which the death of the President occurs, provided in paragraph A. either 2. If the Agent has qualified for payments by the if the President is 65 years of age or older at respective Companies under subparagraph B-1, and termination of this Agreement, an amount equal to so long as the Agent, the President, and the licensed the following, sales representative, have not, for a period of twelve (12) months following termination of this or Agreement, either personally or through any other person, agency or organization, solicited or sold, if the President is 62, 63, or 64 years of age at either at renewal time or otherwise, to that termination of this Agreement, a lesser amount based Company's policyholders, which were credited to the on the following adjusted by an actuarial equivalent Agent's account at the time of termination, any factor based upon the President's age at termination insurance coverage competitive with the insurance of this Agreement: coverages sold by that Company, the Agent shall qualify for the remaining monthly installments from 1. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE that Company as provided in paragraph A, INSURANCE COMPANY will pay an amount equal to the monthly payment by this Company as C. In the event the Agent and the Company enter into a provided for in subparagraph A-l-(a) of Section IV. written agreement, without the complete termination of this Agreement, to release at one time from the Agent's 2. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY account for reassignment to other agents, at least twenty- COMPANY, STATE FARM GENERAL five percent (25%) or five hundred (500), whichever INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM number is less, of the automobile insurance policies COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF credited to the Agent's account, and in addition ail other TEXAS will pay amounts equal to the following: State Farm policies held by policy-holders and members of the households of such policyholders whose (a) That portion of the monthly payments by these automobile insurance policies arc reassigned, the Companies as provided for in subparagraph A-2 Companies with respect to the policies so relea.sed, will of Section IV based on "personal lines of pay the Agent the termination payments in accordance insurance" so classified by the Companies in the with the provisions of paragraphs A and B, as those applicable Schedule of Payments; and provisions may be applicable to each of the Companies. (b) 50% of that portion of die monthly payments by SECTION V - EXTENDED TERMINATION these Companies as provided for in PAYMENTS subparagraph A-2 of Section IV based on the "commercial lines of insurance" so classified by A. In the event the Agreement is terminated, and the Agent the Companies in the applicable Schedule of qualified for the termination payments set forth in Section Payments. Provided, however, that these IV-B-I and 2, and at the time of termination of this payments on such "commercial lines of Agreement: insurance" shall be calculated on only the first $5,000.00 of net premium collections received (1) the President of the Agent is 62 years of age or by the Companies on any one risk or policy. older; and ■}■ I ● /■ 3. STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY will pay an amount equal to the monthly payment by ■ C. Each Company shall be bound by all the terms of this this Company as provided for in subparagraphs A-4- A^eement, except that the separate Schedule of (b) and (c) of Section IV. Payments hereto attached, and those other provisions where the express language or context indicates that they are applicable to the individual Companies only; and the SECTION VI - GENERAL PROVISIONS rights and duties of the Agent with respect to each Company shall be governed accordingly. A. This Agreement has been entered into by the Companies with the Agent in reliance upon the representations and D. The President in his individual capacity shall be bound agreements that: only by the terms of this Agreement that specifically refer to the President. (1) The following person(s) substantially participate(s) in the ownership of the Agent: E. All payments for termination which otherwise might have become available to the Agent under the terms of prior PERCENTAGE OF agreements with any of the Companies are hereby waived NAME ADDRESS INTEREST by the Agent. Dwight L. Hill 10222 Midway Rd. 100 F. This Agreement shall supersede all prior agreements Dallas, TX 75229-6231 between the parties hereto, written or otherwise, and it shall constitute the sole and entire Agreement between the (2) The President of the Agent, having full managerial parties, and no change, alteration, or modification of the authority and responsibility for the operating terms of this Agreement may be made except by management of the Agent as provided for by its by agreement in writing signed by a Regional Vice President laws, shall be a person acceptable to the Companies. or an Agency Vice President of the Companies and The Agent will advise the Companies, in writing, at accepted by the Agent. least forty-five (45) days prior to the appointment of such President of the identities and qualifications of all candidates being considered for appointment as President. The Companies will be deemed to have approved those candidates with respect to which they have not notified the Agent of their unacceptability within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Agent's advice that the candidates are being considered for appointment. (3) The person or persons designated by the Agent as licensed sales representative(s) of the Agent shall be acceptable to the Companies. The Agent will advise the Companies, in writing, at least forty-five (45) days prior to appointment of a licensed sales representative of the identities and qualifications of all candidates being considered for appointment as Unless the licensed sales representative(s). Companies, within thirty (30) days after receipt of such advice, notify the Agent that a candidate is unacceptable to the Companies, the Companies will be deemed to have approved such candidates. All notices of the identities and qualifications of candidates for the position of President or licensed sales representative shall be sent to a Regional Vice President or Agency Vice President. B. Since each party is relying upon the other or others to carry out the provisions of this Agreement, neither the Agreement nor any interest thereunder can be sold, assigned, or pledged; and no right in any sum due or to become due to the Agent hereunder can be sold, assigned, or pledged without the prior written consent of the Companies, s , IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to be executed in triplicate on their behalfs. ITNESS: DWIGHT HILL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. By: IX'M--?. iU/ Resident \hXAJJ- Dwight L. Wfll, Individually STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY STATE FA COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS /, Authorized Representativi ice President of Agency KRISTI ROTH M.OG 0 5 PrinUd In U.SA. (Rev. 1/1/82) 12^2 - S"?- Form AGT-AWS-1 AGENTS’ WORK STATION LOAN AGREEMENT This is a Loan Agreement (the “Agreement’’) between State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates (“STATE FARM”), having its principal place of business at One State Farm Plaza. Bloomington, Illinois 61710, and Dwight L Hill ; (hereinafter referred to as “AGENT”), of I~ rving, Texas WITNESSETH WHEREAS, STATE FARM desires to loan to AGENT, and AGENT desires to borrow from STATE FARM certain equipment and software; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the munial promises herein set forth, the parties hereto agree as follows: 1. Equipment. STATE FARM agrees to loan to AGENT and AGENT agrees to borrow from STATE FARM the items of equipment (collectively, the “Equipment”) listed on Exhibit A attached hereto and incoiporaied herein. The parties agree that the Equipment becomes pan of the ECHO system in AGENT’S possession under the ECHO System Agreement. 2. Software. STATE FARM agrees to loan to AGENT and AGENT agrees to borrow from STATE FARM the software (collectively, the “Software”) listed on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein. AGENT acknowledges that the Software is licensed for use under separate agreements between STATE FARM and software vendors, and that the Software and all documentation and copies thereof are proprietary to the software vendors. AGENT agrees not to sell, distribute or loan it to any other entity, and shall not decompile, reverse engineer or make copies of the Software, but that it may make copies for backup or archival purposes. The parties agree that the Software and any updates or upgrades provided under Section 5 below become part of the ECHO system in AGENT’S possession under the ECHO System Agreement. 3. Term. The Equipment and Software shall be loaned for a period beginning with its installation, and shall continue until terminated on thirty (30) days’ written notice to the other. This Agreement shall also terminate immediately without further action of cither party upon termination of the State Farm Agent’s Agreement. ^ In the event of termination, AGENT agrees to that the Equipment and Software together with any documentation and updates shall be made available for STATE FARM to retrieve, and to use reasonable means for the safekeeping of the Equipment of Software until such time that STATE FARM may remove the Equipment or Software from AGENT’S office. 4. Maintenance and Support. STATE FARM agrees to provide maintenance and support for the Equipment and Software. AGENT acknowledges that some or all of the maintenance and support will be provided through the manufacturer’s original warranty or through contracted services. AGENT agrees promptly to report to STATE FARM any defects or malfunctions of the Equipment or Software to enable STATE FARM to provide such supiwrt and make requests for correction under appropriate warranties. AGENT further agrees to cooperate m providing access to its premises necessary to conduct maintenance and support. AGENT agrees that, this maintenance and support obligation notwithstanding, AGENT shall be responsible for any maintenance cost for (a) problems caused by AGENT’S failure to maintain a suitable installation enviroruneni for the Equipment or Software; (b) problems caused by misuse or abuse of Equipment or Software, or by use of non-STATE FARM approved supplies or by misuse of supplies; and (c) problems caused by unauthorized repair or tampering with the Equipment or Software. 5. DpHrursorllni^ratles. STATE FARM agrees to provide AGENT Software and Equipment updates or upgrades as determined by STATE FARM. Any such updates or upgrades shall be considered included in the terms Software” or “Equipment” as defined above. 5, 13 OLH400IS7 »tt9»^KlO 6. Resiriciions on Use. AGENT agrees to use the Equipment and Software only in its business as an independent contractor agent or trainee agent for STATE FARM. Unless authorized in writing by STATE FARM, AGENT further agrees that it will not (i) load any software onto the Equipment, (ii) add any equipment onto the system which equipment or software is not listed in Exhibit A or subsequently supplied for AGENT’S use by STATE FARM, or (iii) use the Equipment or Software to access the Internet (other than accessing the STATE FARM home page) or any other on-line services. In the event of any violation of this Section. AGENT agrees to compensate STATE FARM for any repair or restoration of the Equipment or Software which STATE FARM at its option elects to perform or have performed. 7. Risk of Loss. STATE FARM assumes all risk of casualty loss to the Equipment and Software under this Agreement while in transit and while in your possession, except for loss caused by the grossly negligent, reckless or willful or intentional conduct of AGENT or AGENT’S office staff. STATE FARM shall not be responsible for any loss caused by loss of use of the Equipment or Software including but not limited to lost profits. AGENT will be responsible for obtaining insurance, if it so desires, to cover AGENT’S loss of use of the Equipment or Software. 8. Personal Property Taxes. STATE FARM leases, owns or licenses the Equipment and Software under this Agreement. As the lessee, owner or licensee of the Equipment and Software, STATE FARM is responsible for the payment of those personal property taxes aitribuiable to such Equipment and Software which are legally assessed against STATE FARM or its property. 9. niSCI.ATMF.R OF WARRANTIES. OTHER THAN THOSE STATED HEREIN, STATE FARM MAKES NO WARRANTY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING WITHOUT limitation. THE DESIGN OR CONDITION OF THE EQUIPMENT OR SOFTWARE. ITS MERCHANTABILITY OR ITS FITNESS OR CAPACITY OR DURABILITY FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, THE QUALITY OF THE MATERIAL OR WORKMANSHIP OF THE EQUIPMENT OR SOFTWARE OR CONFORMITY OF THE EQUIPMENT OR SOFTWARE TO THE PROVISIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF ANY PURCHASE ORDER OR ORDERS RELATING THERETO. AS TO STATE FARM, AGENT BORROWS THE EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE “AS IS.” 10. 1 IMITATION OF I IABILITY AND HOI,D HARMLESS. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT. STATE FARM SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE CLAIMED TO HAVE RESULTED FROM THE USE OF THE EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE OR TO BE RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE TRANSACTION TO WHICH THIS AGREEMENT RELATES, REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF ACTION. EXCEPT FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF STATE FARM. AGENT AGREES THAT IT SHALL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD STATE FARM HARMLESS FOR ANY LIABILITY, LOSS. CLAIM COST OR EXPENSES OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES, ARISING FROM ANY SUCH CLAIM. OR DAMAGE TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ARISING OUT OF THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF AGENT, ITS EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT. ANYTHING IN THE AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WHATSOEVER SHALL STATE FARM BE LIABLE TO AGENT FOR ANY SPECIAL. CONSEQUENTIAL. INDIRECT. CIRCUMSTANTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES OR ANY KIND WHATSOEVER. II. A.s.signment and Delegation. Anything in the Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, AGENT may not delegate or assign its'duties under the Agreement to any other entity, except when such delegation or assignment is approved in advance by State Farm in writing,' which approval STATE FARM may in its sole discretion gram or deny. This Agreement shall be a contract binding upon each of the parties hereto, their successors and assigns, represents the entire agreement between parties, and cannot be amended or modified except as agreed to by each of the parties in writing. I IN WITNESS WHEREOF, AGENT and STATE FARM have caused this Agreement to be executed below. This Agreement shall become effective on the date the second of the two parties to sign ex^utes this Agreement below. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOmLE INSURANCE COMPANY (signature) Dwight L Hill (primed) Agent I Replaces-None Printed in U&A. 12-16-96 EQUIPMENT: IBM P750 desktop Pentium 133 MHZ processor 32MB Memory 1.62GB Hard drive Sound/FAX/modem card ■ IBM MWave Token Ring card - Olicom 3118 DualSior 800 tape drive 6x CD ROM drive 17" monitor Keyboard Mouse Lan Based Modem (LBM) ANTEC Multi Access Unit (MAU) Tripp Lite surge protector SOFTWARE: IBM Antivirus for Windows NT, 2,4 Staff Administration Windows NT 4.0 SUR Introduction and Overview GN Quicken 6.0 USA Reference Sources NT Service Register (AWS Iss) Using Desktop Classroom ODBC Manager & Access Database for ODBC Car Insurance Policies - Topic 1-5 GN SNA Net Config Premium Calculation Quickpay 3.0 Pricing Principles GN Rumba NT, Version 1.0 Eligibility and Binding Rules GN SNA Workstation, Version 2.11 Claims Principles VSE Smalltalk runtime libraries Claims Handling, Parts 1-2 AWS Introduction CBE Parts 1-3 The ECHO Auto Application Path (IL only) Miscellaneous Vehicles ASAT - Agent Staff Aptitude Test Auto Policy Changes Administrative Command Initiator Desktop Classroom NetOp Desktop Classroom Tutorial Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 AWS End of Day CPE Middleware Communication Icon Author Philibert Uniscreen II DLH.SF-003100 May 30, 2024 Hill, Dwight L 4647 Elsby Ave Dallas, TX 75209-3203 Dear Dwight, Following is a review of your estimated Termination and Extended Termination Payments you requested. Section IV, Paragraph B of the Agent’s Agreement reviews the qualifications that must be met in order for Termination Payments to be made. In order for Termination Payments to be made, the Agent’s Agreement must be terminated. The agent will return, or make available for return, Company property within 10 days of the termination of the agreement. In addition, the agent agrees to not induce, advise, or solicit any State Farm policyholders in his account at the time of his termination. The agent also agrees to not act or represent himself in any way as an agent or representative of the Companies. Please see Section III, Termination of Agreement, of the Agent’s Agreement for a more thorough review of Termination provisions. The following are your estimated monthly Termination and Extended Termination Payments by company assuming a 4/30/2024 termination date. Term payments will be made for 60 months following your termination. Term Pay Ext Term Pay Auto Voluntary $2,645 $2,645 Auto TCM $19 $0 Fire $198 $193 Lloyds $3,665 $3,636 Fire TCM $125 $125 Health $22 $0 Life $102 $102 Total $6,776 $6,701 NOTE: Extended Termination pay is available to agents who are 60 years or older with 20 years of service (last 10 continuous). Please remember that if you terminate prior to age 65, your Extended Termination Payments will be actuarially reduced. Extended termination payments are also available for those agents who meet the terms of the Early Notification Program. Under the Early Notification Program, you can qualify for Extended Termination payments at age 55 if (1) you are at least 55 years old, with 20 years of service (last 10 continuous) OR (2) age plus years of service equals 80. Extended Termination amounts will be actuarially reduced for retirement before age 65. For retirement at age 59 years 6 months, the actuarial factor of 0.6222 reduces your Extended Termination payments to $4,169 a month. If you elect the joint and 2/3 survivor option, the extended term amount would be further adjusted to $3,543 a month. The survivor amount would be $2,362 a month. NOTE: Life Writing Compensation Payments are based on writing compensation that would have been paid to you if your Agreement had not been terminated. Life Writing Compensation Payments will fluctuate each month depending on premium paid each month following termination and payments are reduced by a decreasing commission scale as business ages and any lapsed/cancelled policies. NOTE: All figures are estimates. Contract provisions will govern actual amounts. Attached is the estimate you requested. If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact an ASR Representative at 1-833-335-0077 and follow the prompts to contracts and compensation. Our hours of operation are 7am to 7 pm central time, Monday through Friday. Sincerely, EXHIBIT Agency/Sales Resources P-22 DLH-009152 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Richard Orsinger Bar No. 15322500 richard@ondafamilylaw.com Envelope ID: 107747671 Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Dwight L. Hill Appellee's Brief Status as of 11/6/2025 12:43 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Epstein 24065206 robert@epsteinpc.com 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM SENT Richard Osinger richard@ondafamilylaw.com 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM SENT Marisol Lopez marisol@lawyerforu.com 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM SENT Diane Wiles Diane@ondafamilylaw.com 11/6/2025 12:31:52 PM SENTI EXHIBIT A
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