Maribel de Leon-Gonzalez v. Todd Blanche

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0375n.06

Case No. 25-4009

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 16, 2026

KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

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MARIBEL ELIZABETH DE LEON-

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GONZALEZ; A.V.D.L., )

Petitioners, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE UNITED STATES v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) APPEALS

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, )

Respondent. ) OPINION )

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Before: COLE, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Maribel Elizabeth de Leon-Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of her minor son, A.V.D., seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). De Leon-Gonzalez also seeks review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to remand. For the reasons below, we deny the petition.

I.

De Leon-Gonzalez is a native and citizen of Guatemala. She entered the United States in 2015 accompanied by her minor son, A.V.D. On June 16, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security served them both with notices to appear, alleging removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). De Leon-Gonzalez conceded removability.

De Leon-Gonzalez then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.

In her application, de Leon-Gonzalez stated that a man had attempted to rape her at least twice and that she feared returning to Guatemala because the father of that man would kill her for reporting his son to the police.

The IJ denied de Leon-Gonzalez’s application, finding that she did not testify credibly during the removal proceedings. The IJ noted that there were “many inconsistencies both internally with [de Leon-Gonzalez’s] testimony and between [her] testimony and her written statement.” A.R. 126. The IJ detailed specific inconsistencies and how de Leon-Gonzalez provided non-responsive answers or implausible explanations to each. For instance, she testified about three attempted-rape incidents when her application mentioned only two. And she could not explain the discrepancy between her testimony that her son’s father had never injured her and her prehearing statement that he had “beat [her] badly” and bruised her eye. Id. at 537.

De Leon-Gonzalez appealed the decision to the BIA. While the appeal was pending, she moved to remand the proceedings to the IJ based on new evidence. Specifically, de Leon-Gonzalez argued that she had a hearing impairment, now formally diagnosed, that hindered her ability to understand the immigration proceedings and answer questions accurately, thus resulting in her inconsistent testimony and the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. De Leon-Gonzalez also relied on the evidence about her hearing impairment to argue that the removal proceedings violated her due- process rights.

The BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion to remand. The BIA upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on de Leon-Gonzalez’s inconsistencies in her testimony and her non-responsive answers to questions. It found that remand was not warranted because the record did not reflect that de Leon-Gonzalez had trouble hearing or understanding the proceedings, or

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that any hearing issues caused her inconsistent testimony. And it rejected de Leon-Gonzalez’s due-process claim.

II.

In her petition for review, de Leon-Gonzalez argues that (1) she was denied due process during the removal proceedings because the IJ did not accommodate her hearing impairment, and (2) the BIA abused its discretion when it denied the motion to remand. We address each argument in turn.

A.

We start with de Leon-Gonzalez’s due-process claim. We review de novo alleged violations of due process in removal proceedings. Deh v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2026).

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause guarantees due process to noncitizens in removal proceedings. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (per curiam). To satisfy the dictates of due process, a noncitizen must “be afforded a full and fair hearing.” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 853 (6th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). De Leon-Gonzalez must establish the following to succeed on a due-process claim: (1) a defect in the removal proceedings, and (2) prejudice caused by that defect. Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 296–97 (6th Cir. 2016).

We focus on the prejudice factor. A due-process violation prejudices removal proceedings when the violation leads to a “substantially different outcome from that which would have occurred in the absence of” the violation. Id. at 297 (quotation omitted). We can bypass the merits of a due-process claim if the noncitizen cannot show prejudice. Id. at 296.

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De Leon-Gonzalez’s due-process claim fails because she has not shown that she suffered prejudice from any alleged due-process violation. The IJ denied relief after finding that de Leon- Gonzalez was not credible based on her inconsistent testimony. See Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An adverse credibility determination is fatal to claims for asylum and relief from removal, preventing such claims from being considered on their merits.”). De Leon- Gonzalez does not challenge the adverse credibility determination itself; rather, she argues that her hearing impairment affected her ability to testify consistently.

The record, however, does not reflect that a hearing impairment caused de Leon-Gonzalez to provide inconsistent statements during the removal proceedings. When de Leon-Gonzalez testified differently than her written statements or prior testimony, she had multiple opportunities to clarify the inconsistencies. And, based on her answers, she appeared to understand the questions. When de Leon-Gonzalez provided non-responsive answers to these clarifying questions, which could suggest miscomprehension, the IJ further questioned her to ensure she understood and answered the questions asked. But de Leon-Gonzalez continued to provide evasive testimony that did not resolve the inconsistencies.

De Leon-Gonzalez argues that the new evidence she provided after the removal proceedings about her hearing deficit explains her inconsistent testimony. But she fails to point to a single instance where her hearing impairment influenced her inconsistent statements. In Deh v. Blanche, for instance, we rejected a due-process claim where the petitioner complained about translation issues but failed to “point to any specific interpretation errors.” 174 F.4th at 508–09. De Leon-Gonzalez has likewise failed to identify any of her testimony impacted by her hearing impairment. Thus, she cannot show that the lack of an accommodation for her impairment “affected the outcome” of her removal hearing. See id. at 508 (quotation omitted).

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B.

We next turn to de Leon-Gonzalez’s argument that the BIA erred by denying her motion to remand based on post-removal-hearing evidence about her hearing impairment. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for an abuse of discretion. Perez-Hernandez v. Blanche, 184 F.4th 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2026). “The BIA abuses its discretion if its decision was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“The relevant test for deciding a motion to remand for consideration of new evidence is whether the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.” Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583, 592 (6th Cir. 2020). New evidence is immaterial if it would not likely change the result of the case. Yousif v. Garland, 53 F.4th 928, 936 (6th Cir. 2022).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the record did not reflect that de Leon-Gonzalez was unable to understand the proceedings due to her hearing impairment. So the new evidence of her diagnosis would not have changed the outcome of her case. We reached the same conclusion in rejecting de Leon-Gonzalez’s due-process claim.

III.

For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.