Maribel Capote v. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, LLC

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 9, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0346
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 9, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0346 Lower Tribunal No. 23-4678 ________________

Maribel Capote, et al., Appellants,

vs.

SCI Funeral Services of Florida, LLC, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J. Rebull, Judge.

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP, and Jorge L. Piedra, Robert J. Neary, and Rasheed K. Nader, for appellants.

Gray│Robinson, P.A., and Ted C. Craig, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.

LOGUE, J.

Plaintiffs below, Maribel Capote, Caridad Salmeron, and Pedro Valdivieso (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appeal a final judgment entered in favor

of defendant below, SCI Funeral Services of Florida, LLC (“SCI Florida”),

granting SCI Florida’s motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss

the amended class action complaint. The case was dismissed with leave to

amend, which the Plaintiffs declined to do. For the reasons set forth below,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against SCI Florida. They

alleged they entered into preneed contracts with funeral homes owned by

SCI Florida for burial rights, funeral merchandise, and funeral services.1 The

preneed contracts contain a clause providing that nothing shall “limit the right

of the Purchaser, after making payment in full of the Interment Rights being

purchased herein, from transferring said Interment Rights to third parties,

subject to the transfer of title on the records of the Seller.”

Plaintiffs alleged that, in contravention of this language, while SCI

Florida recognized a purchaser’s right to assign burial rights, it refused to

1 “Burial right” includes the right to use a grave space, mausoleum, etc. See § 497.005(8), Fla. Stat. “Burial service” is defined as “any service offered or provided in connection with the final disposition, memorialization, interment, entombment, or inurnment of human remains or cremated remains. . . .” § 497.005(9), Fla. Stat. Further, “burial merchandise” includes items such as a casket, urn, monument, prayer cards, etc. See § 497.005(7), Fla. Stat. 2 recognize a purchaser’s right to assign burial services or burial merchandise.

This limitation on assignments, Plaintiffs alleged, violated the terms of the

preneed contracts and the Florida Funeral, Cemetery, and Consumer

Services Act (“Funeral Act”), section 497.001 et seq., Florida Statutes.

Section 497.459(6)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that “[p]ersons who

purchase merchandise or burial rights pursuant to this chapter shall have the

right to sell, alienate, or otherwise transfer the merchandise or burial rights

subject to and in accordance with rules adopted by the licensing authority.”

Plaintiffs asserted counts for (I) breach of contract, alleging that the

Plaintiffs have incurred damages by the “devaluation of the value of the

preneed contracts themselves”; (II) unjust enrichment, requesting an award

against SCI Florida “in the amount by which it has been unjustly enriched at

Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ expenses”; (III) violation of section 497.152(9)

of the Funeral Act, asserting that they have suffered monetary damages

because SCI Florida’s practice of requiring the Plaintiffs to accept delivery of

the merchandise prior to time of need has devalued the preneed contracts;

(IV) declaratory relief under section 86.021, Florida Statutes, seeking a

declaration as to their rights under the preneed contracts, seeking an award

of attorneys’ fees and costs; and (V) declaratory relief under section 86.021,

seeking a declaration as to their rights under the Funeral Act and an award

3 of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Plaintiffs identified the class as “[a]ll Florida citizens who purchased a

preneed contract from a cemetery or funeral home owned and operated by

[SCI Florida] in the State of Florida and who are now prohibited from

transferring or assigning the entire preneed contract to a third party.”

(emphasis added). They sought certification under both (b)(2) and (b)(3) of

Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

In response to the operative complaint, SCI Florida filed a motion for

summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. Both motions asserted the

operative complaint’s class action claims were moot and the class

representatives could not represent the proposed class because SCI Florida

had revised its policy and recognized that purchasers could transfer burial

rights, burial services, and burial merchandise. It supported its motion for

summary judgment by the declaration of the same SCI Florida officer who

the Plaintiffs had referenced in the attachments to the operative complaint to

maintain SCI Florida was not recognizing such transfers. Attached to the

declaration were memorandums to SCI Florida affiliates and letters to the

named plaintiffs informing them of the new policy. The trial court stayed

discovery pending resolution of the motions.

Ultimately, the trial court entered an order granting SCI Florida’s

4 motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. The trial court denied

the Plaintiffs’ request to lift the stay on discovery and delay the summary

judgment motion. In response to the Plaintiffs’ argument that they needed

the discovery to test the new policy, the trial court noted that the Plaintiffs

could simply request the transfers they were seeking and thereby confirm

whether or not the new policy was in effect. When asked by the court why

they did not do so, Plaintiffs admitted it was within their ability but maintained,

“we weren’t required to, we didn’t have to, and it wouldn’t have made a

difference in this case.”

In granting the motion, the trial court explained that “[b]efore class

certification, Defendant ha[d] mooted the claim set forth in the most recent

version of Plaintiffs’ complaint.” The trial court made clear that its ruling

applied to the operative complaint and to the Plaintiffs’ standing to represent

the class, not their individual claims: “If you all choose to attempt to amend

your complaint to define the class differently, people required to pay a

transfer fee, people required to fill out a form, I mean, that’s another case for

another day.” In response, the Plaintiffs stated, “And we can or may move to

amend that definition based upon this new development that was just

presented to the court.”

The trial court granted the Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended

5 complaint “that asserts claims that are not based on an alleged ongoing

inability to transfer or assign Plaintiffs’ preneed cemetery contracts with SCI

Florida.” The trial court also reserved ruling on the issue of attorney’s fees.

This Court relinquished jurisdiction to allow the Plaintiffs to “obtain a non-

conditional final, appealable order.” Thereafter, the trial court entered a final

judgment against the Plaintiffs and in favor of SCI Florida.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de

novo. See Reeves v. Gross, 403 So. 3d 362, 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). A trial

court’s order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice based

on trial court’s determination that causes of action are moot is reviewed de

novo. See Real Est. Sols. Home Sellers, LLC v. Viera E. Golf Course Dist.

Ass’n, 288 So. 3d 1228, 1230 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (reviewing de novo

trial court’s order dismissing declaratory judgment action based on trial

court’s determination that action was moot; holding that trial court’s order

dismissing complaint with prejudice is reviewed de novo); see also Coventry

First, LLC v. State Off. of Ins. Regul., 30 So. 3d 552, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)

(“We examine the mootness determination de novo.”).

ANALYSIS

Class actions provide litigants and courts a fair and efficient way to

6 resolve disputes involving the rights of large classes of parties which if

litigated individually might otherwise lead to conflicting results, get lost due

to the small size of individual claims, or unduly clutter court dockets. Class

actions, however, have the distinction of being the only procedural vehicle

where a judgment is entered adjudicating the claims or defenses of parties

who never appeared in the case – namely the absent class members. The

absent class members will be personally bound by a judgment resulting from

a lawsuit they did not file, often did not consent to, filed by a class

representative they did not appoint, and litigated by lawyers they did not hire

or direct. The rights of the absent class members live or die based on the

class representative’s facts and the class counsel’s legal presentation. For

this reason, a judge must always be mindful of the due process rights of

absent class members.

To protect the due process rights of absent class members, a judge

deciding whether to certify a class or dismiss a complaint filed as a class

action must ensure that the interests of the proposed class representatives

aligned with the interests of the absent class members: “The premise of a

class action is that litigation by representative parties adjudicates the rights

of all class members, so basic due process requires that named plaintiffs

possess undivided loyalties to absent class members.” Broussard v.

7 Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1998). The

United States Supreme Court “has repeatedly held [that] a class

representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and

suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” E. Texas Motor Freight Sys.

Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v.

Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)). “A class

representative accomplishes this if he or she, by proving his or her own

individual case, necessarily proves the cases of the other class members.”

Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 112 (Fla. 2011).

For this reason, it is well-established that “[n]o class action may

proceed unless there is a named plaintiff with standing to represent the

class.” Graham v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 813 So. 2d 273, 273–74 (Fla.

5th DCA 2002) (affirming dismissal of class action where the claims of class

representative were moot). “[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to

represent a class establishes a requisite of a case or controversy with the

defendant, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member

of the class.” Taran v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 685 So. 2d 1004,

1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494

(1974)). See, e.g., Ramon v. Aries Ins. Co., 769 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2000) (concluding the trial court properly entered summary judgment in

8 class action where class representative’s claim became moot and therefore

he could not represent class); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Domato, 730 So. 2d

343, 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“We find that Domato is an improper class

representative, as his claim against Allstate is atypical of the class he

purports to represent.”)

As pled in the operative complaint, the Plaintiffs defined the putative

class as purchasers of preneed contracts “who are now prohibited from

transferring or assigning the entire preneed contract to a third party.”

Because the class representatives can now transfer or assign their preneed

contracts, they no longer qualify as representatives of the putative class as

pled. In these circumstances, the trial court did not err in granting summary

judgment and dismissing the operative complaint with leave to amend in the

manner it did.

The Plaintiffs maintain that they potentially have a claim regarding the

imposition of transfer fees. But the operative complaint makes no reference

to transfer fees and the Plaintiffs declined to amend their complaint to allege

a claim or define a class in that regard. They also maintain that SCI Florida

did not tender the relief sought for damages resulting from the devaluation

of the preneed contracts due to the inability to transfer or assign. But their

allegations were framed in the context of a denial of the ability to transfer

9 and, again, although authorized to do so, the Plaintiffs declined to amend

their complaint to address their claim in the context where the ability to

transfer has been recognized. We also see no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s denial of the motion for continuance to allow discovery on the issue

of the enforceability of the new policy when the Plaintiffs conceded it was

within their control to test the new policy by simply requesting the transfer

that they insisted were being denied.

The Plaintiffs finally draw our attention to their request for attorney’s

fees. The Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees under the prevailing party statute

in the Funeral Act, section 497.169(2), Florida Statute, which provides in

relevant part as follows:

In any civil litigation resulting from a transaction involving a violation of this chapter by . . . a preneed entity or preneed sales agent licensed under part IV, the court may award to the prevailing party and against such . . . preneed entity or sales agent, after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of any appeal, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from the nonprevailing party in an amount to be determined by the trial court.

(emphases added). Based on the language allowing an award of fees only

after the exhaustion of any appeal, it was proper for the trial court to reserve

jurisdiction to address attorneys’ fees.

Affirmed.

LOBREE, J., concurs. 10 LINDSEY, J., concurs in result only.