Mariani v. United States

80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 766, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20571, 1999 WL 1390368
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 27, 1999
Docket3:CV-98-1701
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 80 F. Supp. 2d 352 (Mariani v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 766, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20571, 1999 WL 1390368 (M.D. Pa. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

VANASKIE, Chief Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This action under 2 U.S.C. § 437h challenges the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or “Act”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et seq., which ban corporate contributions to candidates for federal elective office, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (the “corporate contribution ban”), and prohibit making campaign contributions in the name of another person, 2 U.S.C. § 441f (the “conduit contribution ban”). Section 437h of Title 2 U.S.C. assigns to the en banc court of appeals the role of decision maker on constitutional challenges to FECA provisions, with the district court’s task being relegated to determining, in the first instance, whether the constitutional challenge is frivolous. See California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193-94 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981). If the issues presented are not frivolous, the district court is to make findings of fact and certify the issues to be resolved to the appellate court. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 818 (D.C.Cir.1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (remanding to district court for findings of fact before reaching merits).

Plaintiff Renato P. Mariani’s constitutional challenges to the corporate and conduit contribution bans arise in the context of a criminal prosecution against him and others in connection with contributions made to several candidates for federal elective office, including the presidential candidacies of Bob Dole and Bill Clinton. Essentially, the indictment in question charges that between August of 1994 and December of 1996, Mariani, who was then president of Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (“Empire”) and Danella Environmental Technologies, Inc. (“Danella”), as well as other officers of Empire and Danella, used various employees and others associated with Empire and Danella as conduits for contributions to the campaigns of Dole, Clinton and others, with the ultimate source of the campaign contributions being Empire’s corporate treasury.

Mariani contends that the ability of corporations to make contributions to political parties and political action committees (“soft money”) in unlimited amounts undermines the justification for the corporate contribution ban — eliminating corruption and the appearance of corruption arising from financing campaigns from large aggregations of wealth embodied in corporate treasuries. As explained by Mariani:

Because a statute that limits First Amendment interest (as FECA concededly does) can only survive the strict scrutiny imposed by law if it directly advances a compelling state interest in a narrow and precise way, ... the easy availability of the elephantine soft money loophole leaves the statute one that simultaneously — and thus unconstitutionally — limits First Amendment interests and fails directly to advance its goals.

(Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. Entry 32 at 6 (emphasis in original).)

By Memorandum and Order filed on March 25, 1999, I determined that Maria-ni’s challenge to the corporate contribution ban was not legally frivolous. In making this determination, I observed that “Mar-iani has presented facts on which to base a rational argument that the ostensible pur *355 poses of a ban on corporate contributions to candidates for federal elective office— eliminating the corruption and appearance of corruption resulting from corporate contributions to individual candidates, see, e.g., FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982)-is completely undermined by the allowance of ‘soft money’ contributions by corporations.” (Id. at 4.) Because the challenge to the corporate contribution ban was not frivolous, I declined to make a separate determination as to the challenge to the conduit contribution ban, finding that interests of judicial economy and expedition militated against such a separate determination. Id. at 9 n. 3.

Having decided that this action is not frivolous, I must now make findings of fact pertinent to the issues to be certified to the Third Circuit for en banc resolution. In connection with this endeavor, the parties were directed to submit proposed findings of fact following the completion of pertinent discovery.

As a result of the process established by Court Order, the parties have stipulated to 117 proposed findings of fact and agreed to the inclusion of 279 documents in the evi-dentiary record for this case. See Joint Stipulation of Facts filed on July 26, 1999, Dkt. Entry 53. The United States and intervenor-defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) (referred to jointly as the “Government”), submitted 36 separate proposed findings of fact, a number of which are admitted by Mariani. In addition to the 117 findings of fact to which he has stipulated, Mariam has also proposed 468 additional findings of fact. In addition to the 279 documents to which the parties had stipulated, Mariani has also filed “Supplemental Exhibits.”

I have carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions and find that many proposed findings, particularly those that are not disputed as to factual accuracy, may be adopted verbatim. 1 A number of proposed findings, particularly those that merely quote or restate another person’s testimony or statement, however, are not appropriate as findings of fact. 2 As argued by the Government, a number of Mariani’s proposed findings are also redundant and have not been adopted for that reason. 3

While both the United States and FEC have agreed to the accuracy of an overwhelming majority of the remainder of Mariani’s proposed findings, they have contested the relevancy and materiality of all but six of Mariani’s factual assertions. The United States and/or the FEC have also objected to particular findings on the grounds that the evidence proffered by Mariani in support of particular assertions is not admissible. Examples of purportedly inadmissible evidence include documents that had been filed by the FEC in other litigation; an FEC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; the Minority Report of the Final Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs: Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection With 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, S.Rep. No. 105-167 (1998) [Joint Exhibit (“JEx.”) ] 21;

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Mariani v. United States
Third Circuit, 2000

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Bluebook (online)
80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 766, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20571, 1999 WL 1390368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mariani-v-united-states-pamd-1999.