2 CLERK OF COURT
5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 MARIANA STONES CORPORATION, CIVIL CASE NO. CV1307-19 LTD., 8
9 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER 10 V.
11 FADIAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. and DOES 12 1-10,
13 Defendant. 14
15 INTRODUCTION 16
17 Judicial recusal safeguards public confidence in the courts, but it does not automaticall
18 undo rulings issued before any disqualification concern is raised. This case- presents that precis 19 question. After years of litigation, discovery, and dispositive motion practice, the original judg 20 presiding over the case granted in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Only after tha 21 ruling did Defendant assert that the original judge presiding over the case had a familia 22
23 relationship involving prior employment with Plaintiff. The original judge thereafter recuse
24 once the issue was brought to the Court's attention. The issues now before the Court ar 25 threefold: (1) whether the recusal complied with Guam's judicial disqualification statute, (2) 26 whether that later recusal requires setting aside the January 25, 2024 summary-judgment rulin 27
28 under Rule 60(b )( 6), and (3) whether Defendant's request for judicial notice was procedurall Decision and Order CVJ307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
proper and warrants sanctions. This Decision and Order addresses each issue in tum and explain
2 why relief is not warranted. Attorney Jacques C. Bronze represents Plaintiff Mariana Stones
3 Corporation. Attorney William L. Gavras represents Fadian Development, Inc. 4 BACKGROUND 5 This action anses from a commercial dispute between Plaintiff Mariana Stones 6 Corporation, Ltd. ("MSC") and Defendant Fadian Development Inc. ("Fadian"). The case was 7
8 filed in 2019 and preceded through discovery and dispositive motion practice.
9 Following the close of discovery, MSC moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 10 2024, the original judge presiding over the case issued a written Decision and Order granting i 11 part summary judgment in MSC's favor. See, Decision & Order (Jan. 25, 2024). At the time th 12
13 ruling was entered, no party had raised any issue regarding judicial disqualification. See, MSC's
14 Opp'n to Mot. to Set Aside Summ. J. (Mar. 29, 2024). 15 On March 1, 2024-more than a month after the summary-judgment ruling issued 16 Fadian filed a Statement of Objection and Motion seeking disqualification. See, Fadian's 17 Statement of Objection & Mot. for Disqualification (Mar. 1, 2024). Fadian asserted that th 18
19 original judge's brother had a prior employment relationship with MSC and that this relationshi
20 created an appearance of impropriety requiring disqualification under 7 GCA § 6105(a). Id. 21 On March 6, 2024, the original judge recused from further proceedings. See, Order o 22 Recusal (Mar. 6, 2024). The recusal order stated that, prior to the filing of Fadian's March 1, 23 2024 objection, the Court was unaware that the judge's brother had any involvement with MS 24
25 related to the matters before the Court. Id. The case was thereafter reassigned.
26 Following reassignment, Fadian moved for relief from the January 25, 2024 summary- 27 judgment ruling, arguing that the ruling should be set aside because it was issued before recusa 28
Page 2 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
and allegedly undermines public confidence in the judicial process. Id. MSC opposed the motion,
2 arguing that disqualification was not required at the time the ruling was entered and that relie
3 from judgment is neither automatic nor warranted under the governing legal standards. Id. 4 While the motion was pending, Fadian filed an ex parte motion requesting that the Cou 5 take judicial notice of a March 19, 2015 disqualification order entered in a separate case, Palme 6 v. Marianas Stones Corporation, Ltd. See, Fadian's Ex Parte Mot. for Judicial Notice (Dec. 5, 7
8 2025). Fadian contends that the Palmer order bears on whether allowing the January 25, 2024
9 ruling to stand would undermine public confidence in the judicial process. Id.
MSC opposed the request for judicial notice, arguing that the motion was procedurall II improper, untimely, and irrelevant, and that the circumstances underlying the Palme 12
13 disqualification are materially different from those presented here. See, MSC's Opp'n to E
14 Parte Mot. for Judicial Notice (Jan. 5, 2026). 15 DISCUSSION 16 The Court addresses three issues. First, whether the recusal complied with Guam' 17 judicial disqualification statute. Second, whether relief from the January 25, 2024 summary 18
19 judgment ruling is warranted under Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 6) and the govemin
20 equitable considerations. Third, whether Defendant's request for judicial notice was procedurall 21 proper and whether sanctions are appropriate. Each issue is addressed in tum. 22
23 I. The Recusal Was Proper. 24
25 Judicial disqualification in Guam is governed by 7 GCA § 6105. Section 6105(a)
26 provides that any judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or he 27
Page 3 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, unless, after full disclosure, all parties agree that th
2 judge may continue to sit.
3 The Supreme Court of Guam has consistently explained that § 6105(a) is designed to 4 avoid even the appearance of impartiality. People v. Tennessen, 2010 Guam 12, ,r,r 33-35. Th 5 Court stated that the inquiry is whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the relevant facts, 6
would question the judge's impartiality. 7
8 Here, once the relationship identified by Fadian was brought to the Court's attention, th
9 original judge elected to recuse from further proceedings. That decision was fully consistent wit
the statute's purpose. Section 6105(a) imposes a forward-looking obligation: when a 11 appearance concern arises, the appropriate response is to remove the judge from continue 12
13 participation. The recusal thus comported with Guam law and ensured that the case proceede
14 before a tribunal whose impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. 15
16 II. Setting Aside the Summary Judgment Ruling Is Not Warranted.
17 Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 6) permits a court to relieve a party from a fina 18
19 judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Althoug
20 the recusal was proper, it does not follow that the Court must set aside the summary-judgmen 21 ruling entered before the recusal occurred. Neither 7 GCA § 6105 nor Guam preceden 22 establishes a rule of automatic invalidation of prior rulings whenever a judge later disqualifies 23
24 himself or herself.
25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) can be used to vacate orders by a judge who 26 later disqualifies if the ground for disqualification existed at the time of the order. Chambers v. 27 Kansas City Kansas Community College, 2014 WL 326021, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 2014). This 28
Page 4 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
remedy is not to be used lightly. Id. In determining whether a judgment should be vacated, th
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2 CLERK OF COURT
5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 MARIANA STONES CORPORATION, CIVIL CASE NO. CV1307-19 LTD., 8
9 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER 10 V.
11 FADIAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. and DOES 12 1-10,
13 Defendant. 14
15 INTRODUCTION 16
17 Judicial recusal safeguards public confidence in the courts, but it does not automaticall
18 undo rulings issued before any disqualification concern is raised. This case- presents that precis 19 question. After years of litigation, discovery, and dispositive motion practice, the original judg 20 presiding over the case granted in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Only after tha 21 ruling did Defendant assert that the original judge presiding over the case had a familia 22
23 relationship involving prior employment with Plaintiff. The original judge thereafter recuse
24 once the issue was brought to the Court's attention. The issues now before the Court ar 25 threefold: (1) whether the recusal complied with Guam's judicial disqualification statute, (2) 26 whether that later recusal requires setting aside the January 25, 2024 summary-judgment rulin 27
28 under Rule 60(b )( 6), and (3) whether Defendant's request for judicial notice was procedurall Decision and Order CVJ307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
proper and warrants sanctions. This Decision and Order addresses each issue in tum and explain
2 why relief is not warranted. Attorney Jacques C. Bronze represents Plaintiff Mariana Stones
3 Corporation. Attorney William L. Gavras represents Fadian Development, Inc. 4 BACKGROUND 5 This action anses from a commercial dispute between Plaintiff Mariana Stones 6 Corporation, Ltd. ("MSC") and Defendant Fadian Development Inc. ("Fadian"). The case was 7
8 filed in 2019 and preceded through discovery and dispositive motion practice.
9 Following the close of discovery, MSC moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 10 2024, the original judge presiding over the case issued a written Decision and Order granting i 11 part summary judgment in MSC's favor. See, Decision & Order (Jan. 25, 2024). At the time th 12
13 ruling was entered, no party had raised any issue regarding judicial disqualification. See, MSC's
14 Opp'n to Mot. to Set Aside Summ. J. (Mar. 29, 2024). 15 On March 1, 2024-more than a month after the summary-judgment ruling issued 16 Fadian filed a Statement of Objection and Motion seeking disqualification. See, Fadian's 17 Statement of Objection & Mot. for Disqualification (Mar. 1, 2024). Fadian asserted that th 18
19 original judge's brother had a prior employment relationship with MSC and that this relationshi
20 created an appearance of impropriety requiring disqualification under 7 GCA § 6105(a). Id. 21 On March 6, 2024, the original judge recused from further proceedings. See, Order o 22 Recusal (Mar. 6, 2024). The recusal order stated that, prior to the filing of Fadian's March 1, 23 2024 objection, the Court was unaware that the judge's brother had any involvement with MS 24
25 related to the matters before the Court. Id. The case was thereafter reassigned.
26 Following reassignment, Fadian moved for relief from the January 25, 2024 summary- 27 judgment ruling, arguing that the ruling should be set aside because it was issued before recusa 28
Page 2 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
and allegedly undermines public confidence in the judicial process. Id. MSC opposed the motion,
2 arguing that disqualification was not required at the time the ruling was entered and that relie
3 from judgment is neither automatic nor warranted under the governing legal standards. Id. 4 While the motion was pending, Fadian filed an ex parte motion requesting that the Cou 5 take judicial notice of a March 19, 2015 disqualification order entered in a separate case, Palme 6 v. Marianas Stones Corporation, Ltd. See, Fadian's Ex Parte Mot. for Judicial Notice (Dec. 5, 7
8 2025). Fadian contends that the Palmer order bears on whether allowing the January 25, 2024
9 ruling to stand would undermine public confidence in the judicial process. Id.
MSC opposed the request for judicial notice, arguing that the motion was procedurall II improper, untimely, and irrelevant, and that the circumstances underlying the Palme 12
13 disqualification are materially different from those presented here. See, MSC's Opp'n to E
14 Parte Mot. for Judicial Notice (Jan. 5, 2026). 15 DISCUSSION 16 The Court addresses three issues. First, whether the recusal complied with Guam' 17 judicial disqualification statute. Second, whether relief from the January 25, 2024 summary 18
19 judgment ruling is warranted under Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 6) and the govemin
20 equitable considerations. Third, whether Defendant's request for judicial notice was procedurall 21 proper and whether sanctions are appropriate. Each issue is addressed in tum. 22
23 I. The Recusal Was Proper. 24
25 Judicial disqualification in Guam is governed by 7 GCA § 6105. Section 6105(a)
26 provides that any judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or he 27
Page 3 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, unless, after full disclosure, all parties agree that th
2 judge may continue to sit.
3 The Supreme Court of Guam has consistently explained that § 6105(a) is designed to 4 avoid even the appearance of impartiality. People v. Tennessen, 2010 Guam 12, ,r,r 33-35. Th 5 Court stated that the inquiry is whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the relevant facts, 6
would question the judge's impartiality. 7
8 Here, once the relationship identified by Fadian was brought to the Court's attention, th
9 original judge elected to recuse from further proceedings. That decision was fully consistent wit
the statute's purpose. Section 6105(a) imposes a forward-looking obligation: when a 11 appearance concern arises, the appropriate response is to remove the judge from continue 12
13 participation. The recusal thus comported with Guam law and ensured that the case proceede
14 before a tribunal whose impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. 15
16 II. Setting Aside the Summary Judgment Ruling Is Not Warranted.
17 Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 6) permits a court to relieve a party from a fina 18
19 judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Althoug
20 the recusal was proper, it does not follow that the Court must set aside the summary-judgmen 21 ruling entered before the recusal occurred. Neither 7 GCA § 6105 nor Guam preceden 22 establishes a rule of automatic invalidation of prior rulings whenever a judge later disqualifies 23
24 himself or herself.
25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) can be used to vacate orders by a judge who 26 later disqualifies if the ground for disqualification existed at the time of the order. Chambers v. 27 Kansas City Kansas Community College, 2014 WL 326021, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 2014). This 28
Page 4 of6 Decision and Order CV1307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
remedy is not to be used lightly. Id. In determining whether a judgment should be vacated, th
2 Court must consider the risk of injustice to the parties, the risk that denial of relief will produc
3 injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining public confidence in the judicial process. Id. 4 This case has been pending since 2019. The parties litigated through discovery and dispositiv 5 motions for several years without any suggestion that the original judge's impartiality migh 6
reasonably be questioned. The summary-judgment Decision and Order issued on January 25, 7
8 2024. It was only after that ruling that Defendant first asserted that the judge's brother would b
9 placed on a witness list. 10 In other words, the alleged disqualifying circumstance surfaced after the dispositiv 11 ruling had already been entered. The record reflects that the judge's brother had previous I 12
13 worked for Plaintiff. The parties dispute the significance of that employment. Plaintiff represents
14 that the brother's role was limited and unrelated to the claims at issue. Defendant contends he 15 could be a witness. But what is undisputed is that this issue was not raised at any point during th 16 years of litigation preceding the January 25, 2024 ruling. 17 Once the matter was brought to the Court's attention, the original judge recused. Tha 18
19 response was proper. But a proper recusal does not retroactively taint rulings issued before an
20 appearance concern was raised. Applying the factors used in Chambers confirms that relief is no 21 warranted. Defendant has not shown injustice to the parties. There is no indication the summary 22 judgment analysis was influenced by the later-identified circumstance. Nor would denial ofrelie 23 produce injustice in other cases. And public confidence in the judiciary is not undermined wher 24
25 a judge issues a ruling in good faith on a fully briefed motion and then recuses when a ne
26 concern is raised. 27
Page 5 of6 Decision and Order CVI 307-19 Mariana Stones Corporation, LTD vs. Fadian Development, Inc. and Does 1-10.
III. Defendant's Filing Was Procedurally Proper and Sanctions Warranted. 2 Judicial notice is governed by Rule 201 of the Guam Rules of Evidence, which permits 3 I
court to take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding. GRE 201(±). 4
5 Here, the procedural posture of the case is significant. The record reflects tha
6 Defendant's prior counsel withdrew after the summary-judgment ruling and relate 7 disqualification briefing. Attorney William L. Gavras was thereafter substituted as counsel fo 8 Defendant. At the time Attorney Gavras entered the case, briefing on the disqualification an 9
10 vacating summary judgment had already closed and the matter had been reassigned fo
11 consideration. 12 Given that Attorney Gavras did not represent Defendant during the earlier briefing an J
13 entered the case at a late procedural stage, the Court finds it reasonable that he raised the reques 14 for judicial notice upon reviewing the file and identifying a prior court order he believe 15
16 relevant. The Court will therefore take judicial ·notice in resolving the present matters, an
17 sanctions are not warranted. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, Defendant's motion to set aside the original judge's summary judgmen 20 decision and order is denied and the Defendant's Ex Parte Motion to Take Judicial Notice is 21
22 granted.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED APR 2 Z2026 ---------- _,--- 25
27 4}~~\1 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS 28 Judge, Supe.rior-C:ourt .Q.{·Guam
Page 6 of6 .%¾:.~J}