Marian Radu v. Adam Rawley

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 17, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-01981
StatusUnknown

This text of Marian Radu v. Adam Rawley (Marian Radu v. Adam Rawley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marian Radu v. Adam Rawley, (N.D. Ga. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

MARIAN RADU,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:24-CV-1981-TWT

ADAM RAWLEY,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER This is a personal injury action. It is before the Court on the Defendant Adam Rawley’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] and Motion to Strike [Doc. 39] and the Plaintiff Marian Radu’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 38]. For the following reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] is GRANTED, the Defendant’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 39] is DENIED, and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 38] is DENIED. As a result, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 23] and the Defendant’s Motion in Limine [Doc. 26] are DENIED as moot. I. Background1 This action arises out of a car accident between the two parties that took place on April 3, 2022 in Gwinnett County, Georgia. (Def.’s Statement of

1 The operative facts on the Motion for Summary Judgment are taken from the Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and the Plaintiff’s response thereto. The Court will deem the Defendant’s factual assertions, where supported by evidentiary citations, admitted unless the Plaintiff makes a proper objection under Local Rule 56.1(B). Material Facts ¶ 1). The Plaintiff Marian Radu was a passenger in a vehicle driven by non-party Ionut Creta. ( ¶ 2). In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that as the vehicle he was a passenger in “lawfully entered the

intersection on a green traffic signal, Defendant [Adam Rawley] suddenly and without warning disregarded the red traffic signal for his vehicle and drove his vehicle directly into the intersection, colliding with the passenger side of Mr. Creta’s vehicle containing Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 5). A police officer responded to the traffic accident and did not issue a traffic citation to the Defendant. (Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 4). During depositions, the Defendant testified

that he had a green light when he entered the intersection, while the Plaintiff testified that he does not remember whether Creta had a red, yellow, or green light at the time of the accident—he was asleep when the accident occurred. ( ¶¶ 5, 7); (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B (“Rawley Dep.”) at 11:22-23; Ex. D (“Radu Dep.”) at 15:17-18). As a result of the accident, the Plaintiff contends, he sustained fractures in his cervical spine, a concussion, and other injuries. (Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 8).

The Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Gwinnett County on March 28, 2024, asserting one count each of negligence and negligence per se. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-16). The Defendant removed the action to this Court on May 6, 2024, and now moves for summary judgment. [Doc. 24].

2 II. Legal Standards Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue

of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. , 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The

burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. , 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). III. Discussion A. Motion for Summary Judgment The Defendant argues that there is no genuine dispute that he had a green light at the time of the accident, and there is no admissible evidence that

the accident caused the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-12). In response, the Plaintiff contends that Creta told the responding officer that he had a green light. (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J., at 4-5). He asserts on that basis that summary judgment is improper because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to who was at fault for the accident. ( at

3 5-6).2 The Court need not wade into the Defendant’s causation arguments because the Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Defendant’s evidence that he had

a green light at the time the accident occurred. First, the Plaintiff’s reliance on the purported body camera footage from the accident scene is misplaced because that evidence is not properly before the Court. The Plaintiff has not filed this evidence in the record and failed to file a statement of additional material facts with citations to supporting evidence, as required under Local Rule 56.1(B)(1), (B)(2)(b). Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(B)(1) provides that

“[e]ach material fact must be numbered separately and supported by a citation to evidence proving such fact” and that the Court “will not consider any fact . . . set out only in the brief and not in the movant’s statement of undisputed facts.” Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) prohibits a party from using information as evidence on a motion when that information was not provided during discovery as required under Rule 26. The fact that the Defendant could have requested the video from the police department himself, as the Plaintiff

asserts, is irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s disclosure obligations under Rule 26. Thus, the Court has not and cannot consider the body camera footage cited

2 The Court has also considered the Defendant’s reply [Doc. 32] and the Plaintiff’s surreply [Doc. 33]. The Court notes that the Plaintiff’s surreply was not properly styled as a motion permitting leave to file a surreply, but as the Defendant has not opposed it, the Court will nonetheless consider it. 4 only via a Dropbox link in a footnote of the Plaintiff’s response brief. Second, the Plaintiff cannot rely on the police officer’s description of the accident in the police report—including Creta’s statement to him at the

scene—as evidence that Creta had a green light, because it is hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802; , 683 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a district court generally cannot consider inadmissible hearsay on a motion for summary judgment). The Plaintiff’s argument that the police officer’s statement is admissible because he could be called to testify at trial misses the mark. Even if the officer testified at trial, his testimony as to

what Creta said, if admitted as evidence that Creta in fact had a green light, would still be inadmissible hearsay. While the Plaintiff is correct that the officer could testify about what he observed at the accident scene without running afoul of the hearsay rules, the Plaintiff is not attempting to rely merely on the officer’s observations. Instead, he clearly seeks to have the Court consider Creta’s statement to the officer about the color of the traffic light as evidence of the truth of that matter. There is no exception to Rule 802 that

allows that here. , 556 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir.

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