Mariah Wooldridge v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 2, 2024
• Docket: 07-24-00081-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00081-CR

MARIAH WOOLDRIDGE, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 181st District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 083192-B-CR, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding

December 2, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Mariah Woolridge, appeals her conviction for the offense of assault on

a public servant1 and sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The sentence of incarceration

was suspended with Appellant placed on community supervision for a period of four

years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b-2). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the morning of August 15, 2022, Potter County sheriff’s deputies Rashondric

Sheppard and Javier Galvan were dispatched to a rural residence outside of Amarillo to

investigate a 9-1-1 call about a person trespassing on private property while “yelling and

acting very strangely.” Sheppard and Galvan were able to locate the person, who was

later identified as Appellant, in a pasture. Appellant was acting “hysterical in a sense” but

she was able to give her name and date of birth. During her interaction with the officers,

Appellant made a statement indicating that she might commit suicide. Perceiving that

Appellant might be a danger to herself, the officers attempted to place her under arrest

for an “emergency mental health evaluation . . . .” While effectuating the arrest, Appellant

kicked Galvan hard in the genital area. The officers forced Appellant to the ground and

secured her in handcuffs. Galvan indicated that the kick “hurt a lot,” but that he did not

need medical attention.

Appellant was subsequently indicted for the offense of assault on a public servant.

At trial, the State offered redacted versions of the body cam videos of Sheppard and

Galvan. Appellant requested that the unredacted body cam videos be played for the jury.

The trial court denied Appellant’s request.2 During closing arguments, Appellant argued

that the State should have called other witnesses to present the complete picture of what

transpired. In response, the State, focusing on the charged offense, said, “[W]ho are the

only three people present during the assault of Deputy Galvan? Deputy Galvan and

2The trial court did allow a portion of the videos containing the officers’ interaction with the complaining homeowners to be shown to the jury, but not the remainder of the videos.

2 Deputy Sheppard, and the Defendant, Mariah Wooldridge. Deputy Sheppard and Deputy

Galvan are the two witnesses you heard from. Ms. Wooldridge, absolute right not to

testify against herself.” Appellant objected to this statement as constituting a comment

on her right not to testify. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection but stated that

“the jury is instructed, as I’ve read to you in the instructions, that the Defendant has the

right throughout these [sic] proceeding, as the law provides, to not testify.” At the close

of evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty and assessed her punishment at two years’

incarceration but recommended that the sentence be suspended in favor of community

supervision. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdicts and

placed Appellant on community supervision for a period of four years. From this

judgment, Appellant timely appealed.

By her appeal, Appellant presents three issues. By her first issue, Appellant

contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow her to show the jury the unredacted

body cam videos of the events occurring on the day Appellant was arrested. Appellant

contends, by her second issue, that the State violated her constitutional right to remain

silent by stating, during closing arguments, that she had an absolute right not to testify.

Appellant’s third issue contends, in the alternative to her second issue, that the State’s

comment on Appellant’s right to remain silent violated Texas statutory law.

ISSUE ONE: EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

By her first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

overruling her request to admit the full body cam recordings into evidence under the Rule

of Optional Completeness and, by so ruling, denied her the opportunity to present several

3 defensive theories. The State responds that the trial court’s ruling was not erroneous

because the full recordings added nothing meaningful to and did not explain or assist the

jury’s understanding of the evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Further, admitting the

unredacted recordings would have unnecessarily prolonged the trial.

We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Id. If the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable

theory of law, it will not be disturbed even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient

reason for the ruling. Id.

Error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is generally reviewed for non-

constitutional error. Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The

exception is when evidence offered by the defendant is erroneously excluded and that

evidence is so vital to the defendant’s theory of the case that it effectively prevents the

defendant from presenting a defense. Id. An appellate court must disregard a non-

constitutional error that does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(b). If, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance the error did

not influence the jury, or influenced the jury only slightly, we will not reverse a conviction.

Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We will only reverse a

conviction for non-constitutional error if we have “grave doubt” about whether the result

of the trial was substantially influenced by the error. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91,

94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A “grave doubt” exists when, “in the judge’s mind, the matter

4 is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of

the error.” Id.

The Rule of Optional Completeness, as applicable to the present case, provides

that when a party introduces part of a recording, an adverse party may inquire into any

other part of the recording on the same subject and may introduce any recording that is

necessary to explain or allow the jury to fully understand the part offered by the proponent.

TEX. R. EVID. 107. “This rule is one of admissibility and permits the introduction of

otherwise inadmissible evidence when that evidence is necessary to fully and fairly

explain a matter ‘opened up’ by the adverse party.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 217–18. Its

purpose is to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing

only part of a recording. Id. at 218. This rule does not permit the introduction of similar,

but inadmissible, evidence unless it is necessary to explain the properly admitted

evidence. Id.

In the present case, the State’s redacted versions of the officers’ body cam

recordings were approximately thirty and two minutes long. After Appellant objected, the

trial court admitted recordings of the deputies’ initial interaction with the complaining

property owners. By contrast, the unredacted versions of the body cam recordings

offered by Appellant are each approximately two hours long. The footage that was

omitted from the redacted recordings consisted mostly of Galvan’s discovery that the key

fob to his patrol car had become dislodged from his clothing, the officers’ search for the

missing key fob, and Appellant exhibiting a calmer demeanor while being considerably

more lucid once placed in the patrol car.

5 Appellant contends that the unredacted video should have been shown to the jury

because, in the redacted version, the officers indicate that Appellant might have been

“under the influence of something.” Appellant correctly contends that voluntary

intoxication is not a defense to assault.3 She argues that the unredacted video showing

her calm and lucid would have allowed the jury to conclude that she was not intoxicated.

However, the redacted video leaves the decided impression that Appellant was not

intoxicated. Sheppard asked Appellant multiple times if she had taken any medicine or

drugs and she consistently denied having done so. The rationale for the officers’ decision

to arrest Appellant was to obtain a mental health examination. Finally, the fact that

Appellant was calm and lucid once placed in the patrol car does not establish that she

was not under the influence of narcotics. Thus, admission of the unredacted recording

would not have made the redacted portions of the recording “fully and fairly understood.”

Castillo v. State, 573 S.W.3d 869, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.)

(citing Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

Appellant also contends that the unredacted recording “would have allowed the

jury to wonder whether Deputy Sheppard . . . sufficiently remembered the events to make

his testimony reliable . . . .” The primary focus of Appellant’s argument is on the fact that

Sheppard initially testified that the key fob that had been lost in the field was necessary

to operate the patrol car. On cross-examination, Sheppard acknowledged that the car is

operational without the key fob. However, Galvan testified that the deputies were ordered

by their supervisor to stay on the property until they found the missing key fob. Since this

3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (“Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the

commission of crime.”).

6 matter was clarified by the deputies in testimony heard by the jury, the admission of the

unredacted body cam recordings were not “necessary to explain properly admitted

evidence.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218.

For the first time, in her reply brief, Appellant argues that the unredacted recordings

included statements made by Deputy Galvan that were inconsistent with his trial

testimony relating to whether Appellant kicking him in the genital area caused him pain.

At the time that the redacted recording was offered, Appellant did not identify the portion

of the unredacted recording where Galvan discussed his pain as “necessary to explain or

allow the trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by” the State. TEX. R. EVID. 107.

Similarly, at the time Galvan testified to the pain caused by Appellant kicking him,

Appellant cross-examined him regarding his statements made on the unredacted

recording but did not offer that portion of the recording. See id. The Court is aware that

Appellant obtained a running objection to “any reference to State’s Exhibit Number 1 or

the jury’s viewing of it,” but her objection failed to identify this aspect of the unredacted

recording as a ground for its admission into evidence under the Rule of Optional

Completeness and, therefore, we conclude that this argument was not preserved for

appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

Because the unredacted body cam recordings were not necessary to correct any

materially false impressions left on the jury from the redacted recordings, we conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request to admit the

unredacted recordings and overrule Appellant’s first issue.

7 ISSUES TWO AND THREE: COMMENT ON APPELLANT’S RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY

By her second issue, Appellant contends that the State violated her constitutional

right not to testify by commenting on that right in its closing argument. Appellant’s third

issue contends that, if we do not find the State’s comment to violate Appellant’s

constitutional rights, it was made in violation of article 38.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. The State responds contending that its comment was invited by Appellant’s

argument and could not be taken as a comment on Appellant’s right not to testify in the

context in which it was made. Further, even if error, the State contends that the trial court

cured that error by explicitly instructing the jury that it could not give any consideration to

Appellant not testifying.

We utilize the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on

an objection to improper jury argument. Martin v. State, 570 S.W.3d 426, 439 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 825 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably,

without reference to any guiding rules and principles. State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it was “so clearly

wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Henley

v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d

571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

A prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s failure to testify violates both the state

and federal constitutions as well as Texas statutory law. Acosta v. State, No. AP-77,092,

2024 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 225, at *117 (Tex. Crim. App. June 5, 2024) (per

8 curiam) (not designated for publication); see U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.08. However, “the implication that the State

referred to the defendant’s failure to testify must be a clear and necessary one. If the

language might reasonably be construed as merely an implied or indirect allusion, there

is no violation.” Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585, 2020 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 921, at

*123 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2020) (within the portion of the opinion which was not

designated for publication) (quoting Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011)). In assessing whether a prosecutor’s argument violates a defendant’s Fifth

Amendment rights, “courts must view the State’s argument from the jury’s standpoint and

resolve any ambiguities in the language in favor of it being a permissible argument.”

Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 891. Courts are not to find that the prosecutor manifestly

intended to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify “if some other explanation for

his remark is equally plausible.” Id. We must determine “whether the language used was

manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would necessarily and

naturally take it as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” Id. The context in

which the comment was made is an important factor. Id.

In her closing, Appellant criticized the State’s case against her for only presenting

two witnesses, the arresting deputies, when, according to her, it should have called

others, including: the complaining homeowners, the 9-1-1 operator who received the

complaint, the arresting deputies’ supervisor, the firefighters and/or paramedics who

attended to Appellant after she was arrested, and the doctors and nurses who examined

Appellant at the hospital and Pavilion. In its closing, the State responded by drawing

attention to the fact that there were only three witnesses to the actual crime for which

9 Appellant was charged: the two deputies and Appellant. It did so while also expressly

reminding the jury that Appellant has an “absolute right not to testify against herself.” We

conclude that the State’s argument was invited by and responsive to Appellant’s closing

argument. See Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)

(areas of proper jury argument include response to argument of opposing counsel).

Because the State’s indirect allusion to Appellant’s failure to testify was invited by

Appellant and was constrained to the area of invitation, we conclude that the State’s

comment does not constitute reversible error. See Allen v. State, 693 S.W.2d 380, 386

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (op. on reh’g) (State’s “indirect allusion” to defendant’s

failure to testify was invited by defendant’s argument about evidentiary inadequacy);

Pabon v. State, No. 02-18-00517-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8017, at *14 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Based on

our review of the entire closing argument, we hold that the prosecutor was responding to

defense counsel’s argument discussing the witnesses and evidence that the State had

not offered in the jury’s presence. Such a response is permissible.”); Darby v. State, 922

S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (“An indirect allusion to a

defendant’s failure to testify is not reversible error when invited by argument of the

defendant, if the prosecutor confines the invited argument to the area of invitation.”);

Martinez v. State, 851 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1993, pet.

ref’d) (“The prosecutor may answer opposing counsel’s jury argument so long as the

10 response does not exceed the scope of the invitation. The invitation may even properly

include an allusion to the accused’s failure to testify.” (internal citations omitted)).4

None of the cases cited by Appellant to establish that the State’s comment

constitutes reversible error involved situations where the defendants made arguments

that invited the challenged comments by the prosecutors. See Trevino v. State, 979

S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (“The prosecutor’s remarks were

uninvited . . . .”); see also McDaniel v. State, 524 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)

(prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to testify not invited by defendant’s

argument); Torrez v. State, No. 07-24-00003-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 4723, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo July 5, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same);

Whitehead v. State, 437 S.W.3d 547, 550–51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d)

(same); Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.

ref’d) (same); Crocker v. State, 248 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2007, pet. ref’d) (same); Dietz v. State, 692 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

1985, pet. ref’d) (same). Further, in her briefing, Appellant acknowledges that the State

did not emphasize its comment.

Being mindful that we “must view the State’s argument from the jury’s standpoint

and resolve any ambiguities in the language in favor of it being a permissible argument,”

4 Appellant, in her brief, cites United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, [33], 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L.

Ed. 2d 23 (1988), and Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), as establishing that a prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s failure to testify does not contravene the defendant’s rights if the defendant’s argument opens the door to the prosecutor’s comment. Notably, Appellant’s brief does not distinguish these holdings; rather, it simply cites other cases that are distinguishable in that they do not address situations in which the defendant opened the door to the prosecutor’s argument, as addressed below.

11 Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 891, we conclude that the State’s closing argument was merely

an indirect allusion to Appellant’s failure to testify that was invited by Appellant and was

constrained to the area of invitation. Thus, we conclude that the comment was not

reversible error under the federal or state constitution or statutory authority.5 Allen, 693

S.W.2d at 386; Pabon, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8017, at *14; Darby, 922 S.W.2d at 618;

Martinez, 851 S.W.2d at 389. We overrule Appellant’s second and third issues.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.

5 Appellant’s third issue is presented in the alternative and contends that, even if we conclude that

the State’s comment was not a direct comment on Appellant’s failure to testify, the comment violated her statutory rights under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.08, which prohibits even an allusion to a defendant’s failure to testify. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.08. Above, we acknowledged that the State’s comment was an indirect allusion. However, our analysis that the State’s argument in this case was permissible is based on it being invited by Appellant’s argument. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s objection under statutory law.