Maria Verna Liza Sablan v. Conrad Muna Sablan; Conrad Muna Sablan v. Maria Verna Liza Sablan

• Court: District Court, Northern Mariana Islands
• Decided: June 9, 2026
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00013
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

PFILCW Clerk District Court 1 JUN 09 2026

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 0" the Northern Marianajlslands FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS ®Y. (Deputy Clerk) 3 MARIA VERNA LIZA SABLAN, Case No. 1:22-cv-00013 4 Plaintiff, 5 Vv. DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 6 || CONRAD MUNA SABLAN, FOR RECONSIDERATION Defendant. © || CONRAD MUNA SABLAN, 9 Counterclaimant,

11 |} MARIA VERNA LIZA SABLAN, 12 Counter-defendant. 13 Before the Court is Defendant and Counterclaimant Conrad Mufia Sablan’s (“Conrad”

15 motion for reconsideration of the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law (“FFCL”), whic

16 ||judgment was entered based upon. (Mot., ECF No. 104.) Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Mari 17 || Verna Liza Sablan (“Maria”) filed her opposition (Opp’n, ECF No. 105), to which Conrad replie 18 || (Reply, ECF No. 107). The motion was considered without oral argument. (ECF No. 109.) For th 13 |! following reasons, the Court DENIES Conrad’s motion. 20 I. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] motion to alter o 22 amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” “[A] Rul 23 59(e) motion is an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality an 24 conservation of judicial resources.”” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotin 25

Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “A district court has 1 considerable discretion when considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Turner 2 v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations 3 omitted). 4 There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the 5 motion is “necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the 6 judgment is based;” 2) the moving party presents “newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;” 3) the motion is necessary to “prevent manifest injustice;” 7 or 4) there is an “intervening change in controlling law.”

8 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Conrad initially moved for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (Mot. 2), but now 11 agrees with Maria that Rule 59(e) provides the governing standard, as judgment has already been 12 entered on February 25, 2026 (Reply 1–2). The Court agrees, and finds that Conrad has not met 13 that standard. Conrad does not contend there is any newly discovered evidence or change in 14 controlling law. Instead, he moves for reconsideration on the basis that it is necessary to correct 15 manifest errors of law and facts, and to prevent manifest injustice. (See Reply 2.) The Court’s 16 FFCL details its reasoning for finding the restitution amount due to Maria, in addition to the 17 18 appropriate statute of limitations for Conrad’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment. (See FFCL 7– 19 14, 20–21, ECF No. 102.) As Conrad himself recognizes, he has already presented—whether at 20 trial or in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law—many of the arguments he now 21 relies upon in support for reconsideration. (See Mot. 5–6; Reply 4.) As to any arguments that 22 Conrad has not previously presented explicitly, the Court does not see any reason why the 23 arguments could not have been raised prior to the entry of judgment; thus, relying on them for 24 reconsideration at this stage is inappropriate. See Milano v. Carter, 599 Fed. App’x 767, 768 (9th 25 Cir. 2015) (A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments 1 or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”) (quoting Exxon 2 Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)). Lastly, even if the Court were to consider 3 Conrad’s arguments in support of reconsideration, it does not find any manifest errors of law or 4 fact, or manifest injustice that would warrant granting the motion. 5 6 The Court briefly addresses Conrad’s new argument on reconsideration that his 7 counterclaim for unjust enrichment for Maria’s failure to pay her share of the marital debt is a 8 “‘compulsory counterclaim’ required to be filed in this case pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1).1” 9 (See Mot. 8.) Even assuming that Conrad’s counterclaim meets the legal requirements for being a 10 compulsory counterclaim, the Court agrees with Maria and finds that Conrad’s counterclaim would 11 still be barred by the applicable statute of limitations—the catch-all six year statute of limitations 12 outlined at 7 CMC § 2505. (See Opp’n 8.) “[A] compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing 13 of the original complaint . . . .” Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 82 F.3d 423, 1996 WL 171443, at *8 14 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 15 1985)). The original complaint in this matter was filed in 2022, more than six years after Conrad’s 16 claims accrued, which was no later than 2015. (See FFCL 20.) Thus, even if the Court were to 17 18 extend every benefit of the doubt to Conrad by assuming his counterclaim is a compulsory 19 counterclaim, it would still be time-barred. 20 / / 21 22 1 Conrad cites to Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands law regarding compulsory counterclaims, 23 but a federal court sitting in diversity applies state substantive law and federal procedural law. See In re County of Orange, 784 F. 3d 520, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 24 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). “Rules regarding compulsory counterclaims are procedural, and the federal rules therefore apply.” De Salles v. Cook, No. CV161111DMGPJWX, 2016 WL 9113995, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 25 May 12, 2016) (internal citations omitted). Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs compulsory counterclaims. . HI. CONCLUSION

5 For the foregoing reasons, Conrad has failed to meet his burden of showing that th

3 ||extraordinary remedy of reconsideration is appropriate in this matter, and therefore th

4 DENIES his motion. Because there are no pending claims against any parties in this action, 5 || the Clerk is directed to close this case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of June, 2026. 7 vw

9 Chief Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25