Maria Rodriguez Robles v. U.S. Attorney General

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: September 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-10065
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 1 of 12

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-12225 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

MARIA VIRGINIA RODRIGUEZ ROBLES, Petitioner, versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A216-453-425 ____________________ ____________________ No. 24-10065 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

MARIA VIRGINIA RODRIGUEZ ROBLES, Petitioner, USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 2 of 12

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versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A216-453-425 ____________________

Before BRANCH, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: In this consolidated case, Maria Virginia Rodriguez Robles challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’s order affirming the denial of her cancellation of removal application 1 and its order denying her motion to reopen the removal proceedings.2 We af- firm. I. Rodriguez Robles entered the United States without inspec- tion in June of 2002, and the Department of Homeland Security filed a Notice to Appear against her with the immigration court in July of 2018. It charged her with removability as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rodriguez Robles appeared before an

1 Case No. 23-12225.

2 Case No. 24-10065. USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 3 of 12

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immigration judge (“IJ”) and conceded that she was removable as charged. The IJ directed Mexico as the country of removal based on the Department’s recommendation after Rodriguez Robles failed to designate a removal country. In 2019, Rodriguez Robles filed an application for cancella- tion of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), arguing that her re- moval would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her U.S.-citizen children. The merits hearing for the application primarily focused on her 16-year-old daughter, Amy. Amy was diagnosed with an adjust- ment disorder, depression, and anxiety following two separate in- cidents when she was 12 years old. In the first, her then-18-year-old cousin “touch[ed] her incorrectly.” In the second, she was sus- pended from school for a week and bullied by her peers after send- ing “inappropriate” photos of herself to her “boyfriend,” an older student at school, when he pressured her to do so. Amy was “very self-conscious” as a result, but she attended therapy twice a week for approximately “four to six months” and became involved in her church, which helped her heal. Amy attended one more therapy session three years later, but she is not engaged in ongoing treat- ment and has no long-term mental health care plan. She faces no criminal charges for the incident at school. In the hearing, Rodriguez Robles further testified that her husband worked but that she did not and that she had good rela- tionships with all her children. She maintained that she would take the children with her if she were removed to Mexico because, USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 4 of 12

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though her husband could financially support them, he would be unable to take care of them due to his work schedule. In Mexico, Rodriguez Robles and her children would live in a small town with her family, which, based on information from her family, Rodri- guez Robles believed did not have access to schools or hospitals that provided the types of services Amy would need. She testified that her two older children spoke “a little bit” of Spanish and that the two youngest did not but that the children could become pro- ficient if they practiced the language. None of her children have medical conditions or diseases, and, though Amy has depression, she is not taking any medications. The IJ denied the application for cancellation of removal be- cause Rodriguez Robles did not meet the exceptional and ex- tremely unusual hardship standard. The IJ explained that the chil- dren would not experience a familial separation because Rodriguez Robles would take them with her to Mexico, and they would be able to adjust to life there as they had been there before, under- stood some Spanish, and were young enough that they could be- come proficient in the language “rather quickly.” They would also have Rodriguez Robles’s family there for support. The IJ went on to state that, though the children may have better educational op- portunities in the United States, that is “not in and of itself a factor that shows an exceptional or extremely unusual hardship.” The children were also healthy, with no “medical impediments that re- quire any type of medical care in the United States,” and, though Amy has dealt with a lot, she was not engaged in ongoing mental health treatment or taking any medications, and she appeared to USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 5 of 12

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“have been coping with her own mental health.” The IJ further stated that though Rodriguez Robles and her children may face a lower standard of living in Mexico, that is not, by itself, an excep- tional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ ultimately con- cluded that Rodriguez Robles had failed to establish “that her qual- ifying relatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily normally be ex- pected” with a deportation and, thus, denied her application. Rodriguez Robles appealed the decision to the Board and filed a motion to remand the case for further proceedings. She ar- gued that the IJ failed to take “all her circumstances into consider- ation” before denying her application; she recounted her previous testimony and added that her family in Mexico was living in pov- erty, so they would not be able to help her, and that her son had “developed lots of problems,” including a learning disability, and was recommended for additional cognitive and psychological test- ing. The Board, in a single-judge decision, dismissed her appeal, stating that the IJ had “considered and discussed the relevant fac- tors and applied controlling legal authority” and that his decision was correct. The Board also denied her motion to remand for fur- ther proceedings, because the records about her son’s problems were available during the previous hearing, so they should have been brought up then, and because they did not support the ail- ments that she alleged. Rodriguez Robles appeals to this Court. 3

3 This appeal created Case No. 23-12225. USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 6 of 12

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Rodriguez Robles later filed another motion with the Board to reopen the proceedings, this time for the IJ to consider two new mental health assessments, one of Amy and one of herself. She ar- gued that Amy’s assessment showed that Amy’s mental health would suffer if Rodriguez Robles were removed to Mexico and, thus, showed an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship “by the plain meaning of the words.” The Board denied the motion, explaining that the new assessments were unlikely to change the outcome of the proceedings, because (1) they did not demonstrate that Amy would be unable to obtain mental health care in Mexico and (2) the evidence, in the aggregate, was still unlikely to establish an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Rodriguez Robles appeals that decision to this Court as well. 4 II. A. Rodriguez Robles first argues that the Board erred in finding that she did not demonstrate that her U.S.-citizen children would experience an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. This Court reviews the decisions of the Board only, not the decisions of the IJ, except to the extent that the Board expressly adopts the IJ’s decisions. Flores-Panameno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019). A person deemed removable can have her removal cancelled if, among other things, the removal would cause an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the

4 This appeal created Case No. 24-10065. USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 7 of 12

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person’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a U.S. citizen or perma- nent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The application of the ex- ceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to found facts is an irreducibly mixed question, which this Court recently held to be “primarily factual.” Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23- 10105, 2025 WL 2234162, at *19 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025). Thus, “we review for substantial evidence the question whether the found facts in the administrative record . . . add up to an ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ within the meaning of § 1229b(b)(1)(D).’” 5 Id. at *8. In other words, the Board and IJ’s de- termination of whether there is an exceptional and extremely unu- sual hardship is “conclusive” as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at *11. Though, the facts informing the determination “remain unreviewable.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225, 144 S. Ct. 780, 792 (2024). An exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is one that is “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would nor- mally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close fam- ily members.” Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001). It is a “very high standard,” Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 322 (BIA 2002), that is limited to “truly excep- tional” and “very uncommon” scenarios. Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. &

5 Rodriguez Robles, in a brief submitted before the decision in Lopez-Martinez,

argues that the application of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is “a quintessential question of law.” In light of our Court’s decision in Lopez-Martinez, the question is a factual one, and we apply the substantial evidence standard. 2025 WL 2234162, at *19. USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 8 of 12

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N. Dec. at 59. In evaluating the hardship, the Board and IJ consider various factors in the aggregate, including the age; health; and cir- cumstances, such as medical and educational needs, of the qualify- ing relatives. Id. And while a “lower standard of living or adverse country conditions” in the return country are relevant factors, they “generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. at 63–64. Here, there is substantial evidence to support that Rodri- guez Robles did not demonstrate that her children would experi- ence an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ care- fully weighed the factors and found that (1) there would be limited familial separation because the children would accompany Rodri- guez Robles to Mexico; (2) Rodriguez Robles has family in Mexico to help the children adjust to life there; (3) her children were young enough to become proficient in Spanish quickly; (4) the children were healthy and had no medical issues requiring ongoing care in the United States; (5) reduced educational opportunities do not, on their own, establish hardship; and (6) even if the children face ad- verse economic impact, that is also not enough to show hardship. The Board reviewed the IJ’s decision and agreed with it. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the decision that Rodriguez Robles did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hard- ship standard. B. Rodriguez Robles next argues that the Board and the IJ in- correctly applied the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 9 of 12

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standard by “adding to the statute the requirement that there must not exist adequate [health care] alternatives (or any alternatives) in the home country.” This argument is a question of law that we re- view de novo. Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]hether the Board applied the correct legal standard is a question of law.”). The exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard “is based on a cumulative consideration of all hardship factors.” Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 811 (B.I.A. 2020). However, a “two-part test” applies when the hardship is based on the qualifying relative’s health: “[T]o the extent that a claim is based on the health of a qualifying relative, an applicant needs to establish [1] that the relative has a serious medical condition and, [2] if he or she is ac- companying the applicant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.” Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-10105, 2025 WL 2234162, at *19 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811). In other words, it is proper to evaluate the availa- bility of care in the return country; it is the second part of the two- part test. Rodriguez Robles’s argument conflicts with precedent and, thus, fails. Further, to the extent that Rodriguez Robles’s argument challenges our precedent as adding an incorrect step, it also fails. The Board first stated this two-part test when it explained that it engages in a “cumulative consideration of all hardship factors” USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 10 of 12

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when evaluating the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard. J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811. Thus, the test is not an ad- ditional requirement to be met before the factors are weighed; it simply tells the IJ and Board how to weigh them. And the Board used the test for that purpose here. It discussed all the evidence in the record, not just the availability of care in Mexico, when it de- termined, “considering the factors presented cumulatively,” that Rodriguez Robles did not establish an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. C. Finally, Rodriguez Robles argues that the Board abused its discretion when it denied her later motion to reopen removal pro- ceedings. She maintains that the Board should have reopened the proceedings because she provided additional psychological records and that when it didn’t—in part because the records did not demonstrate that Amy could not receive mental health services in Mexico—the Board, again, applied the wrong legal standard. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen re- moval proceedings for an abuse of discretion. I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107, 108 S. Ct. 904, 913 (1988). The Board abuses its discre- tion when it exercises its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). This standard is highly deferential, particularly in the immigration context. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110 (explaining that the deference ac- corded to “agency decisions on petitions for reopening or reconsid- eration in other administrative contexts appl[ies] with even greater USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 11 of 12

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force in the [immigration] context” to avoid “endless delay” of re- moval). However, “[t]o the extent that the [Board’s] decisions were based on a legal determination, [this Court’s] review is de novo.” Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). Fur- ther, a party seeking to reopen proceedings has “a heavy burden” of showing that “if proceedings before the [IJ] were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.” Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rodriguez Robles’s claim that the Board incorrectly added a requirement to the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is duplicative of her argument discussed in Part II.B and is rejected for the same reasons. Her argument that the Board otherwise abused its discretion by denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings is also re- jected. The Board considered the two mental health evaluations and determined that they were unlikely to change the outcome of her case because (1) they did not demonstrate that Amy would be unable to obtain medical care in Mexico and (2) the record evi- dence still would be unlikely to establish an exceptional and ex- tremely unusual hardship. Of course, it is possible that other infer- ences could have been made, but “we can’t reweigh the evidence from scratch.” Lopez-Martinez, 2025 WL 2234162, at *22 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is “no obvious disconnect be- tween the Board’s conclusions and the contents of the USCA11 Case: 23-12225 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/23/2025 Page: 12 of 12

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administrative record,” Id., so the Board’s determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the Board did not abuse its discre- tion. III. For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decisions are af- firmed. AFFIRMED.