FILED APRIL 23, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
MARIA MARTINEZ and ) No. 41156-7-III ISRAEL ZARAGOZA, ) ) Appellants, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION v. ) ) BRET D. MOORE, ) ) Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Maria Martinez and Israel Zaragoza appeal the trial
court’s order denying them an award of attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3 and CR 11.
They contend the trial court erred. We agree, and reverse and remand for the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of Martinez and Zaragoza to include their reasonable attorney
fees, including those incurred in their motion for reconsideration. We deny their request
for an award of attorney fees on appeal. No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
FACTS
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Maria Martinez and Israel
Zaragoza,1 concluding that Bret Moore was liable for shooting the couple’s dog. An
arbitrator then determined Martinez’s damages. Moore filed a request for trial de novo of
the arbitrator’s award. The request bore only his trial attorney’s signature.2
Martinez moved to strike Moore’s request for trial de novo because the request
omitted Moore’s signature, as required by SCCAR 7.1(b). She also moved for entry of
judgment of the arbitrator’s award and requested reasonable attorney fees pursuant to
SCCAR 7.3.
Moore responded to the motion to strike, citing MAR 7.1 (2019), a superseded
version of SCCAR 7.1. He argued that MAR 7.1 did not require the party’s signature.
He requested that Martinez be sanctioned under CR 11 and prohibited from filing
“repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous motions and pleadings in the future.” Clerk’s Papers
(CP) at 50.
Martinez replied that same day, noting that MAR 7.1 had been superseded by
SCCAR 7.1, and the new rule added the requirement that the party requesting a trial de
1 We subsequently refer to the couple as “Martinez” and “her.” 2 Moore’s appellate counsel is not his trial attorney.
2 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
novo must sign. Martinez also requested CR 11 sanctions for, among other reasons,
Moore’s lack of legal or factual bases for his arguments.
Moore responded to Martinez’s request for CR 11 sanctions, accusing her of
continuing her “harangue and bellicose threats in order to avoid a trial to which the
Defendant is entitled.” CP at 54. He argued that both MAR 7.1 and SCCAR 7.1 required
requests for trial de novo to be filed “substantially” in the prescribed form. CP at 54.
Citing authorities, he argued that due process is satisfied by notice reasonably calculated
to inform opposing parties of the action and allow them to object, and that court rules
should be interpreted to promote form over substance. Moore renewed his request for
CR 11 sanctions against Martinez.
After a hearing, the trial court struck Moore’s trial de novo request for
noncompliance with SCCAR 7.1’s signature requirement. However, it denied Martinez’s
request for attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3 and CR 11.
Martinez moved the trial court to reconsider its denial of sanctions and attorney
fees. With respect to CR 11, she cited several pleadings in the trial court file that
seemingly showed opposing counsel’s repeated failures to comply with civil rules and
court orders. She also argued that the trial court should award sanctions under its
equitable power. The court denied Martinez’s motion for reconsideration.
3 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
Martinez appeals to this court.
ANALYSIS
A. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER SCCAR 7.3
Martinez, citing Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway, 2 Wn.3d 528, 540
P.3d 82 (2023), argues the trial court erred when it refused to award her attorney fees
under SCCAR 7.3. Moore now concedes the trial court erred and agrees that we should
remand for the trial court to award Martinez reasonable attorney fees under that rule.
We accept his concession and remand for the trial court to award Martinez her reasonable
attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3.
B. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER CR 11
Martinez next argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
request for CR 11 sanctions. We agree.
We review a trial court’s decisions on CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.3
Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711, 724, 532 P.3d 601
3 Martinez assigned error to the trial court’s failure to award sanctions under both CR 11 and its inherent equitable powers. However, Martinez failed to adequately develop the latter argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6). We decline to consider assignments of error that are not meaningfully argued. Kinderace LLC v. City of Sammamish, 194 Wn. App. 835, 837 n.1, 379 P.3d 135 (2016). We therefore only address sanctions under CR 11.
4 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
(2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its conclusion is manifestly unreasonable
or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Gordon v. Robinhood Fin., LLC, 31 Wn. App.
2d 185, 207, 547 P.3d 945 (2024).
CR 11 sanctions are appropriate when a litigant’s argument is made “‘for an
improper purpose, or if the claim is not grounded in fact or law and the signing litigant
failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.’” Kilduff v. San Juan County, 194 Wn.2d 859,
877, 453 P.3d 719 (2019) (quoting In re Recall of Piper, 184 Wn.2d 780, 787, 364 P.3d
113 (2015)). Good faith arguments for the modification or reversal of existing law are
not “baseless” claims and are therefore not the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions.
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). We apply an
objective standard to determine if sanctions are warranted, asking whether a reasonable
attorney in similar circumstances could believe their actions to be factually and legally
justified. Id. at 220.
As an initial matter, Moore argues that Martinez failed to provide the required
informal notice before seeking CR 11 sanctions, thus precluding her request for CR 11
fees. We disagree, largely for the reason argued by Martinez: Martinez notified Moore of
her request for CR 11 sanctions in a pleading filed the same day Moore filed the
purportedly spurious pleading, yet this notice did not deter Moore.
5 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
In her motion, Martinez cited Crossroads, a recent 9-0 Washington Supreme
Court decision making clear that the failure of an aggrieved party to sign the request for
trial de novo is fatal. 2 Wn.3d at 538-42. The arguments raised by Moore in opposition
to Martinez’s motion to dismiss his request for trial de novo conflicted with the holding
in Crossroads. Moore’s arguments were more than spirited zealous advocacy for the
modification of law; they were hopeless arguments contrary to our State’s highest court.
His arguments were baseless, and the trial court abused its discretion in not granting
Martinez’s request for CR 11 sanctions.4
C. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
In her opening brief, Martinez requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
RAP 18.1, SCCAR 7.3, and RAP 18.9.5 Moore responded that attorney fees on appeal
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FILED APRIL 23, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
MARIA MARTINEZ and ) No. 41156-7-III ISRAEL ZARAGOZA, ) ) Appellants, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION v. ) ) BRET D. MOORE, ) ) Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Maria Martinez and Israel Zaragoza appeal the trial
court’s order denying them an award of attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3 and CR 11.
They contend the trial court erred. We agree, and reverse and remand for the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of Martinez and Zaragoza to include their reasonable attorney
fees, including those incurred in their motion for reconsideration. We deny their request
for an award of attorney fees on appeal. No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
FACTS
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Maria Martinez and Israel
Zaragoza,1 concluding that Bret Moore was liable for shooting the couple’s dog. An
arbitrator then determined Martinez’s damages. Moore filed a request for trial de novo of
the arbitrator’s award. The request bore only his trial attorney’s signature.2
Martinez moved to strike Moore’s request for trial de novo because the request
omitted Moore’s signature, as required by SCCAR 7.1(b). She also moved for entry of
judgment of the arbitrator’s award and requested reasonable attorney fees pursuant to
SCCAR 7.3.
Moore responded to the motion to strike, citing MAR 7.1 (2019), a superseded
version of SCCAR 7.1. He argued that MAR 7.1 did not require the party’s signature.
He requested that Martinez be sanctioned under CR 11 and prohibited from filing
“repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous motions and pleadings in the future.” Clerk’s Papers
(CP) at 50.
Martinez replied that same day, noting that MAR 7.1 had been superseded by
SCCAR 7.1, and the new rule added the requirement that the party requesting a trial de
1 We subsequently refer to the couple as “Martinez” and “her.” 2 Moore’s appellate counsel is not his trial attorney.
2 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
novo must sign. Martinez also requested CR 11 sanctions for, among other reasons,
Moore’s lack of legal or factual bases for his arguments.
Moore responded to Martinez’s request for CR 11 sanctions, accusing her of
continuing her “harangue and bellicose threats in order to avoid a trial to which the
Defendant is entitled.” CP at 54. He argued that both MAR 7.1 and SCCAR 7.1 required
requests for trial de novo to be filed “substantially” in the prescribed form. CP at 54.
Citing authorities, he argued that due process is satisfied by notice reasonably calculated
to inform opposing parties of the action and allow them to object, and that court rules
should be interpreted to promote form over substance. Moore renewed his request for
CR 11 sanctions against Martinez.
After a hearing, the trial court struck Moore’s trial de novo request for
noncompliance with SCCAR 7.1’s signature requirement. However, it denied Martinez’s
request for attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3 and CR 11.
Martinez moved the trial court to reconsider its denial of sanctions and attorney
fees. With respect to CR 11, she cited several pleadings in the trial court file that
seemingly showed opposing counsel’s repeated failures to comply with civil rules and
court orders. She also argued that the trial court should award sanctions under its
equitable power. The court denied Martinez’s motion for reconsideration.
3 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
Martinez appeals to this court.
ANALYSIS
A. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER SCCAR 7.3
Martinez, citing Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway, 2 Wn.3d 528, 540
P.3d 82 (2023), argues the trial court erred when it refused to award her attorney fees
under SCCAR 7.3. Moore now concedes the trial court erred and agrees that we should
remand for the trial court to award Martinez reasonable attorney fees under that rule.
We accept his concession and remand for the trial court to award Martinez her reasonable
attorney fees under SCCAR 7.3.
B. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER CR 11
Martinez next argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
request for CR 11 sanctions. We agree.
We review a trial court’s decisions on CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.3
Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711, 724, 532 P.3d 601
3 Martinez assigned error to the trial court’s failure to award sanctions under both CR 11 and its inherent equitable powers. However, Martinez failed to adequately develop the latter argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6). We decline to consider assignments of error that are not meaningfully argued. Kinderace LLC v. City of Sammamish, 194 Wn. App. 835, 837 n.1, 379 P.3d 135 (2016). We therefore only address sanctions under CR 11.
4 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
(2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its conclusion is manifestly unreasonable
or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Gordon v. Robinhood Fin., LLC, 31 Wn. App.
2d 185, 207, 547 P.3d 945 (2024).
CR 11 sanctions are appropriate when a litigant’s argument is made “‘for an
improper purpose, or if the claim is not grounded in fact or law and the signing litigant
failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.’” Kilduff v. San Juan County, 194 Wn.2d 859,
877, 453 P.3d 719 (2019) (quoting In re Recall of Piper, 184 Wn.2d 780, 787, 364 P.3d
113 (2015)). Good faith arguments for the modification or reversal of existing law are
not “baseless” claims and are therefore not the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions.
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). We apply an
objective standard to determine if sanctions are warranted, asking whether a reasonable
attorney in similar circumstances could believe their actions to be factually and legally
justified. Id. at 220.
As an initial matter, Moore argues that Martinez failed to provide the required
informal notice before seeking CR 11 sanctions, thus precluding her request for CR 11
fees. We disagree, largely for the reason argued by Martinez: Martinez notified Moore of
her request for CR 11 sanctions in a pleading filed the same day Moore filed the
purportedly spurious pleading, yet this notice did not deter Moore.
5 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
In her motion, Martinez cited Crossroads, a recent 9-0 Washington Supreme
Court decision making clear that the failure of an aggrieved party to sign the request for
trial de novo is fatal. 2 Wn.3d at 538-42. The arguments raised by Moore in opposition
to Martinez’s motion to dismiss his request for trial de novo conflicted with the holding
in Crossroads. Moore’s arguments were more than spirited zealous advocacy for the
modification of law; they were hopeless arguments contrary to our State’s highest court.
His arguments were baseless, and the trial court abused its discretion in not granting
Martinez’s request for CR 11 sanctions.4
C. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
In her opening brief, Martinez requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
RAP 18.1, SCCAR 7.3, and RAP 18.9.5 Moore responded that attorney fees on appeal
are not authorized by SCCAR 7.3 because he no longer is appealing the arbitrator’s
award. In her reply, Martinez limits her request for fees on appeal to RAP 18.1(a).
4 Moore argues that CR 11 sanctions are discretionary, so the denial of sanctions can never be an abuse of discretion. We disagree. As noted above, we review the denial of CR 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. There is no clearer case for the imposition of CR 11 sanctions than “advocacy” to overturn a recent 9-0 decision from our State’s highest court. 5 Martinez’s request for attorney fees under RAP 18.9 was conditional, in the event that Moore filed a frivolous response brief.
6 No. 41156-7-III Martinez v. Moore
RAP 18.1(a) is not a standalone provision that authorizes an award of attorney fees
on appeal. Carter v. C&K Contracting Inc., 35 Wn. App. 2d 41, 54, 573 P.3d 914
(2025). Rather, it permits an award of attorney fees on appeal if an award is authorized
by applicable law and the party complies with the provisions of RAP 18.1.6
Reversed and remanded.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________ Staab, C.J. Murphy, J.
6 We view Martinez’s reply brief as tacitly conceding that attorney fees on appeal are not available under SCCAR 7.3 (because Moore is not appealing the arbitrator’s award) or RAP 18.9 (because Moore did not file a frivolous response brief). Even had Martinez not conceded these arguments, we would have denied her request for attorney fees on appeal under those two provisions.