MARIA ISABEL SAAD v. CHARBEL ABUD

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: April 19, 2023
• Docket: 21-0594
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April 19, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0594 Lower Tribunal No. 09-41811 ________________

Maria Isabel Saad, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Charbel Abud, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica Diaz, Judge.

Law Office of Alexis Gonzalez, P.A., and Alejandro F. Hoyos, and Alberto H. Orizondo, for appellants.

Shahady & Wurtenberger, P.A., and John J. Shahady (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, C.J. Maria Isabel Saad and Alexis Gonzalez, Saad’s trial counsel, appeal

the trial court’s orders pertaining to the final judgment on the motion for

sanctions entered against them and the denial of the motion to disqualify.

Because the trial court failed to include the factual findings necessary to

support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably intertwined

that allocation of time spent on establishing an enforceable contract was not

possible, we reverse and remand the sanctions judgment with instructions.

We affirm as to all other issues.

In the context of a breach of contract action, Charbel Abud filed a

motion for sanctions pursuant to section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes (2012),

seeking fees to be paid by the appellants for the unnecessary time spent

preparing and litigating the appellants’ affirmative defense that asserted that

the contract at issue was unenforceable. The trial court, which had previously

held that the contract was enforceable, determined that appellants knew or

should have known that the affirmative defense was not supported by the

material facts or was not supported by the application of then existing law to

those material facts. As a result, the trial court granted the motion for

sanctions.

After an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of fees, the trial

court entered the final judgment on the motion for sanctions. In the order, the

2 trial court named Abud’s attorneys who testified “that establishing an

enforceable contract, being the central issue in this case, was so inextricably

intertwined with the other issues that allocation of the fees expended solely

in establishing an enforceable contract is not possible, practical or feasible.”

The trial court also named Abud’s fee expert who affirmed the same. The

court summarily concluded that “the record evidence presented during this

hearing, a review of the docket entries, and the testimony of [Abud’s

attorneys and expert]” satisfied the trial court that the issues were indeed

inextricably intertwined. The trial court cited to Lubkey v. Compuvac

Systems, Inc., 857 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), which states that it

is the burden of the party seeking attorneys’ fees to allocate the fees to the

issues or to show that the issues are so intertwined rendering allocation

unfeasible. Commenting on Saad’s fee expert’s testimony, the trial court

stated that the testimony was “not accurate nor feasible based on the

evidence presented.” The trial court then broke down the hourly rates for

each of Abud’s attorneys and the hours expended by each attorney. On this

basis, the trial court found the cumulative lodestar amount owed to Abud to

be $94,310.00.

3 Appellate courts are to review the issue of “whether the multiple claims

are separate or intertwined under the de novo standard of review.” Crown

Custom Homes, Inc. v. Sabatino, 18 So. 3d 738, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

We find that the trial court committed reversable error by failing to

include in the final judgment on the motion for sanctions specific factual

findings to support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably

intertwined that allocation of time spent solely on establish an enforceable

contract was not possible. See Id. at 741 (“Here the trial court made no

factual findings to support its legal conclusion that the counts were

so intertwined as to make individual allocation of fees unfeasible.

Additionally, the limited record before this court does not enable us to resolve

that issue despite the scope of our review.”); Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins.

Co., 228 So. 3d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 2017) (“The trial court must set forth

‘specific findings’ as to its determination of the number of hours, the hourly

rate, and any reduction or enhancement factors.”); Haines v. Sophia, 711

So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“It is an exceedingly painstaking and

time consuming task to sort through, as here, numerous time sheet entries

and assess their context and amounts. It is, however, a necessary evil that

trial judges make the effort.”).

4 For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand the final judgment on

the motion for sanctions with instructions for the trial court to make factual

findings to support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably

intertwined that allocation of time spent solely on establishing an enforceable

contract was not practical, feasible, or possible. We recognize that the judge

who issued the order has since recused herself from this case. To the extent

that the successor judge is unable to make the requisite findings based on a

review of the existing record, the trial judge is free to order a new evidentiary

hearing and come to his or her own legal conclusions based on the evidence

presented. We affirm as to all other issues.

Affirmed in part; Reversed and remanded in part with instructions.