Maria Elena Granados v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 28, 2024
• Docket: 13-23-00526-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-23-00526-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MARIA ELENA GRANADOS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

Appellant Maria Elena Granados was indicted for possession of a controlled

substance in an amount of twenty-eight grams or more but less than 200 grams, a third-

degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.117(c). Appellant entered into

a plea agreement, and the trial court placed appellant on deferred adjudication community

supervision for five years. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke community supervision, alleging that appellant violated the terms of her community

supervision. During a hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court found the State’s

allegations to be true, adjudicated appellant guilty of the offense, and sentenced her to

ten years’ imprisonment. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief

stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

2 in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant

of her right to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and

to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided

appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires

appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se

access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant did

not file a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

3 Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise her of her right to file a petition for

discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

DORI CONTRERAS Chief Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 28th day of August, 2024.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4. 4