In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-21-00019-CV ________________
MARIA CONCEPCION DELGADO, Appellant
V.
LUIS GOVEA LOPEZ, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Polk County, Texas Trial Cause No. CIV33210 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this pro se appeal from a Final Decree of Divorce, Maria Concepcion
Delgado claims she is a “sovereign citizen” and challenges the trial court’s
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Relevant Background
In October 2019, Luis Govea Lopez filed his Original Petition for divorce in
Polk County, Texas. Lopez alleged, among other things, that Delgado had been
domiciled in Texas for the previous six-month period and a resident of Polk County
1 for the preceding ninety-day period. Citation issued, and after several unsuccessful
attempts to serve Delgado, Lopez filed a Motion for Alternative Service supported
by a process server’s affidavit outlining her attempts to serve Delgado. The trial
court granted the Motion for Alternative Service, and the Return of Service shows
Delgado was successfully served in November 2019. Delgado subsequently filed
several documents with the trial court where she indicated she did “not consent to
these proceedings.” She also filed a “Demurrer Affidavit,” and “Affidavit of
Demand,” and “Notice Statement.”1
The Final Decree of Divorce noted that on November 25, 2020, the trial court
conducted a hearing and despite receiving notice, Delgado failed to appear. The trial
court orally rendered and granted the divorce the same day but did not sign the Final
Decree of Divorce until January 2021. The Final Decree includes the trial court’s
findings that at the time of filing of the suit, Delgado had been domiciled in Texas
for the preceding six months and a Polk County resident for the preceding ninety
days. The trial court further found that it had jurisdiction of the case and parties and
the matter had been on file at least sixty days since the suit was filed. On appeal,
Delgado filed a letter brief with documents attached as an appendix, which were not
a part of the clerk’s record, and she has not provided us with a reporter’s record.
1Delgado provided the same address for herself as the location of service in at least one of these documents. 2 Standard of Review
Delgado appeared pro se in the trial court and on appeal. We liberally construe
a pro se appellant’s brief. See Giddens v. Brooks, 92 S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). Nevertheless, pro se litigants must comply with the
rules of evidence and procedure, and we do not afford them special treatment
because they are acting pro se. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–
85 (Tex. 1978).
An appellate brief must state all issues presented for review clearly and
concisely and include appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i). “When the appellate issue is unsupported by argument or lacks
citation to the record or legal authority, nothing is presented for review.” Atkins-
January v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., No. 09–16–00439–CV, 2017 WL 3297977,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Valadez v.
Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2007, no pet.); Nguyen v. Kosnoski,
93 S.W.3d 186, 188 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). We have no
duty or right to independently review the record and applicable law to determine if
there was error; if we did, we would no longer be neutral adjudicators but instead
become an advocate for that party. See Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845. Therefore, an
appellant may forfeit error through her failure to brief adequately. Fredonia State
Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994) (stating “error
3 may be waived by inadequate briefing [ ]”); McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478,
484 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (noting “[b]are assertions of error,
without argument or authority, waive error.”); In re Lester, 254 S.W.3d 663, 668 n.3
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding).
Analysis
Delgado challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over her based on a sovereign
citizen status, and her answer in the trial court contained handwritten notes that she
did “not consent to these proceedings.” We examine the question of jurisdiction de
novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). The
Texas Government Code has given the County Court at Law of Polk county
concurrent civil jurisdiction with the district court in family law cases and
proceedings. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.1892(a)(2). The phrase
“family law cases and proceedings” in Chapter 25 of the Government Code
incorporates suits for divorce “‘including the adjustment of property rights’” and
“‘every other matter incident to divorce ... proceedings.’” Id. § 25.0002(2); see In re
Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
Delgado does not assert that this is not a divorce proceeding or that another court
has dominant jurisdiction. The County Court at Law of Polk County had jurisdiction
of this divorce proceeding. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 25.1892(a)(2), 25.0002(2).
4 Delgado’s brief also includes arguments claiming she is the “sole beneficiary
doing business as the name MARIA CONCEPCION DELGADO” which is “a non
corporate entity not registered with any Secretary of State.” Delgado further
contends the Polk County Court at Law is a foreign state and is misusing her name.
She argues that the trial court is “misusing the name of this American Citizen.”
Even assuming Delgado preserved a “sovereign citizen” argument, Delgado’s
alleged sovereign-citizen status does not exempt her from the jurisdiction of the
Texas courts, as this court has previously rejected that notion in a criminal case. See
Borne v. State, 593 S.W.3d 404, 409 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2020, no pet.) (noting
same in context of criminal case). Our sister state courts have likewise rejected
“sovereign citizen” arguments. See Barcroft v. Walton, No. 02-16-00110-CV, 2017
WL 3910911, at *5 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Barcroft v. Cty. of Fannin, 118 S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, pet. denied). We agree and reject Delgado’s “sovereign citizen” arguments as
somehow precluding the trial court’s jurisdiction.
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-21-00019-CV ________________
MARIA CONCEPCION DELGADO, Appellant
V.
LUIS GOVEA LOPEZ, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Polk County, Texas Trial Cause No. CIV33210 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this pro se appeal from a Final Decree of Divorce, Maria Concepcion
Delgado claims she is a “sovereign citizen” and challenges the trial court’s
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Relevant Background
In October 2019, Luis Govea Lopez filed his Original Petition for divorce in
Polk County, Texas. Lopez alleged, among other things, that Delgado had been
domiciled in Texas for the previous six-month period and a resident of Polk County
1 for the preceding ninety-day period. Citation issued, and after several unsuccessful
attempts to serve Delgado, Lopez filed a Motion for Alternative Service supported
by a process server’s affidavit outlining her attempts to serve Delgado. The trial
court granted the Motion for Alternative Service, and the Return of Service shows
Delgado was successfully served in November 2019. Delgado subsequently filed
several documents with the trial court where she indicated she did “not consent to
these proceedings.” She also filed a “Demurrer Affidavit,” and “Affidavit of
Demand,” and “Notice Statement.”1
The Final Decree of Divorce noted that on November 25, 2020, the trial court
conducted a hearing and despite receiving notice, Delgado failed to appear. The trial
court orally rendered and granted the divorce the same day but did not sign the Final
Decree of Divorce until January 2021. The Final Decree includes the trial court’s
findings that at the time of filing of the suit, Delgado had been domiciled in Texas
for the preceding six months and a Polk County resident for the preceding ninety
days. The trial court further found that it had jurisdiction of the case and parties and
the matter had been on file at least sixty days since the suit was filed. On appeal,
Delgado filed a letter brief with documents attached as an appendix, which were not
a part of the clerk’s record, and she has not provided us with a reporter’s record.
1Delgado provided the same address for herself as the location of service in at least one of these documents. 2 Standard of Review
Delgado appeared pro se in the trial court and on appeal. We liberally construe
a pro se appellant’s brief. See Giddens v. Brooks, 92 S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). Nevertheless, pro se litigants must comply with the
rules of evidence and procedure, and we do not afford them special treatment
because they are acting pro se. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–
85 (Tex. 1978).
An appellate brief must state all issues presented for review clearly and
concisely and include appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i). “When the appellate issue is unsupported by argument or lacks
citation to the record or legal authority, nothing is presented for review.” Atkins-
January v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., No. 09–16–00439–CV, 2017 WL 3297977,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Valadez v.
Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2007, no pet.); Nguyen v. Kosnoski,
93 S.W.3d 186, 188 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). We have no
duty or right to independently review the record and applicable law to determine if
there was error; if we did, we would no longer be neutral adjudicators but instead
become an advocate for that party. See Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845. Therefore, an
appellant may forfeit error through her failure to brief adequately. Fredonia State
Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994) (stating “error
3 may be waived by inadequate briefing [ ]”); McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478,
484 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (noting “[b]are assertions of error,
without argument or authority, waive error.”); In re Lester, 254 S.W.3d 663, 668 n.3
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding).
Analysis
Delgado challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over her based on a sovereign
citizen status, and her answer in the trial court contained handwritten notes that she
did “not consent to these proceedings.” We examine the question of jurisdiction de
novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). The
Texas Government Code has given the County Court at Law of Polk county
concurrent civil jurisdiction with the district court in family law cases and
proceedings. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.1892(a)(2). The phrase
“family law cases and proceedings” in Chapter 25 of the Government Code
incorporates suits for divorce “‘including the adjustment of property rights’” and
“‘every other matter incident to divorce ... proceedings.’” Id. § 25.0002(2); see In re
Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
Delgado does not assert that this is not a divorce proceeding or that another court
has dominant jurisdiction. The County Court at Law of Polk County had jurisdiction
of this divorce proceeding. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 25.1892(a)(2), 25.0002(2).
4 Delgado’s brief also includes arguments claiming she is the “sole beneficiary
doing business as the name MARIA CONCEPCION DELGADO” which is “a non
corporate entity not registered with any Secretary of State.” Delgado further
contends the Polk County Court at Law is a foreign state and is misusing her name.
She argues that the trial court is “misusing the name of this American Citizen.”
Even assuming Delgado preserved a “sovereign citizen” argument, Delgado’s
alleged sovereign-citizen status does not exempt her from the jurisdiction of the
Texas courts, as this court has previously rejected that notion in a criminal case. See
Borne v. State, 593 S.W.3d 404, 409 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2020, no pet.) (noting
same in context of criminal case). Our sister state courts have likewise rejected
“sovereign citizen” arguments. See Barcroft v. Walton, No. 02-16-00110-CV, 2017
WL 3910911, at *5 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Barcroft v. Cty. of Fannin, 118 S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, pet. denied). We agree and reject Delgado’s “sovereign citizen” arguments as
somehow precluding the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Texas law allows a suit for divorce if the petitioner or the respondent has been
“(1) a domiciliary of this state for the preceding six-month period; and (2) a resident
of the county in which the suit is filed for the preceding 90–day period.” Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 6.301. Section 6.301’s requirements are not jurisdictional, but rather
are mandatory and involve the right to maintain suit. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86
5 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Oak v. Oak, 814 S.W.2d 834,
837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The domicile and
residence requirements are fact issues the trial court determines, which will not be
disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d
43, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). A trial court may grant a divorce if
it has been on file for at least sixty days. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.702(a).
In his Original Petition, Lopez pleaded that Delgado was domiciled in Texas
for the preceding six months and a resident of Polk County for the preceding ninety
days. The trial court’s Divorce Decree incorporated findings that Delgado was a
domiciliary of Texas for the requisite six months, a resident of Polk County for
ninety days, and that the matter had been on file for at least sixty days. The trial
court’s findings of fact are conclusive in the absence of a reporter’s
record. See Campos v. Campos, 388 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no
pet.); In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet.
denied). Given the trial court’s findings and absence of a reporter’s record, we
conclude that Lopez satisfied section 6.301’s mandatory requirements, which
allowed him to maintain his divorce suit against Delgado. See Campos, 388 S.W.3d
at 758; In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 489; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.301.
We overrule Delgado’s first issue challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction and
Lopez’s right to maintain a divorce proceeding against her. To the extent she
6 attempts to raise other arguments in her brief, there are no citations to the record or
appropriate authority, and we are unable to ascertain other coherent issues.2 See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i). Accordingly, she has waived any other
issues. See WorldPeace v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 460
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding appellant’s failure to
offer argument, citations to record, or citations to authority in its brief waived issue
on appeal); see also Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284–85.
Conclusion
Having overruled Delgado’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice
Submitted on June 16, 2022 Opinion Delivered October 6, 2022
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
2The authorities Delgado cited had little or no applicability to the matter before us. 7