Maria Castillo-Correa v. William Barr, U. S. Atty

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: March 9, 2020
• Docket: 17-60380
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 17-60380 Document: 00515334852 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/06/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED March 6, 2020 No. 17-60380 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk

MARIA CASTILLO-CORREA,

Petitioner

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A089 716 631

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Maria Castillo-Correa petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) finding that she is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ’s finding was based on a determination that Castillo-Correa’s prior Texas convictions for theft were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The BIA dismissed Castillo-Correa’s appeal based on its decision in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 17-60380 Document: 00515334852 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/06/2020

No. 17-60380

I. & N. Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), which altered its prior definition of a theft offense and held that the Texas theft statute was a CIMT. Castillo-Correa also filed a timely petition for review from the BIA’s denial of her motions for reconsideration and a stay of removal. After the parties filed their briefs, we decided Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2019). In relevant part, we held that the BIA’s definition of a CIMT announced in Diaz-Lizarraga applies only to crimes committed after that decision issued. See id. at 431. Because her own theft convictions occurred many years prior to Diaz-Lizarraga, Castillo-Correa filed an unopposed motion to remand to the BIA for further consideration in light of Monteon-Camargo. We have previously recognized that remand may be appropriate when the BIA’s decision has become unsustainable in light of an intervening change in binding precedent. See Kane v. Holder, 581 F.3d 231, 242 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Arce–Vences v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 167, 172-73 (5th Cir. 2007) (remanding to the BIA for further consideration in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision). Accordingly, we GRANT the initial petition for review and REMAND this case to the BIA for further consideration. See Monteon-Camargo, 918 F.3d at 431. Castillo-Correa’s unopposed motion to remand is DENIED AS MOOT. Further, her petition for review from the denial of her motion for reconsideration and for a stay of removal also is DENIED AS MOOT.