Maria Ann Hudson v. State of Washington et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 21, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00404
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 MARIA ANN HUDSON, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00404-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., 14 Defendants. 15

17 This case arises from Plaintiff Maria Ann Hudson’s claims regarding the alleged sex 18 trafficking of her daughter, abuse of her daughter, and general enabling and cover up of abuse by 19 Defendants. See generally Dkt. No. 18 (Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”)). This matter is 20 before the Court on its own motion. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s TAC and the relevant record, 21 the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore 22 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. 23 // 24 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in 3 this action. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff’s application for IFP status was granted, but U.S. Magistrate 4 Judge Brian A. Tsuchida recommended that this Court review Plaintiff’s complaint under 28

5 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 5) was subsequently filed on 6 the docket, and on March 31, 2025, she filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6). 7 On June 3, 2025, following the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 8 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a 9 claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to 10 amend. Dkt. No. 9. The Court determined that while Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had 11 acted in CONCERT, CONSPIRACY AND FRAUDS and with malice with other government agencies to deprive BY THE ANTI- 12 LITERACY JIM CROW SCHOOL TO PRISON SEX TRAFFICKING PIPELINE AND THROUGH STATE AND 13 LOCAL LAWS EQUIVALENT TO EACH RESPECTIVE CORRESPONDING FEDERAL STATUTES, SERVICES AND 14 SUPPORTS INCLUDING EDUCATIONAL CASTE [sic] IN WASHINGTON STATE EDUCASTIONAL [sic] LAWS 15 16 (Dkt. No. 6 at 5), the allegations were not supported by factual details as to the alleged 17 conspiracy, or what Plaintiff asserted was the “Antiliteracy Jim Crow Sex Trafficking School to 18 Prison Pipeline.” Dkt. No. 9 at 3. 19 On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint(“SAC”). Dkt. No. 11. On 20 August 20, 2025, the Court dismissed the SAC with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 12. Like the 21 Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s SAC also lacked sufficient factual detail to plausibly state a 22 claim. See Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff included over 100 pages of exhibits to support her claims. Id. 23 The Court determined, however, that none of the exhibits to the SAC articulated factual content 24 that would allow the Court to draw reasonable inference that Defendants had in fact engaged in 1 the alleged misconduct. Plaintiff relied on her exhibits but failed to tie the contents of those 2 exhibits to the cause(s) of action. Dkt. No. 12 at 4. The Court informed Plaintiff that “[i]t is not 3 clear how the exhibits, which are mostly comprised of Plaintiff’s own conclusory accusations of 4 misconduct, support Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. The Court also explained that “the Court will not

5 pick through ‘the pleadings and documents on file herein’ to locate Plaintiff’s claims. Id. 6 (citation omitted). 7 Not only did the Court explain to Plaintiff why it dismissed the Second Amended 8 Complaint, but the Court also provided Plaintiff guidance on what the Court expected for the 9 TAC, as well as links to helpful material for pro se plaintiffs. The Court stated: 10 [T]he Court cautions Plaintiff that her Third Amended Complaint must conform to the minimum requirements of Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 8(a) and must be filed in accordance with Local Civil Rule 5.2(a). This means that Plaintiff’s Third Amended 12 Complaint must include a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the legal 13 basis for any of her claims, and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). All three of these requirements must be met. 14 The Court strongly urges Plaintiff to review the resources for pro se litigants available at 15 https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself-pro-se. The Court especially encourages Plaintiff to review the example 16 complaint template forms available at https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/court-forms#Pro%20Se. 17 18 Id. at 5. Plaintiff was thus provided clear instruction from the Court on what Plaintiff needed to 19 include in a TAC. 20 Additionally, the Court emphasized that it would allow Plaintiff “one final time” to 21 amend the complaint within 30 days of the Court’s order. Id. The Court noted that, should 22 Plaintiff fail to file a TAC by September 19, 2025, Plaintiff’s case would be dismissed. Id. On 23 September 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Late, requesting she be allowed to 24 file her TAC late. Dkt. No. 13. Plaintiff attached her TAC as an exhibit (Dkt. No. 13-1) to her 1 Motion for Leave to File Late. The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Late (Dkt. 2 No. 17), and now reviews the TAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 The Court’s authority to grant IFP status derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Per the statute,

5 the Court must dismiss a case if the IFP Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 6 granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th 7 Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 8 prisoners”). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 9 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as when ruling on dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 10 Procedure 12(b)(6).” Day v. Florida, 2014 WL 1412302, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2014) 11 (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129). Rule 12(b)(6) requires courts to assume the truth of factual 12 allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 13 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must provide sufficient factual details in the 14 complaint to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

15 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se (without an attorney), courts must 16 construe the complaint liberally. Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 17 2011) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, a court “should not 18 supply essential elements of the [pro se] claim that were not initially pled.” E.g., Henderson v. 19 Anderson, No. C19-789, 2019 WL 3996859, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2019) (internal citation 20 and quotation omitted); see also Khalid v. Microsoft Corp., 409 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1031 (W.D. 21 Wash. 2019) (“[C]ourts should not have to serve as advocates for pro se litigants.” (quoting Noll 22 v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))). 23 //

24 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Failure to State a Claim 3 Similar to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and SAC, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible 4 claim in her TAC. Plaintiff’s TAC lists a series of laws she believes have been violated, then

5 provides a single paragraph stating the facts that she believes support her claims. See Dkt. No. 18 6 at 2–3. The factual statement alleges: “retaliation for protected speech and advocacy”; 7 “intimidation through threat of force”; “unlawful searches, seizures, and forced evaluations”; 8 “cruel and unusual punishment through forced isolation and misdiagnosis”; and “involuntary 9 servitude and peonage via school-to-prison/trafficking pipeline,” among other claims. Id. at 2. 10 Even construing the complaint liberally due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, see Johnson, 653 F.3d at 11 1011, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 12 The factual statement simply provides conclusory statements without any actual factual details. 13 On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). 14 Dkt. No. 21. In support of her motion, Plaintiff filed a 94-page exhibit. Dkt. No. 22. Although a

15 complaint must stand on its own, the Court reviewed the exhibits out of an abundance of caution 16 given that Plaintiff is proceeding without an attorney. The exhibits include: a letter from 17 Bellevue Police Department that responds to, but does not provide any details of, a complaint 18 Plaintiff submitted (Dkt. No. 22 at 1); an Evergreen Health After Visit Summary showing 19 Plaintiff’s daughter went to the doctor for a head injury but does not provide detail as to how the 20 injury occurred (Dkt. No. 22 at 2–3); a request by Plaintiff for her daughter’s part-time 21 attendance in school, without details as to why the request was made (Dkt. No. 22 at 4–5); a 22 release of information to Northwest Justice Project (Dkt. No. 22 at 6); medical documents, 23 //

24 // 1 evaluations, and reports that outline Plaintiff’s daughter’s medical history (Dkt. No. 22 at 7–59); 2 and various school, court, and unrecognizable1 documents. 3 The exhibits do not help the Court determine what facts might support the misconduct 4 Plaintiff alleges in her TAC. For example, Plaintiff includes a psychological evaluation report

5 dated September 2, 2022 (Dkt. No. 22 at 17–46), and although it outlines a history of Plaintiff’s 6 daughter’s mental health, as well as home, school, and general life experiences, it does not 7 outline facts supporting that Defendants committed “retaliation for protected speech and 8 advocacy”; “intimidation through threat of force”; “unlawful searched, seizures, and forced 9 evaluations”; “cruel and unusual punishment through forced isolation and misdiagnosis”; or 10 “involuntary servitude and peonage via school-to-prison/trafficking pipeline.” 11 To state a plausible claim for relief in federal court, a Plaintiff must “plead[] factual 12 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 13 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, as the Court has twice 14 warned Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 9 at 3, Dkt. No. 12 at 4), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

15 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 16 678. In the TAC, Plaintiff only relies on recitals of the elements of causes of action supported by 17 nothing other than one paragraph of conclusory statements. Nor does Plaintiff tie any part of the 18 content of the exhibits she provided to the causes of action. As the Court also previously 19 explained to Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 12 at 4–5), the Court will not pick through “the pleadings and 20 documents on file herein” to locate Plaintiff’s claims. See Replenium Inc. v. Albertsons Cos., 21 Inc., No. C24-1281, 2025 WL 460057, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2025) (rejecting arguments 22 where “Defendant frequently gesture[d] at entire documents and ma[de] sweeping assertions 23

24 1 For example, Plaintiff attached photos and other documents that are too blurry to review. Dkt. No. 22 at 76–81. 1 about their content[]—without pincites [or] any meaningful explanation of how any particular 2 content[] map[ped] onto” the issues before the court). Judges are not “archaeologists searching 3 for treasure.” Krause v. Nev. Mut. Ins. Co., No. C12-342, 2014 WL 99178, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 3, 4 2014) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Osborne, No. 20-10404, 2022 WL 264555, at

5 *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2022) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” 6 (quoting Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994))). Critically, 7 “[j]udges need not paw over files without assistance from the parties.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 8 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 165 F.3d 1084, 1085 9 (7th Cir. 1999)). 10 The Court, therefore, FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983. For this reason, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint 12 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Courts will typically allow pro se plaintiffs to amend 13 their complaints in lieu of dismissal unless amendment would be futile because no set of facts 14 can cure the deficiencies. Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017). However, the

15 Court has allowed Plaintiff to amend her complaint twice now (See Dkt. Nos. 9, 12), with clear 16 direction as to how and why prior complaints failed to state a claim, direction to court rules 17 Plaintiff must follow when filing a complaint, and resources for pro se plaintiffs. 18 B. Motion to Appoint Counsel 19 Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. Dkt. No. 15. This request is moot, 20 because the Court will be dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. However, even if the request were not 21 moot, the Court would deny Plaintiff’s motion. While the Court recognizes the challenges faced 22 by pro se litigants in preparing a case without legal counsel and acknowledges Plaintiff’s 23 situation, “[g]enerally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560

24 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of appointment of counsel). 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may appoint counsel for indigent civil 2 || litigants under “exceptional circumstances.” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. Exceptional circumstances 3 || exist where (1) a pro se plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the 4 || complexity of the legal issues involved would impede the pro se litigant’s ability to present the 5 || case. Id.; see also Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Wilborn 6 || v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 7 Here, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual details in the TAC to state a claim that 8 plausible. Consequently, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff has established a likelihood 9 || of success on the merits. 10 |) C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Special Master Appointment 11 On October 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 12 || Special Master Appointment. Dkt. No. 21. That request is also moot, because the Court is 13 || dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 16 (1) Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 18) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 17 (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED AS MOOT. 18 (3) Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Special Master 19 Appointment (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED AS MOOT. 20 21 Dated this 21st day of October, 2025.

23 Tana Lin United States District Judge 24