Margulis v. Lindsay

286 N.E.2d 724, 31 N.Y.2d 167, 335 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1972 N.Y. LEXIS 1130
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 7, 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 286 N.E.2d 724 (Margulis v. Lindsay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Margulis v. Lindsay, 286 N.E.2d 724, 31 N.Y.2d 167, 335 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1972 N.Y. LEXIS 1130 (N.Y. 1972).

Opinions

Breitel, J.

The issue in this case turns on the breadth of meaning of the term “ project ” in the Public Housing Law. Appellants attribute to the term project ’’ a particular meaning which would require resubmission for approval to the New York City Board of Estimate of a project modified since the prior approval by the board. Respondents, on the other hand, would give the term a broader and, therefore, a vaguer rendering, thus making unnecessary a reapproval because of modifications. While the issue in litigation is phrased in technical terms and embraces the arts of statutory interpretation, the [171]*171issue beneath the issue is whether a public housing project planned for a community may be unshaken from its prior approval and defeated on another run-through the board, the community having become more articulately aroused and antagonistic to the project in the latter days.

The judicial process is not charged with the power or the responsibility of determining the desirability of the project or its location. That power and responsibility rests elsewhere. The judicial process is limited in the present context to the technical issue whether the project by being changed required a new approval. For the reasons to be discussed, it is concluded that the statutory terms are broad indeed, and if not broad, would be vague and absent in standards of interpretation, which would in any event preclude a court from requiring a submission for a new approval because of modifications in the project.

Special Term, New York County, granted plaintiffs a favorable declaratory judgment and an injunction in a taxpayers’ action to bar the public housing project planned for Forest Hills in Queens County. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed.

The project is a proposed public housing development, to be largely financed out of Federal funds, and to contain, in its various modifications, 828, 840, or 848 housing units. The earliest project was designed to contain one 22-story building, three of 12 stories, and three of 10 stories. The last intention is to erect three buildings, each of 24 stories. Much is also made of the proposed change from 248 to 341 units to be allotted to the aged.

There can be no abiding controversy about the number of units in the project requiring reapproval, or those allotted to the aged. The substantial controversy is over the shifting from a seven-building project to a three-building project, plaintiffs insisting that the change is so great as to make the project a different one from that originally approved.

Some underbrush should be removed. The impact of the project on the Forest Hills community is not the nupaber or size of the buildings. They were always tall buildings, and only a short time ago would have been regarded as gargantuan even in the smaller ” version. The case does not involve a substitution of high-rise buildings for a low-level o^ dispersed [172]*172development. However one views the project* plaintiffs have not shown how the different physical designs would have any impact on the community. In short, it has not been shown that its physical qualities threaten the esthetics, the safety, or the convenience of the community. Hence, the technical issue is a technical one even to those who raise it. The real issue, as suggested earlier, is 'the impact on the community of so, vast a public housing project, aggregating over 800 units to be occupied by low-income people, threatening to impair the middle class “life-style ” and security of the surrounding area; but that was always so, even when the “ smaller ” version was projected with its high-rise buildings. And, indeed, the increase in uses allotted to the aged in later design would decrease rather than increase the feared negative impact on the community. But this real issue is one that has been foreclosed by the prior approval by the Board of Estimate, and plaintiffs do not question that.

It is bootless to detail the events which led up to the controversy. It is enough that the early version, after considerable opposition, was approved as a plan and a project (the statute distinguishes between the two) by the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate. This was in 1966. By 19*70 the project was changed in a series of modifications. The number and height of the buildings were markedly changed; the prospective occupancy represented in the number of units was not.

Section 150 of the Public Housing Law is the statute requiring approval both of the plan and the project. Section 3 of the Public Housing Law defines a plan broadly as an undertaking for the clearance and replanning of an area. It defines a project as the specific work or improvement, including of course the buildings, to effectuate the plan. Qualifications there are in the definitions but no limits or standards to demark either the plan or the project.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
286 N.E.2d 724, 31 N.Y.2d 167, 335 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1972 N.Y. LEXIS 1130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/margulis-v-lindsay-ny-1972.